State v. Hagaman

• Docket Number: COA22-434
• Decision Date: 16 January 2024
• Parties: STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL JUSTIN HAGAMAN, Defendant.
• Court: North Carolina Court of Appeals

1

STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA v. MICHAEL JUSTIN HAGAMAN, Defendant.

No. COA22-434

Court of Appeals of North Carolina

January 16, 2024

Heard in the Court of Appeals 21 March 2023.

Appeal by defendant from order and judgment entered 10 November 2021 by Judge Gary M. Gavenus in Superior Court, Watauga County Nos. 18CRS50759-62, 18CRS50936.

Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Zachary K. Dunn, for the State.

Patterson Harkavy LLP, by Christopher A. Brook, for defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

Defendant-appellant appeals from an order and judgment entered pursuant to a guilty plea for one count of indecent liberties with a child. In the plea agreement, Defendant-appellant reserved his right to appeal from the trial court's ruling on his motion to suppress. Defendant-appellant argues on appeal the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. For the following reasons, we affirm.

I. Background

The State's evidence at the motion to suppress hearing tended to show that on or about 25 May and 30 May 2018, Detective J.B. Reid of the Boone Police Department was "conducting an undercover operation involving the distribution of child pornography on certain file sharing networks." Detective Reid found ten files containing explicit videos of child pornography uploaded to a file sharing network on the internet known as BitTorrent. Based upon the Internet Protocol ("IP") address that uploaded the videos, Detective Reid determined the files came from Defendant's residence. On or about 6 June 2018, Detective Reid applied for, received, and executed two search warrants permitting a search of (1) Defendant and his vehicle or vehicle(s) in his control, and (2) Defendant's residence. The warrants authorized law enforcement to, in part, search for:

6. Text files containing information pertaining to the interest in child pornography or sexual activity with children and/or pertaining to the production, trafficking in, or possession of child pornography.

7. Correspondence…. Pertaining to the trafficking in, production of, or possession of visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

8. Correspondence…. Soliciting minors to engage in sexually explicit conduct for the purposes of committing an unlawful sex act and/or producing child pornography.

10. Names and addresses of minors visually depicted while engaged in sexually explicit conduct.

12. Any book, . . ., or any other material that contains an image of child pornography.

13.Any and all documents and records pertaining to the purchase of any child pornography.

14.Notations of any password that may control access to a computer operating system or individual computer files. Evidence of payment for child pornography[.]^[1]

We first note we need not discuss the vehicle search. As Defendant states in his brief and confirmed by the record, "[h]e only filed a motion to suppress in file number 18-CRS-50936, in which he ultimately pled guilty to one count of indecent liberties. . . . Accordingly, [Defendant's] appeal and appellate brief focuses exclusively on file number 18-CRS-50936." The indecent liberties with a child charge stems from the search conducted in Defendant's residence. Accordingly, we direct our focus to that search.

In the search of Defendant's residence, State Bureau of Investigation Special Agent Chris Chambliss assisted in the execution of the search warrant and found four notebooks. Special Agent Chambliss was "[p]rimarily looking for passcodes, or keywords, or something that would potentially show something along those lines, something that would further the investigation" during his initial review of the notebooks. One of the notebooks included a reference to Defendant's commission of a hands-on sexual offense involving a minor. Thereafter, Detective Reid applied for two additional search warrants and identified the victim of the hands-on offense. Ultimately, Defendant was indicted for (1) ten counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and (2) two counts of first-degree sexual offense.

On or about 28 June 2019, Defendant filed a (1) motion to suppress "evidence seized in excess of the scope" of the initial search warrants and (2) motion to quash the third and fourth warrants and suppress "any evidence seized thereby[.]" On or about 4 March 2020, the trial court entered an order denying Defendant's motion to suppress and motion to quash. On or about 10 November 2021, Defendant entered a guilty plea on ten counts of second-degree sexual exploitation of a minor and one count of indecent liberties with a child reserving his right to appeal the order denying his motion to suppress and motion to quash.

