State v. Hall
| Decision Date | 28 December 2000 |
| Docket Number | No. 18060-3-III.,18060-3-III. |
| Citation | 104 Wash. App. 56,14 P.3d 884,104 Wn. App. 56 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Respondent, v. Robbie L. HALL, Appellant. |
Karen R. Baker, Seattle, for Appellant.
James A. Hershey, Deputy Prosecuting Atty., Wenatchee, for Respondent.
Bruce L. Brown, Kent, for amicus curiae.
A jury convicted Robbie L. Hall of three counts of third degree assault on law enforcement officers. Mr. Hall appeals, alleging four instructional errors: (1) refusal to give a voluntary intoxication instruction; (2) refusal to include intent in the to convict instructions; (3) refusal to give an attempted assault instruction; and (4) refusal to instruct the jury that the defendant's knowledge that the victim is a law enforcement officer is an element of third degree assault. We affirm.
As background, Chelan County Sheriff's Deputy Josh Mathena arrested Mr. Hall near Chelan for an unrelated matter. The critical events here reportedly arose during Mr. Hall's disruptive and self-destructive behavior while en route to jail in Wenatchee. Ultimately, the State charged three third degree assaults with Deputy Mathena, Deputy Marcus Harris, and City of Chelan Police Officer Steve Groseclose as victims.
Mr. Hall "began acting up, screaming, yelling" and began to bang his head against the plexiglass directly behind Deputy Mathena. Deputy Mathena radioed Deputy Harris for assistance. When Deputy Harris arrived, he tried without success to persuade Mr. Hall to calm down. The two deputies then tried to restrain Mr. Hall. As Deputy Mathena reached across the passenger compartment, Mr. Hall jumped up and tried to bite the deputy's hand. Deputy Mathena jerked his hand back but not before Mr. Hall inflicted a small abrasion on one of his fingers. While partially restrained, Mr. Hall then twice tried to head butt Deputy Harris. According to Deputy Mathena, Deputy Hall "barely" avoided both attempts. Officer Groseclose then arrived and helped the two deputies put Mr. Hall in leg restraints. Mr. Hall attempted to spit on Officer Groseclose. The officer stepped back "to avoid the majority of it." Officer Groseclose said getting spat on raised concerns regarding the possibility of contamination.
Psychologist, Mark Mays, Ph.D., the sole defense witness, testified that Mr. Hall suffered from a personality disorder at the time of the assault that impaired his ability to control his anger and impulses. According to Dr. Mays, Mr. Hall's condition resulted in a type of paranoia toward law enforcement authorities that escalated in stressful situations. It was Dr. Mays's opinion that Mr. Hall lacked the capacity to form intent to commit the charged assaults. Dr. Mays opined Mr. Hall "lost control as a result of his psychological difficulties." Dr. Mays further stated that Mr. Hall's "mental disorder would be amplified and made even worse by alcohol." "I think it would be harder for him if intoxicated, even mildly intoxicated, to exert thinking control over his behavior ."
In rebuttal, psychiatrist Dr. Vernon Cressy disputed that Mr. Hall had a major personality disorder. Instead, Dr. Cressy opined that Mr. Hall had the capacity to form intent to assault the officers. Psychologist, Timm Fredrickson, Ph.D., testified Dr. Mays's report was not inconsistent with his own earlier assessment that Mr. Hall was free of mental disorder. In Dr. Fredrickson's opinion, Mr. Hall showed some "antisocial personality traits" but otherwise did not have "a full-blown antisocial personality disorder." Dr. Fredrickson also believed that Mr. Hall had the capacity to form intent to assault the officers. Deputy Mathena's and Deputy Harris's testimony indicated Mr. Hall was not intoxicated but did smell of alcohol.
The trial court did not give Mr. Hall's requested instruction on voluntary intoxication, reasoning insufficient evidence of intoxication existed. The trial court also rejected Mr. Hall's proposed instructions on "attempted" third degree assault, reasoning no such crime existed because the third degree assault statute encompassed attempted physical contact. Mr. Hall also excepted to the trial court's to convict instruction, which did not include intent as a specific element.
After guilty verdicts on all three counts and sentencing, Mr. Hall filed this appeal. This court stayed the matter pending the Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Brown, 140 Wash.2d 456, 998 P.2d 321 (2000).
The issue is whether the trial court erred by abusing its discretion when rejecting Mr. Hall's proposed instruction on voluntary intoxication on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to support giving it.
