State v. Haines

• Decision Date: 28 June 1892
• Citation: 15 S.E. 555,36 S.C. 504
• Parties: STATE v. HAINES.
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court

15 S.E. 555

36 S.C. 504

STATE v. HAINES.

Supreme Court of South Carolina

June 28, 1892

Appeal from general sessions circuit court of Richland county; JAMES ALDRICH, Judge.

Wade Haines was convicted of murder, and appeals. Affirmed.

Allen J. Green and Douglass & Onear, for appellant.

P. H Nelson and G. W. M. Williams, for the State.

POPE J.

Wade Haines, on his trial for the murder of Miss Florence Hornsby before his honor, Judge ALDRICH, and a jury, at the April term, 1891, of the court of general sessions for Richland county, was found guilty, and, after judgment was pronounced against him, appealed therefrom. His grounds of appeal are as follows: "(1) Because the juror Duffie, on his voir dire, showed himself competent to serve, and his honor erred in requiring him to stand aside. (2) Because his honor erred in allowing the state to challenge peremptorily the juror Parrant, the state having waived its right by the action of the solicitor in taking his seat, and the juror having been presented to the prisoner by the clerk, in obedience to the signal from the solicitor that he was satisfied. It is submitted that it is too late for the state to challenge after the clerk has presented the juror to the prisoner. (3) Because, after the jury had been out all night his honor, in the absence of the accused, had the jury brought into court, and portions of the testimony taken on the trial read to the jury; and it is submitted that, even had the accused been present, his honor further erred in refusing the request of defendant's counsel to have the whole of the testimony read. (4) Because his honor erred in refusing the motion for a new trial: (a) In that the verdict was contrary to his honor's charge, in this 1. Because the circumstances as proved by the state are consistent with a reasonable hypothesis of the innocence of the accused. 2. Because the circumstances do not unequivocally point to the guilt of the accused. ( b) Because as a matter of law, under his honor's charge, the evidence was not sufficient to support the verdict. (c) Because his honor erred in holding that, upon a motion for a new trial on the minutes of the court, he was bound by the finding of the jury upon the facts; whereas, it is submitted that the rule is that while in the first instance (on the trial) the jury alone are the judges of the facts, and the court is prohibited from even intimating to them his opinion on the facts, yet when the jury has rendered its verdict, and motion for a new trial is made, it then becomes the duty of the judge to determine from the whole testimony whether, in his opinion, upon that testimony, the verdict should stand. The prisoner is entitled to hear the judge's opinion on the sufficiency of the evidence, under the rules of law, to support the verdict."

We will now examine the grounds of appeal in the order suggested by the appellant:

1. When the juror W. K. Duffie was presented to the court, an application was made for his examination upon his voir dire. The case discloses the following questions and answers: "Have you formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of this defendant? Answer. Yes, sir. Q. Is that opinion so fixed, of such a character, that it would prevent you reaching a proper conclusion, according to the evidence, if you should hear it? A. I would try not to let it. I don't know whether it would or not. Q. When you say you have formed and expressed an opinion, what do you mean? A. The case was in the papers--the whole trial of the case was in the papers--last year when tried in court here. I read it and formed my opinion from that trial. Q. Do you feel, after reading the papers and forming such an opinion as you have formed from reading them, that it would control you in reaching a verdict, or could you reach a verdict without prejudice and without favor, according to the evidence as you hear it in the courthouse? A. I hope I could; I would not say for certain; I think that would have some influence on my opinion. Q. Do you feel that in the trial of this case you could render a verdict according to the evidence you heard in the courthouse, irrespective of what you knew, or supposed you knew, from the former trial. A. I would try my best to do it; of course I would. Q. Do you feel that you could render such a verdict? A. I think I could do it; yes." The presiding judge ordered the juror to stand aside, in these words: "I don't want to put a doubtful juror on. If he is not certain he can come up to the full measure, he had better stand aside."

