State v. Hall

• Citation: 249 N.W.2d 843
• Decision Date: 19 January 1977
• Docket Number: No. 59289,59289
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Wendell HALL, Appellant.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Iowa

Page 843

249 N.W.2d 843

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. James Wendell HALL, Appellant.

No. 59289.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

Jan. 19, 1977.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 10, 1977.

William M. Tucker and Bruce L. Walker, Iowa City, for appellant.

Richard C. Turner, Atty. Gen., Garry D. Woodward, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Jack W. Dooley, County Atty., for appellee.

Heard en banc.

REYNOLDSON, Justice.

Defendant was charged under § 690.1, The Code, 1973, with the unlawful killing of Sarah Ann Ottens. Her body was found in room 429, Rienow Hall, a University of Iowa dormitory. After defendant was convicted and sentenced to imprisonment for 50 years, he appealed.

In our first review, State v. Hall, 235 N.W.2d 702 (Iowa 1975), we held defendant had demonstrated no reversible error, but concluded trial court should have granted his post-trial motion to examine certain transcripts of grand jury testimony to determine whether the State had suppressed exculpatory evidence. Because those pages of testimony were not before us, we remanded for further limited proceedings:

'We therefore remand the case to the trial court with directions that an In camera inspection of grand jury transcripts be made in the presence of counsel for defendant and for the State (citations).

'We are really concerned with only about 275 pages of a total of 1250 pages of grand jury transcript. The remainder was already available to defendant before and during trial.

'If such inspection discloses exculpatory evidence was suppressed, a new trial shall be granted. If not, the judgment shall stand affirmed. This is the practice approved in State v. White, supra, 260 at 1010, 151 N.W.2d at 557.

'Of course, defendant's right to appeal from the trial court's In camera determination is preserved.'-235 N.W.2d at 731.

Upon remand, the State turned over to defendant the previously-undisclosed grand jury testimony. The prosecution assented to a procedure which allowed defense counsel to examine all of the material and avoided an In camera type hearing.

Defendant then filed a motion asserting the grand jury testimony contained exculpatory information necessitating a new trial. This motion was later amended to raise the invalidity of the indictment under which defendant was charged. This asserted invalidity was grounded on a claimed violation of §§ 771.21 and 771.22, The Code, because a third quarter grand jury, without a court order, considered charges against defendant which had already been considered by the second quarter grand jury.

At the same time, defendant filed a motion to produce which, together with amendments thereto, called for 'all information known' to the State relating to numerous persons and incidents revealed in the newly disclosed grand jury testimony, and requested inspection of all latent fingerprints found in the room in which the victim's body was discovered.

In an exhaustive ruling, trial court carefully analyzed the grounds for these motions and overruled them. Defendant now appeals again, pursuant to the right reserved in our first opinion. He asserts 1) the indictment was invalid because it violated §§ 771.21 and 771.22, The Code, 2) exculpatory evidence was suppressed, and 3) trial court erred in overruling his motion to produce. We affirm.

I. Validity of the indictment.

In attacking the indictment, defendant is confronted at the outset with the limited nature of our remand: an In camera inspection of grand jury transcripts to determine if exculpatory evidence was suppressed.

'It is well settled in Iowa that when the Supreme Court remands for a special purpose, the district court, upon the remand, is limited to do the special thing authorized by this court in its opinion, and nothing else. It has no power or jurisdiction to do anything except to proceed in accordance with the mandate.'--Kuhlmann v. Persinger, 261 Iowa 461, 468, 154 N.W.2d 860, 864 (1967).

See also Hetherington Letter Co. v. O. F. Paulson Const. Co., 192 N.W.2d 808, 809 (Iowa 1972); State v. Mayhew, 183 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Iowa 1971).

Defendant's attempt to enlarge a very constricted area of inquiry by challenging the indictment must fail. Thus we need not consider the merits of his contention. Our treatment of this issue is not to be taken as any indication we perceive merit in defendant's assertions, however. A logical analysis of §§ 771.21 and 771.22, illuminated by State v. Scott, 99 Iowa 36, 68 N.W. 451 (1896), and State v. Collis, 73 Iowa 542, 35 N.W. 625 (1887), does not, in our view, support defendant's attack on the indictment.

II. Suppression of exculpatory evidence.

Trial court, following hearing, held there was no material exculpatory evidence in the formerly-suppressed grand jury testimony. In appealing from this finding, defendant relies on authorities which indicate he is asserting a violation of due process clause of Amendment 14, United States Constitution, and consequently his right to a fair trial. In our review we therefore examine the totality of the circumstances. State v. Boren, 224 N.W.2d 14, 15 (Iowa 1975), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1008, 95 S.Ct. 2630, 45 L.Ed.2d 671 (1975); State v. Elmore, 201 N.W.2d 443, 445 (Iowa 1972).