This court reviews a trial court's decision to reject a jury instruction for abuse of discretion. State v. Picard, 90 Wash.App. 890, 902, 954 P.2d 336, review denied, 136 Wash.2d 1021, 969 P.2d 1065 (1998). The abuse of discretion standard applies throughout this analysis.
A party is entitled to have the court instruct the jury on its theory of the case if evidence exists in the record to support the theory. State v. Hughes, 106 Wash.2d 176, 191, 721 P.2d 902 (1986). Here, Mr. Hall must show: "(1) the crime charged contains an element of a particular mental state; (2) there is substantial evidence of alcohol consumption; and (3) substantial evidence in the record exists showing the alcohol consumption affected his ability to possess the required mental state[.]" State v. Priest, 100 Wash.App. 451, 453-54, 997 P.2d 452 (2000) (citing State v. Gabryschak, 83 Wash.App. 249, 252, 921 P.2d 549 (1996)). The parties' arguments are directed solely to the third factor. Thus, we examine the record to decide if sufficient evidence existed to link Mr. Hall's alcohol consumption with his alleged diminished capacity to form intent.
Dr. Mays testified Mr. Hall would have difficulty controlling his behavior "if intoxicated" or "even mildly intoxicated[.]" "What is relevant is the degree of intoxication and the effect it had on the defendant's ability to formulate the requisite mental state." Priest, 100 Wash.App. at 455, 997 P.2d 452 (citing RCW 9A.16.090; State v. Coates, 107 Wash.2d 882, 889, 735 P.2d 64 (1987)). Here, a critical lack of evidence exists that Mr. Hall was intoxicated or influenced by alcohol consumption.
Both Deputies Mathena and Harris testified that although they could smell alcohol on Mr. Hall, they did not believe the man to be intoxicated. In particular, Deputy Harris, who had specialized training in field sobriety testing, testified that Mr. Hall had "rather good" reflexes and did not slur his words. Thus, we conclude, as did the trial court, that insufficient evidence existed to support giving a voluntary intoxication instruction. Accordingly, the trial court did not err. Priest, 100 Wash.App. at 455, 997 P.2d 452.
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to include intent in its "to convict" instructions.
"Instructions satisfy the requirement of a fair trial when, taken as a whole, they properly inform the jury of the applicable state law, are not misleading, and permit the defendant to argue his theory of the case." State v. Tili, 139 Wash.2d 107, 126, 985 P.2d 365 (1999) (citing State v. Theroff, 95 Wash.2d 385, 389, 622 P.2d 1240 (1980)). "Absence of an element from the instructions renders the verdict less than complete and the judgment reversible." State v. Daniels, 87 Wash.App. 149, 154-55, 940 P.2d 690 (1997) (citing State v. Smith, 131 Wash.2d 258, 266, 930 P.2d 917 (1997)), review denied, 133 Wash.2d 1031, 950 P.2d 476 (1998).
940 P.2d 690. The other two forms of assault, however, require specific intent that the defendant intended to inflict harm or cause reasonable apprehension of bodily harm. State v. Eastmond, 129 Wash.2d 497, 500, 919 P.2d 577 (1996).
The three "to convict" instructions did not refer to intent. But the instructions did state that the jury must find proof beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Hall assaulted the three officers. In that connection, Instruction No. 8 correctly defined the three types of assault along with their required forms of intent. 11 WASHINGTON PATTERN JURY INSTRUCTIONS: CRIMINAL 35.50, at 453 (2nd ed. 1994) (WPIC); see Eastmond, 129 Wash.2d at 500,
919 P.2d 577; see also State v. Esters, 84 Wash.App. 180, 182-83, 927 P.2d 1140 (1997). And Instruction No. 9 properly defined intent. WPIC 10.01; RCW 9A.08.010(1)(a); State v. Allen, 101 Wash.2d 355, 359, 678 P.2d 798 (1984). Moreover, Instruction No. 10 instructed the jury that it could consider diminished capacity, evidence of mental illness or disorder, in determining whether Mr. Hall could form the requisite intent. WPIC 18.20; State v. Ferrick, 81 Wash.2d 942, 944-45, 506 P.2d 860 (1973).
Viewed in their entirety, the instructions properly informed the jury that intent was an essential element of third degree assault. See Esters, 84 Wash.App. at 185,
927 P.2d 1140. Hence, Mr. Hall's argument is unpersuasive. Therefore, we conclude the trial court did not err.
The issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give the jury instructions on the lesser included crime of "attempted" third degree assault.
"A lesser included offense instruction is proper...
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