State v. Hall

• Decision Date: 02 April 1923
• Docket Number: No. 23733.,23733.
• Citation: 297 Mo. 594,250 S.W. 64
• Parties: STATE ex rel. CHASE et al. v. HALE., Circuit Judge.
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

250 S.W. 64

297 Mo. 594

STATE ex rel. CHASE et al. v. HALE., Circuit Judge.

No. 23733.

Supreme Court of Missouri, in Banc.

April 2, 1923.

Original proceeding in prohibition by the State, on the relation of John F. Chase and others, against Robert W. Hall, Judge of the Circuit Court within and for the City of St. Louis. Preliminary rule discharged.

Jesse W. Barrett, Atty. Gen., and Henry Davis and R. W. Otto, Asst. Attys. Gen., for plaintiffs.

Charles P. Williams, Glendy B. Arnold, and Percy Werner, all of St. Louis, for defendant.

DAVID E. BLAIR, J.

This is an original proceeding in prohibition against respondent (referred to in the caption as defendant) as one of the judges of the circuit court of the city of St. Louis to prevent him from entertaining jurisdiction of or trying a suit brought by certain commission merchants against the members of the state board of agriculture, the state marketing commissioner and one of his deputies, and the prosecuting attorney of the city of St. Louis (relators in this proceeding, and referred to as plaintiffs in the caption), to enjoin criminal prosecutions against such commission men for violation of certain provisions of the state marketing bureau act, enacted at the first extra session of the Fifty-First General Assembly, said act being found at page 29 of the Acts of such session. It is contended by relators that no property rights are involved, and therefore that an action will not lie to enjoin criminal prosecutions under the act; that respondent has exceeded his jurisdiction in entertaining the injunction suit and issuing a temporary injunction. This is the sole question for determination.

A brief study of the marketing bureau act is essential to an understanding of the question at issue. An act was passed at the reguar session of the Fifty-First General Assembly (Laws 1921, p. 139) creating a state marketing bureau within the department of agriculture, and in charge of a state marketing commissioner appointed by the commissioner of agriculture. A department of agriculture was created by another act passed at the same session. Laws 1921, p. 125. The latter act was referred to the people under the provisions of section 57, art. 4, of the Constitution (subsequently failing of approval), and at the first extra session of the same General Assembly the marketing bureau act previously enacted was repealed, and a new Taw enacted in lieu thereof. Laws 1921, First Extra Session, p. 29. The latter act (here under consideration) provides for the appointment of a state marketing commissioner by the state board of agriculture (or its successor at law) by the consent of the Governor. Sections 12146a to 12146g cover the relationship between the marketing bureau and commission merchants. In brief, these sections provide for licensing such merchants, payment of a fee therefor, based on annual gross volume of sales, giving of bond by the commission men for the faithful accounting and payment to consignors of the proceeds of all farm products sold, inquisitorial powers on the part of the marketing bureau, and holding of hearings upon complaints or in investigations, power to refuse and to revoke licenses to transact business upon specified grounds, court review of decisions and orders of the marketing bureau, and the making of rules and regulations. Said act defines offenses on the part of commission merchants, including doing a commission business without a license, with penalties therefor, denoted as misdemeanors, with a fine of not less than $50 and not exceeding $500 for each offense.

The general rule is that injunction will not lie to prevent prosecution for the violation of the provisions of a criminal statute. State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 MO. 425, loc. cit. 449, 56 S. W. 474, 48 L. R. A. 596; Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. 616, loc. cit. 646, 111 S. W. 565, and cases cited in brief of relators. But prosecutions for violation of a criminal statute may be enjoined where the remedy is not adequate, and such prosecutions would work irreparable injury. Merchants' Exchange v. Knott, 212 Mo. foot Page 646, 111 S. W. 565; State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. loc. cit. 447, 56 S. W. 474, 48 L. R. A. 596. It therefore remains to determine whether plaintiffs in the injunction suit have brought themselves within this exception to the general rule. This must be determined from the allegations of the petition in the case pending before respondent. If such petition alleges facts showing that plaintiffs named therein and others similarly situated will suffer irreparable injury to their property and business through criminal prosecutions if such marketing bureau act be held to be unconstitutional, then respondent has jurisdiction; otherwise he has no such jurisdiction.

We are not here called upon to determine the constitutionality of the act. This is a question for respondent to determine in the proceeding before him, if he otherwise has jurisdiction. We approach the question before us with the assumption that the law may be unconstitutional. Such unconstitutionality alone does not give respondent jurisdiction to enjoin criminal prosecutions. State ex rel. v. Wood, 155 Mo. loc. cit. 451, 56 S. W. 474, 48 L. R. A. 596; Merchants' as change v. Knott, 212 Mo. loc. cit. 646, 111 S. W. 565.

After reciting the names of the numerous plaintiffs and stating whether they are individuals, firms, or corporations, and the business in which each is engaged, and naming the defendants and describing their relationship to the state marketing bureau, and their duties in connection therewith under the act creating such bureau, and the manner in which plaintiffs conduct their respective businesses, the petition sets out various grounds upon which plaintiffs claim the act violates the state and federal Constitutions. it is unnecessary to set out such allegations at length. We think the constitutional questions are sufficiently raised by the petition in the injunction suit to entitle plaintiffs to have such questions considered in the trial by respondent, if he has jurisdiction to entertain the suit. The various allegations attacking the constitutionality of the act point out the exact constitutional provisions claimed to have been violated, state facts upon which plaintiffs rely, and state the reasons under the facts pleaded why the act violates such provisions.

The petition in the case is very lengthy. and is set out in full in the abstract, several pages thereof being devoted to a statement of the facts which plaintiffs claim constitute irreparable injury to property rights, and authorize injunctive interference. Respondent has made as concise a synopsis as possible of the petition in his brief, and, since we are satisfied that this correctly covers the substance of the petition on the point, we quote such synopsis in full:

"These facts are, in brief, that some hundred firms and corporations are engaged in a business in the city of St. Louis, which falls within the definition and regulations of the law attacked as unconstitutional and void; that their respective businesses have long been followed by the plaintiffs and have been organized and built up into an established course of dealing after many years of effort and expense; that the said pretended act denies to them the right to continue their said businesses and course of...