State v. Woods

• Decision Date: 14 April 1975
• Docket Number: No. 13,13
• Citation: 286 N.C. 612,213 S.E.2d 214
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Vernon Junior WOODS.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 214

213 S.E.2d 214

286 N.C. 612

STATE of North Carolina v. Vernon Junior WOODS.

No. 13.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

April 14, 1975.

Atty. Gen. Rufus L. Edmisten by Asst. Atty. Gen. Sidney S. Eagles, Jr., Raleigh, for the State.

John H. McMurray, Morganton, and Bruce W. Vanderbloemen, Lenoir, for defendant-appellant.

MOORE, Justice.

Defendant first assigns as error the action of the trial court in allowing the State to challenge peremptorily without cause more than nine jurors. It was stipulated that the State peremptorily excused eleven jurors and the record shows that the defendant peremptorily excused thirteen. The trial court ruled that the State had twenty-two peremptory challenges and that the defendant had thirty-four.

Defendant was charged with two capital crimes and one noncapital.

G.S. § 9--21 in part provides:

'(a) In all capital cases each defendant may challenge peremptorily without cause 14 jurors and no more. In all other criminal cases each defendant may challenge peremptorily six jurors without cause and no more. . . .

'(b) In all capital cases the State may challenge peremptorily without cause nine jurors for each defendant and no more. In all other criminal cases the State may challenge peremptorily without cause four jurors for each defendant and no more. . . .'

The trial judge allowed the State nine peremptory challenges in each capital case and four in the kidnapping case, for a total of twenty-two. Defendant was allowed fourteen in each capital case and six in the kidnapping case, for a total of thirty-four. This was error. Under the express provisions of the statute in all capital cases the defendant may challenge fourteenjurors and the State may challenge nine jurors 'and no more.' (Emphasis added.) See State v. Alridge, 206 N.C. 850, 175 S.E. 191 (1934). In the present case, however, we think this error is harmless.

It is well established that the system by which juries are selected does not include the right of any party to select certain jurors but to permit parties to protect themselves against prejudice by allowing them to exclude unacceptable jurors. Defendant has no vested right to a particular juror. State v. Honeycutt, 285 N.C. 174, 203 S.E.2d 844 (1974); State v. Atkinson, 275 N.C. 288, 167 S.E.2d 241 (1969). The right of peremptory challenge is not a right to select but to exclude. State v. Allred, 275 N.C. 554, 169 S.E.2d 833 (1969); State v. Banner, 149 N.C. 519, 63 S.E. 84 (1908). Defendant did not exhaust the fourteen peremptory challenges given him by the statute and was not in any respect denied his right to exclude prospective jurors unacceptable to him.

As was said by Chief Justice Stacy in State v. Koritz, 227 N.C. 552, 555, 43 S.E.2d 77, 80 (1947):

'. . . To present an exception on rulings to challenges to the polls, the appellant is required to exhaust his peremptory challenges and then undertake to challenge another juror. Oliphant v. Atlantic Coast Line (R.) R., 171 N.C. 303, 88 S.E. 425. The court's action in the matter must be hurtful and its effect unavoidable before it will be held to vitiate the trial. State v. Cockman, 60 N.C. 484; State v. Benton, 19 N.C. 196.

'The trial court was at pains to see that every opportunity was afforded for the selection of a fair and impartial jury. The defendants would be entitled to no more on a new trial, and this they have already had. State v. Levy, 187 N.C. 581, 122 S.E. 386; State v. Sultan, 142 N.C. 569, 54 S.E. 841; State v. English, 164 N.C. 497, 80 S.E. 72; State v. Bohanon, 142 N.C. 695, 55 S.E. 797. Their right is not to select but to reject jurors. Having been tried by twelve jurors who were unobjectionable to them, the defendants have no valid ground to urge that they have been prejudiced by the composition of the jury. State v. Pritchett, 106 N.C. 667, 11 S.E. 357; State v. Hensley, 94 N.C. 1021.'

Although it was error for the trial court to allow the State more than nine peremptory challenges and to allow the defendant more than fourteen, we hold that this error was harmless and not so prejudicial as to require a new trial. See 3 Strong, N.C. Index 2d, Criminal Law § 167, p. 126, and cases cited therein.

This assignment is overruled.

