State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 02 June 1965
• Docket Number: No. 1,1
• Parties: STATE, v. James Clarence HALL.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 177

142 S.E.2d 177

264 N.C. 559

STATE, v. James Clarence HALL.

No. 1.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

June 2, 1965.

T. W. Bruton, Atty. Gen., Richard T. Sanders, Asst. Atty. Gen., for the State.

John W. Graham, Edenton, for defendant appellant.

HIGGINS, Justice.

The record comes to us in a condensed form as a pauper appeal. The evidence is somewhat equivocal as to the caution given by the officers to the defendant that the had a right to remain silent and was not required to answer questions, or that any statement he made might be used against him in court. On the other hand, the defendant's objections appear somewhat by inference. However, enough appears to warrant the trial court in finding the defendant was advised of his right to refuse to incriminate himself and likewise require this Court to consider the fundamental question whether, under the circumstances disclosed by the evidence, the wife could consent to a search of the defendant's dwelling without a search warrant and thereby permit the State to use the results of that search to convict the defendant. State v. Elam, 263 N.C. 273, 139 S.E.2d 601; Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 84 S.Ct. 1758, 12 L.Ed.2d 977.

This is the factual background leading up to the search of the defendant's dwelling: The defendant was in jail. This the officers knew. They neither requested nor received his permission to make the search. The officers, no doubt, suspected they might turn up something incriminating. They went to the house, confronted the defendant's wife with their identity as officers, and asked the privilege of searching the house. Nothing in the evidence indicates the officers had sufficient information to enable them to make the affidavit necessary to authorize the court to issue a search warrant. There is some question as to the extent to officers left the wife free to consent to the search, or whether the number of officers had a coercive effect sufficient to make her consent involuntary. Amos v. U. S., 255 U.S. 313, 41 S.Ct. 266, 65 L.Ed. 654. The circumstances did not suggest to her anything better that she could do in the presence of so much 'law' at a time when they had her husband in jail. The officers confronted the defendant with the clock and radio. He then admitted his guilt. Unless proper authority existed for the search of the dwelling, the search was unlawful. The protection extends to the justly as well as to the unjustly accused. State v. Mills, 246 N.C. 237, 98 S.E.2d 329; In Re Walters, 229 N.C. 111, 47 S.E.2d 709; Agnello v. U. S., 269 U.S. 20, 46 S.Ct. 4, 70 L.Ed. 145. An unlawful search does not become lawful by the discoveries which result from it. Fourth and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States; Article I, Section 15, North Carolina Constitution; Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081.

If it be deemed the wife's consent as far as she was able to give it, was voluntary, we are still confronted with the question whether she was authorized to give her husband's consent to the search. The courts are not in agreement on this question. Divergent views are discussed and authorities cited in 47 Am.Jur., Search and Seizure, § 72:

'The decisions are in conflict as to the implied authority of one spouse to consent to a search of the property of the other. In a number of cases, representing the weight of authority, it has been held a wife has no implied authority in the absence of her husband, to consent to a search of his property. So, also, a waiver of his constitutional right against unlawful search made by a husband has been held not to affect the rights of a...