We have studied transcripts of the grand jury testimony and the remand hearing mindful of the policy considerations beneath still-developing constitutional disclosure requirements. These constitutional requisites do not necessarily comport with recommended discovery practices. See A.B.A. Standards Relating to Discovery and Procedure Before Trial, §§ 1.1 through 4.7, at 11-19 (approved draft, 1970).

Although our designation of the type of information which must be disclosed has varied from 'exculpatory evidence' (State v. Hall, supra, 235 N.W.2d at 731; State v. Houston, 209 N.W.2d 42, 47 (Iowa 1973)) to 'matters germane' (State v. Deanda, 218 N.W.2d 649, 652 (Iowa 1974)) to 'important evidence' (State v. McClain, 256 Iowa 175, 184, 125 N.W.2d 764, 769 (1964)) to 'materially exculpatory evidence' (State v. Fryer, 226 N.W.2d 36, 40 (Iowa 1975); State v. Aossey, 201 N.W.2d 731, 734 (Iowa 1972), cert. denied, 41i U.S. 906, 93 S.Ct. 2292, 36 L.Ed.2d 971 (1973)), it is clear from both federal and Iowa decisions not all information in the prosecution's files must be turned over as a matter of constitutional due process.

Some of the underlying policy considerations were discussed in State v. Eads, 166 N.W.2d 766, 768-775 (Iowa 1969), and State v. White, 260 Iowa 1000, 1005-1008, 151 N.W.2d 552, 555-556 (1967). To these should be added the concept that the goal of ultimate truth is not served by substituting a parasitic reliance on police reports and statements for vigorous defense investigation.

Thus the rule against defense access to all information in the prosecutor's file and dragnet requests for information has been steadfastly maintained. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106, 96 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 49 L.Ed.2d 342, 353 (1976); State v. Hall, supra, 235 N.W.2d at 731; see Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 16 (1970).

To constitute a due process violation under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-1197, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963) the suppressed information must be material either to the guilt or punishment of the defendant, not merely potentially or inferentially helpful to the defense. Confronted with a defense argument that the Brady rule should be expanded to include material which might conceivably aid the defense in preparation of its case, the federal circuit court in Williams v. Wolff, 473 F.2d 1049, 1054 (8 Cir. 1973), observed,

'There is little in the prosecutor's file which might not 'aid' in some remote or fanciful way the defense of a case. Unless we are prepared to hold that the prosecutor's file shall be opened to the defense upon demand, which may, indeed, be in the wind, we are not prepared to bring the suggested expansion within the constitutional duty.'

The eighth circuit's speculation a Brady rule expansion might be 'in the wind' was laid to rest in Agurs, supra, 427 U.S. at 109, 96 S.Ct. at 2400, 49 L.Ed.2d at 353, where the United States Supreme Court said,

'If everything that might influence a jury must be disclosed, the only way a prosecutor could discharge his constitutional duty would be to allow complete discovery of his files as a matter of routine practice.

'Whether or not procedural rules authorizing such broad discovery might be desirable, the Constitution surely does not demand that much. While expressing the opinion that representatives of the State may not 'suppress substantial material evidence,' former Chief Justice Traynor of the California Supreme Court has pointed out that 'they are under no duty to report sua sponte to the defendant all that they learn about the case and about their witnesses.' In re Imbler, 60 Cal.2d 554, 35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 301, 387 P.2d 6, 14 (1963). And this Court recently noted that there is 'no constitutional requirement that the prosecution make a complete and detailed accounting to the defense of all police investigatory work on the case.' Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 795, 92 S.Ct. 2562, 2568, 33 L.Ed.2d 706. The mere possibility that an item of undisclosed information might have helped the defense, or might have affected the outcome of the trial, does not establish 'materiality' in the constitutional sense.' (Emphasis supplied).

The same concept was thus articulated in Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154, 92 S.Ct. 763, 766, 31 L.Ed.2d 104, 108 (1972):

'We do not, however, automatically require a new trial whenever 'a combing of the prosecutors' files after the trial has disclosed evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the verdict * * *.' United States v. Keogh, 391 F.2d 138, 148 (CA 2 1968).'

Our decisions have not attempted to define 'materiality' in the context of delineating what information the State must divulge. However, some specific ancillary rules have evolved in our opinions. Information will not be...