State v. Hammonds

• Citation: 243 N.C.App. 602,777 S.E.2d 359
• Decision Date: 20 October 2015
• Docket Number: No. COA15–53.,COA15–53.
• Parties: STATE of North Carolina v. Tae Kwon HAMMONDS, Defendant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US)

243 N.C.App. 602
777 S.E.2d 359

STATE of North Carolina
v.
Tae Kwon HAMMONDS, Defendant.

No. COA15–53.

Court of Appeals of North Carolina.

Oct. 20, 2015.

Attorney General, Roy A. Cooper, III, by Assistant Attorney General, Joseph E. Elder, for the State.

Appellate Defender, Staples S. Hughes, by Assistant Appellate Defender, Barbara S. Blackman, for defendant-appellant.

STROUD, Judge.

243 N.C.App. 603

Tae Kwon Hammonds ("defendant") appeals from a judgment entered after a jury found him guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. Defendant argues that the trial court erred in (1) denying defendant's motion to suppress statements made to police officers while he was involuntarily committed; and (2) ordering that defendant pay $50 in restitution. We find no error in part, vacate in part, and remand.

243 N.C.App. 604

I. Background

The following evidence was presented by the State at trial: At approximately 8:30 p.m. on 10 December 2012, Stephanie Gaddy was walking to her car in a Wal–Mart parking lot in Monroe when she noticed three men and a woman leaning against a vehicle about ten parking spaces away. She was about to get into her vehicle when she was approached from behind by a man who said "give me the money" and demanded her purse. Ms. Gaddy noticed that the man was carrying a handgun and realized she was being robbed. The man took her purse and cellphone. At trial, she described the perpetrator as an African–American male with a deep voice but did not identify defendant or any other individual as the perpetrator.

The next day, on 11 December 2012, defendant attempted suicide by taking an overdose of "white pills" and was brought to Carolinas

777 S.E.2d 362

Medical Center Union Hospital ("CMC Union"). At 3:50 p.m., while defendant was being treated at the hospital, a Union County magistrate ordered that defendant be involuntarily committed. Defendant was placed under 24–hour watch, during which a "sitter" was required to continuously observe him and accompany him when he left his room. That night, defendant became agitated and attempted to leave the hospital but was escorted back to his room by hospital security.

At approximately 5:00 p.m. the next day, on 12 December 2012, Detective Jonathan Williams and Lieutenant T.J. Goforth arrived at the hospital to speak with defendant about the robbery of Ms. Gaddy. The police asked Nurse Jan Kinsella, defendant's attending nurse at the time, if they could speak with defendant, which she allowed. The police officers interviewed defendant in his hospital room for approximately one and a half hours and did not inform defendant of his Miranda rights. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966). During the interview, defendant confessed to the robbery, though he denied using a gun.

On or about 4 February 2013, a grand jury indicted defendant for robbery with a dangerous weapon. See N.C. Gen.Stat. § 14–87 (2011). On or about 30 June 2014, defendant moved to suppress the statements he made during the police interview on the grounds that he was subjected to a custodial interrogation without having been given Miranda warnings, and that his confession was involuntary. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress and admitted an audio recording of the interview at trial. The trial court later memorialized its findings of fact

243 N.C.App. 605

and conclusions of law in a written order. On 2 July 2014, the jury found defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon. The trial court sentenced defendant to 60 to 84 months' imprisonment and ordered that defendant pay $50 in restitution. Defendant gave notice of appeal in open court.

II. Motion to Suppress

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because (1) he was "in custody" for purposes of Miranda and did not receive the Miranda warnings; and (2) his confession was involuntary.

A. Standard of Review

The standard of review in determining whether a trial court properly denied a motion to suppress is whether the trial court's findings of fact are supported by the evidence and whether its conclusions of law are, in turn, supported by those findings of fact. The trial court's findings are conclusive on appeal if supported by competent evidence, even if the evidence is conflicting. The determination of whether a defendant's statements are voluntary and admissible is a question of law and is fully reviewable on appeal.

State v. Cortes–Serrano, 195 N.C.App. 644, 654–55, 673 S.E.2d 756, 762–63 (citations and quotation marks omitted), disc. review denied, 363 N.C. 376, 679 S.E.2d 138 (2009). "Additionally, the trial court's determination of whether an interrogation is conducted while a person is in custody involves reaching a conclusion of law, which is fully reviewable on appeal." State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001).

B. Findings of Fact

Defendant's brief recounts much of the evidence from the hearing on the motion to suppress and notes some findings that the trial court could have made but did not. But our standard of review as to the findings of fact does not allow us to substitute our judgment for that of the trial court; the trial court determines the weight and credibility of the evidence. And this order includes full and detailed findings of fact, so we need not speculate about the basis for the trial court's ruling. Defendant ultimately challenges only small portions of three of the trial court's Findings of Fact 2, 6, and 13 as unsupported or at least partially unsupported by the evidence.

243 N.C.App. 606

Finding of Fact 2 states as follows:

That on December 11th, 2012, at approximately 3:50 p.m., Magistrate Sherry Crowder, a Union County Magistrate, issued a custody order for the involuntary commitment of [defendant], and directed the Union County Sheriff's Department to deliver [defendant] to a facility for examination

777 S.E.2d 363

and treatment. That the paper writing introduced into evidence showed that the magistrate found that the defendant was mentally ill and dangerous to himself or others; and the Sheriff's Department was directed to serve such paper writing on the defendant and transport the defendant.

Defendant argues that Finding of Fact 2 was "partially unsupported by the evidence, as the court found that the involuntary commitment order directed the Union County Sheriff's Department to deliver [defendant] to a facility [for] treatment." (Emphasis added.) Defendant is correct that the involuntary commitment order, issued in Union County, directs "any law enforcement officer " to "take [defendant] into custody within 24 hours after this order is signed and transport [defendant] directly to a 24–hour facility designated by the State for the custody and treatment of involuntary clients and present [defendant] for custody, examination and treatment pending a district court hearing." (Emphasis added and portion of original in all caps.) The evidence also showed that a law enforcement officer from the Union County Sheriff's Office executed this order. The exact wording of Finding of Fact 2 is not strictly supported by the record, but defendant has not demonstrated how the wording of the finding is prejudicial to him, and the substance of the facts is supported by the record. This argument is without merit.

Defendant also argues that Finding of Fact 13, "that nurses were in and out of the room during the interview and that [defendant] ‘was never isolated without the ability to contact others,’ was unsupported by the evidence." (Quoting Finding of Fact 13.) Finding of Fact 13 in its entirety is as follows:

The defendant was interviewed by Detective Williams of the Monroe Police Department and Detective T.J. Goforth at approximately five p.m. on December the 12th. They spoke with the defendant for approximately one and [a] half hours. No Miranda Rights were given to the defendant. On at least three occasions, however, the defendant was told that, "there were no arrest warrants

243 N.C.App. 607

with the officers," and that they were not here to "lock you up." Indeed the defendant was not arrested and there were no warrants present at the time they spoke with the defendant. It is clear from the conversation that the officers had with the defendant that they knew that he was hospitalized as a result of an overdose, whether accidental or intentional, and had been involuntarily committed, and would be going for further evaluation and treatment. But although the defendant's words seem to be muttered, especially initially, they were appropriate responses to the statements or questions from the officers. The defendant answered the questions or statements coherently and appropriately. Throughout the conversation the defendant never asked the officers to leave or to stop talking. There was actually a sitter watching the interview, and nurses were in and out. The defendant was never isolated without the ability to contact

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