Was this error in the trial judge? Section 2261 of the General Statutes of this state governs in these matters. By a reference to its provisions, it will be seen that, "if it appears to the court that the juror is not indifferent in the cause, he shall be placed aside as to the trial of that cause, and another shall be called." At this moment we cannot recall another instance of a statutory provision relating to the trial of causes, such as that now under consideration, that has been passed upon so frequently by this court, and that, too, with such distinctness. We have held in every case that this matter is confided by the law to the discretion of the circuit judge, whose decision thereon, so long as it relates to a question of fact, will not be reviewed by this court. State v. Dodson, 16 S.C. 453; State v. Coleman, 20 S.C. 444; State v. Nance, 25 S.C. 171; State v. Prater, 26 S.C. 198, 2 S.E. Rep. 108; State v. Williams, 31 S.C. 257, 9 S.E. Rep. 853; State v. Wyse, 32 S.C. 45, 10 S.E. Rep. 612; State v. Merriman, 34 S.C. 33, 12 S.E. Rep. 619. This ground of appeal therefore is dismissed.

2. The second question raised by appellant involves the practice in the courts of general sessions in this state, so far as fixing the period, in the ceremony of presenting a juror to the prisoner, beyond which a prosecuting officer cannot exercise the right of peremptory challenge to a juror. There is no statutory regulation governing this matter. It belongs to that class of cases where the practice long established in this state may be said to furnish the rule. Really it would seem, from the nature of the case, that any period preceding the announcement by the prisoner of his acceptance of the juror should be sufficient, for, if the prisoner is once allowed to announce his acceptance of the juror by saying to the clerk, "Swear him," the right of challenge by the state is precluded. Therefore the rejection of the juror by the state's attorney must occur at some time before the prisoner announces his conclusion. The quotation from Miller's Compilation, as made in appellant's argument,--the clerk of court to the juror, "Lay thy hand on the book," ("Here a short pause for the solicitor to decide as to the juror.") "Juror, look on the prisoner." "Prisoner, look on the juror." "What sayest thou?" If no objection, prisoner says, "Swear him,"--sets forth the form adopted in our courts. No doubt the better practice is for the state's attorney to speak promptly after the clerk uses the words, "Lay thy hand on the book;" but where is there any imperative necessity on the state's attorney to signify his objection at that precise moment? The prisoner is not imperiled by such delay. Indeed, there is no reason why the state's attorney should speak until it is made the duty and right of the prisoner to speak. In the practice, as it obtains at the bar in this state, the state's attorney is allowed time to speak until the prisoner has spoken. Surely, any other conclusions than that we have here announced would be the basest technicality. Then, again, as the control of the practical incidents of a trial in the circuit court are wisely confided to the circuit judge, and, as the circuit judge authorized and sanctioned the conduct of this prosecution in the matter here complained of, we feel bound to sustain this action of the circuit judge. This ground of appeal is dismissed.

3. The third ground of appeal here presented requires very careful consideration at our hands, for, while it belongs to the class known as "legal technicalities," yet the seriousness and ability of counsel in its presentation to this court demand at our hands more than ordinary care. Just after the charge of the judge to the jury had been concluded and the jury had retired to their room to make up their verdict, prisoner's attorney requested the judge presiding to allow the sheriff to carry the prisoner back to the county jail, not again to appear in the court room until after the verdict had been announced. The solicitor did not object. The presiding judge acceded to the prisoner's request, and the prisoner was removed to the county jail, and was not again brought into court until sentence was pronounced upon him. The jury remained in consultation until the next day at 1 o'clock in the afternoon. During his absence from the court room, the jury came into court, and requested the presiding judge, in the presence of the solicitor and prisoner's counsel, to have read in their hearing the testimony of four witnesses for the state. This was done, the stenographer reading such testimony, and this was done without objection on the part of prisoner's counsel. The question is now raised by appellant that such procedure was in violation of the legal rights of the prisoner, and that such error vitiates the trial. It is but just to the circuit judge that his report on this matter should be here presented. He reports: "After the jury had been charged and retired, Mr....