Defendant next assigns as error the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence and receiving into evidence State's Exhibits Nos. 6 and 7, an engagement ring and a wedding band. He contends that his constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States were violated in that this evidence obtained by the officers was without the authorization of a valid search warrant and that evidence obtained in such a manner is incompetent under G.S. § 15--27, the federal exclusionary rule, and federal and state decisions dealing with non-consensual searches conducted without search warrants.

To support this position, defendant cites State v. Hall, 264 N.C. 559, 142 S.E.2d 177 (1965). The facts in Hall were briefly as follows: Defendant was in jail and officers both from North Carolina and Virginia knew this. They did not request defendant's permission to search his home but went to the home, confronted defendant's wife, identified themselves as police officers, and asked for the privilege of searching the house. There was some question as to the extent the officers left the wife free the consent to the search, or whether the number of officers had a coercive effect sufficient to make her consent involuntary. A search of the house by the officers turned up a clock and a radio which were later identified as belonging to the store in Edenton, North Carolina, which had been robbed. The officers then confronted the defendant with those items, at which time he confessed to the breaking and entering and larceny. This Court held that the possession of the radio and clock was unlawfully obtained by the officers and the items were improperly admitted in evidence. The facts in the present case clearly distinguish it from Hall.

Here, there were but two officers who talked to Mrs. Woods at the police station in the presence of her mother. Mrs. Woods was asked about the rings and was persuaded by her mother to give the rings to the officers. She thereafter took her mother and the officers to her trailer home where she unlocked the door and led the two officers and her mother to her bedroom where she picked up a pair of her blue jean pants and took from the right side pocket of these pants the two rings in question and gave them to the officers. No search or further inquiry was made at the trailer. The officers were inside the trailer less than two minutes. The rings given to the officers by Mrs. Woods had been given to her by her husband on 11 August 1973. The rings were hers and were in her possession.

It is well settled that evidence obtained by unreasonable searches and seizures is inadmissible. Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution; Article I, Section 20, of the North Carolina Constitution; G.S. § 15--27 (repealed effective July 1, 1975, by Chapter 1286, Section 26, 1973 Session Laws); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961); State v. Reams, 277 N.C. 391, 178 S.E.2d 65 (1970); State v. Colson, 274 N.C. 295, 163 S.E.2d 376 (1968). It is also well settled that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizures does not prohibit a seizure of evidence without a warrant where no search is required. United States v. Pate, 324 F.2d 934 (7th Cir. 1963), cert. den., 377 U.S. 937, 84 S.Ct. 1341, 12 L.Ed.2d 299 (1964); State v. Reams, Supra; State v. Virgil, 276 N.C. 217, 172 S.E.2d 28 (1970).

Quoting with approval from State v. Coolidge, 106 N.H. 186, 208 A.2d 322, this Court in Reams, supra, 277 N.C. at 398, 178 S.E.2d at 69, stated:

"A search ordinarily implies a quest by an officer of the law, a prying into hidden places for that which is concealed. A seizure contemplates forcible dispossession of the owner. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 397, 34 S.Ct. 341, 58 L.Ed. 652; United States ex rel. Stacey v. Pate, 324 F.2d 934, 935 (7th Cir. 1963); (other citations omitted.)"

The evidence in the instant case amply supports the trial judge's findings of fact:

'That Mrs. Woods had a legal right to enter the trailer premises on the occasion when she did so with her mother and the officers. That the officers performed no search on the premises.

'That the interrogation was not extensive in duration. That Mrs. Woods was not coerced by the officers into producing the rings and in fact made no effort to do so until requested by her mother to cooperate with the officers. That she was under no duress, restraint or coercion at the time she agreed to go to the trailer.'

These facts sustained the trial judge's conclusions of law that 'there was no unreasonable search of the premises occupied by the defendant and his wife at the time the rings were obtained, and second, that the rings were legally obtained from Mrs. Woods who voluntarily, knowingly, understandingly and intentionally turned over their possession to the officers.'

We hold, therefore, that no search was involved, and that Mrs. Woods voluntarily turned the rings over to the officers. They were properly admitted into evidence.

This assignment of error is overruled.

Defendant next contends that his rights under the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, as applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment were violated by the unreasonable search and seizure of the automobile in question.

In the instant case, as defendant and his wife were driving their car they were stopped by police officers who took defendant to police headquarters for questioning. The officers had no arrest warrant and no search warrant.

While defendant was being taken to police headquarters, the 1967 Chevrolet and his wife were driven by an officer to headquarters also. Once there, the car...