State v. Halczyszak

• Decision Date: 13 August 1986
• Docket Number: No. 85-538,85-538
• Citation: 25 Ohio St.3d 301,496 N.E.2d 925,25 OBR 360
• Parties: , 25 O.B.R. 360 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HALCZYSZAK et al., Appellees.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

Page 301

25 Ohio St.3d 301

496 N.E.2d 925, 25 O.B.R. 360

The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HALCZYSZAK et al., Appellees.

No. 85-538.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Aug. 13, 1986.

Syllabus by the Court

1. A generalized expectation by police officers that stolen autos or auto parts other than those specified in the search warrant might be found on the premises to be searched does not offend the "inadvertent discovery" requirement of the "plain view" doctrine.

2. The "inadvertent discovery" requirement may be satisfied when police lack antecedent probable cause, i.e., an advance particularized knowledge of, or intent to seize, those objects ultimately seized.

3. The "immediately apparent" requirement of the "plain view" doctrine is satisfied when police have probable cause to associate an object with criminal activity.

4. In ascertaining the required probable cause to satisfy the "immediately apparent" requirement, police officers may rely on their specialized knowledge, training and experience; and the presence of an auto theft expert at the scene of a lawful search does not offend the Fourth Amendment.

5. State v. Wilmoth (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 118, 438 N.E.2d 105, and State v. Williams (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 82, 377 N.E.2d 1013 , are hereby modified insofar as they are inconsistent with the following opinion.

On August 30, 1982, at approximately 8:20 p.m., officers of the Auto Theft Unit of the Cleveland Police Department executed a search warrant for the Coachcraft Company, an auto body repair shop, which was the business premises of William, Ann and Steven Halczyszak, appellees herein. The search warrant was based on information received from a tow-truck operator who told the police that he had delivered a 1981 white Oldsmobile Cutlass automobile with Vehicle Identification Number ("VIN") IG3AM47NIBM484404 to appellees' premises. The tow-truck driver's suspicions were aroused by the condition of the auto, including the fact that the ignition lock was stripped from the steering column.

After entry onto the premises, the police went directly to the garage. As they walked toward this building, they passed a number of vehicles. Once inside the building, they observed various autos in differing stages of assembly before they found the auto, described in their search warrant, in the beginning stages of disassembly. It was positioned next to an engine and transmission and a "stripped-out" auto, i.e., an auto containing only the frame and body shell but without the doors or trunk. This strip-out was of the same year and model as the auto specified in the warrant.

The police made a computer check of the VIN on this second auto. At that time, a VIN plate was observed fully exposed in the top of a tool box along with an envelope with three other VINs written on it. Police made a computer check of all four numbers.

The police then began to check the VINs on other nearby autos and parts inside the garage. One auto was immediately verified to be stolen. The same procedure was repeated on vehicles found outside, with similar results. Ultimately, the officers seized autos and auto parts either confirmed as stolen, believed to be stolen, or used as change-over vehicles and parts. Certain tools and mechanical implements known to be utilized in changing body parts from one vehicle to another, and positioned for such immediate use, were also confiscated.

After the trial court overruled appellees' motion to suppress, they pled no contest, and were convicted of various counts of grand theft, receiving stolen property, and possession of criminal tools. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions relating to the subject matter of the search warrant, but reversed on all other counts based on State v. Williams (1978), 55 Ohio St.2d 82, 377 N.E.2d 1013 , and State v. Wilmoth (1982), 1 Ohio St.3d 118, 438 N.E.2d 105.

The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.

John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., Frank C. Gasper, Cleveland, for appellant.

Friedman, Gilbert & Berezin, Gordon S. Friedman, Cleveland, for appellees William and Ann Halczyszak.

Marillyn Fagan Damelio, Cleveland, for appellee Steven Halczyszak.

HOLMES, Justice.

This case concerns the applicability of the plain view doctrine to the seizure of property not described in the search warrant. For the following reasons, we hold that the search inside the building does not offend the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution.

The Fourth Amendment provides that:

"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized."