II. Motion to Suppress

Defendant contends (1) "[m]any of the trial court's findings of fact are not actually factual findings or are not supported by competent evidence" and (2) "search of [his notebooks] went beyond the scope of the search warrants[,]" so the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress.

A. Standard of Review

As our Supreme Court has explained:

In evaluating the denial of a motion to suppress, the reviewing court must determine whether competent evidence supports the trial court's findings of fact and whether the findings of fact support the conclusions of law. The trial court's findings of fact on a motion to suppress are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting.

State v. Williams, 366 N.C. 110, 114, 726 S.E.2d 161, 165 (2012) (citations and quotation marks omitted). When "the trial court's findings of fact are not challenged on appeal, they are deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal." State v. Biber, 365 N.C. 162, 168, 712 S.E.2d 874, 878 (2011).

Appellate courts "accord[] great deference to the trial court" when reviewing findings of fact because the trial court "is entrusted with the duty to hear testimony, weigh [the evidence,] and resolve any conflicts in the evidence[.]" Williams, 366 N.C. at 114, 726 S.E.2d at 165 (citation and quotation marks omitted). Our deference to the trial court reflects that the trial court "sees the witnesses, observes their demeanor as they testify and by reason of his more favorable position, he is given the responsibility of discovering the truth. The appellate court is much less favored because it sees only a cold, written record." State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134-35, 291 S.E.2d 618, 620 (1982) (citation and quotation marks omitted). In contrast, "[c]onclusions of law are reviewed de novo and are subject to full review." Biber, 365 N.C. at 168, 712 S.E.2d at 878. "Under a de novo review, the court considers the matter anew and freely substitutes its own judgment for that of the lower tribunal." Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).

B. Challenged Findings of Fact

Defendant challenges many findings of fact and grouped his arguments into four categories based upon the nature of the challenge: (1) finding 17 "is not supported by competent evidence[;]" (2) findings 24-26 "are, in whole or in part, conclusions of law and/or are not supported by competent evidence[;]" (3) findings 20, 21, and 27 are not findings of fact but conclusions of law; and (4) findings 19 and 23 are "not factual findings" but are instead the trial court's interpretations of Defendant's argument or of caselaw. (Capitalization altered.) We review each category in turn.

1. Finding 17

Finding 17 states:

The court finds from the credible testimony that paper writings including notebooks often carry information regarding child pornography including passcodes or keywords, correspondence, communication with individuals involved in child pornography, documentation of episodes of child pornography and other information that will further the investigation into child pornography.

Defendant asserts finding 17 is "not supported by competent evidence" because it

overstates the evidence in two ways. First, Agents Chambliss and Anderson did not testify that law enforcement "often" found information regarding child pornography in notebooks. . . Second, neither testified that he had ever discovered handwritten records that included correspondence or communications with individuals involved in child pornography or documentation of episodes of child pornography.

We disagree.

Defendant engages in a hyper-technical, word-for-word interpretation of the testimonies. First, Defendant mentions only Special Agent Chambliss and Special Agent Nathan Anderson, but the trial court did not name these two specific agents in finding 17. Another witness, Detective Reid, testified paper writings in this type of investigation "commonly" include relevant items such as passcodes or passwords. "Commonly" is the adverbial version of the word "common" meaning "occurring or appearing frequently[.]" Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 250 (11th ed. 2003). Similarly, the word "often" means "many times" or "frequently[.]" Id. at 862 (capitalization altered). Thus, the word "commonly[,]" at least as used in this testimony, is a functional equivalent of the word "often" as used in finding 17.

Defendant also argues that "neither [Special Agents Chambliss nor Anderson] testified that [they] had ever discovered handwritten records that included correspondence or communications with individuals involved in child pornography or documentation of episodes of child pornography[;]" finding of fact 17 does not state those two specific agents so testified. Finding of fact 17 simply finds "from the credible testimony that paper writings . . . often carry information regarding child pornography. . . [,]" not which specific law enforcement officers testified about this information. Finding No. 17 is supported by...