Thus, general and exploratory searches are prohibited as an evidence gathering tool. Boyd v. United States (1886), 116 U.S. 616, 6 S.Ct. 524, 29 L.Ed. 746; Marron v. United States (1927), 275 U.S. 192, 48 S.Ct. 74, 72 L.Ed. 231. Both state and federal courts are empowered, indeed required, to exclude evidence obtained by means of searches found violative of the Fourth Amendment. Weeks v. United States (1914), 232 U.S. 383, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652, made applicable to states in Mapp v. Ohio (1961), 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 .

It has been said that "searches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by a judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment--subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz v. United States (1967), 389 U.S. 347, 357, 88 S.Ct. 507, 514, 19 L.Ed.2d 576. One exception to the warrant requirement is the "plain view" doctrine, first expressly established in Coolidge v. New Hampshire (1971), 403 U.S. 443, 91 S.Ct. 2022, 29 L.Ed.2d 564. In essence, the plain view doctrine allows police officers, under particular circumstances, to seize an "article of incriminating character" which is not described in their search warrant. The doctrine "is grounded on the proposition that once police are lawfully in a position to observe an item first-hand, its owner's privacy interest in that item is lost * * *." Illinois v. Andreas (1983), 463 U.S. 765, 771, 103 S.Ct. 3319, 3324.

The particular circumstances under which objects of incriminating character could be seized pursuant to the plain view theory were defined in Coolidge by means of a three-part analysis. First, the initial intrusion that brought the police into a position to view the object must have been legitimate. Second, the police must have inadvertently discovered the object. Third, the incriminating nature of the object must have been immediately apparent. If the Coolidge requirements are complied with, then police need not obtain an additional warrant before they seize the objects observed. The three-prong analysis was subsequently adopted by the vast majority of jurisdictions, including Ohio in State v. Williams, supra, 55 Ohio St.2d 82, 377 N.E.2d 1013 . It is therefore the appropriate standard to be applied to the facts of the case sub judice.

Because there is no dispute here as to the validity of either the search warrant or the initial police intrusion which allowed police within sight of the seized objects, we begin our analysis by examining the "inadvertent discovery" facet of the plain view doctrine. The requirement that evidence may be seized only if discovered inadvertently was intended to guard against planned, warrantless seizures. As stated in Coolidge, supra, 403 U.S. at 471, 91 S.Ct. at 2040, when police "know in advance [what] they will find in plain view and intend to seize," they must either include such objects in the initial warrant or obtain an additional warrant. They may not plan an arrest or use a limited warrant for the mere purpose of "maneuvering themselves within plain view of the object they want." Id. at 470, fn. 26, 91 S.Ct. at 2040 fn. 26. Otherwise, the exception would swallow up the general rule and circumvent the warrant requirement. Although the lower federal courts have differed on the subject, ¹ the emergent test for inadvertent discovery became whether the police had antecedent probable cause to include the object seized in the warrant's description. Texas v. Brown (1983), 460 U.S. 730, 103 S.Ct. 1535, 75 L.Ed.2d 502.

Appellees assert that the police planned to enter the premises with a limited warrant for the purpose of conducting a general, warrantless search. This the state denies, but it seems to be admitted that the police strongly suspected the premises to be a "chop shop" prior to the search. They seemingly had indicated as much in their affidavit for a search warrant by inclusion of the phrase "due to a prior investigation." However, a "generalized expectation" that other stolen property might be present on the named premises is far less than a belief that particular property will be discovered. Texas v. Brown, supra, at 744, 103 S.Ct. at 1544. Appellees presented some evidence relative to the number of tow trucks ordered by the police to infer that the police had a prior intent to seize more than the one vehicle named in the search warrant. However, the official log of tow truck orders admitted into evidence is fully consistent with police testimony that each tow truck was ordered only after an object was determined to be seizable. There was no other evidence which would tend to show that the police knew of any particular incriminating objects other than the vehicle described in the warrant.

Since the police had neither prior, particularized knowledge of the objects ultimately seized, nor prior intent to seize anything other than the object described in the search warrant, it may reasonably be concluded that the police lacked the antecedent probable cause to have justified their inclusion of the additional...