State v. Hanapole, 19142

Decision Date17 December 1970
Docket NumberNo. 19142,19142
Citation178 S.E.2d 247,255 S.C. 258
CourtSouth Carolina Supreme Court
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Larry HANAPOLE and Terry Cobb, Appellants.

C. Rauch Wise, Greenwood, for appellants.

Solicitor Philip K. Wingard, Lexington, Atty. Gen. Daniel R. McLeod and Asst. Atty. Gen. Hubbard W. McDonald, Jr., Columbia, for respondent.

MOSS, Chief Judge:

The President of the United States, The Honorable Richard Milhous Nixon, was scheduled to arrive at the Columbia Metropolitan Airport during the morning of May 3, 1969. In view of this event tight security measures were obviously necessary. The Airport Commission was charged with the duty and responsibility of preparing the facilities of the airport for the arrival of the President and his party. In furtherance of this objective, the Commission established liaison with the Federal Secret Service and also enlisted the aid of several South Carolina Law Enforcement Agencies, and they jointly developed plans for the protection of the President and his party and to insure public order at the airport. Plans were also made to provide for the spectators who were expected to be on hand to welcome the President. It was decided to set up a roped off area for spectators adjacent to the landing ramp, thereby physically separating such spectators from the President and his party. Security officers were placed at the entryways to the spectators area with instructions that any individual carrying objects that could be used as a weapon, or carrying an obscene sign, would be denied admittance to the area unless they left such objects and signs outside. Likewise, all bulky items in which a weapon could be concealed would have to be searched before such could be taken into the spectators area.

The record reveals that shortly before the arrival of the President's plane, approximately 5,000 people had assembled in the roped off area and were orderly and well behaved as they awaited the coming of the President.

The appellants, along with several others, came to the airport about twenty-five minutes before the scheduled arrival of the plane bearing the President and his party. This group came to the airport to voice their opposition to the involvement of the United States in the war in Vietnam and carried certain signs and banners expressing these views, some of which were attached to sticks or staffs. This group was conspicuous by reason of their dress and the carrying of the signs and banners. There is evidence that those who had already assembled in the spectators area became restless and uneasy at the sight of this group. When this group of individuals reached the roped off area, they asked for Sheriff Day, one of the law officers in charge of the security force. Sheriff Day came forward and introduced himself to the group and informed them that if they desired to enter the spectators area they would have to leave their sticks and obscene signs outside and that the rolled up banners carried by some of the group would have to be inspected. He also informed them that if they would comply with this request they would be admitted to the spectators area. Some of the group failed to comply with the directive of the sheriff and were told that they would have to leave the premises. Upon their refusal, seven of the group, including the appellants, were placed under arrest and later charged with disorderly conduct and trespass.

The warrants charged the appellants, and five others, on May 3, 1969, with (1) 'The crime of disorderly conduct in that on said date, at the Columbia Metropolitan Airport, West Columbia, South Carolina, the above named persons did use vulgar and abusive language and did act in a generally disorderly manner, all in a boisterous manner', in violation of Section 16--558 of the Code; and (2) 'Did enter into the place of business and premises of the Richland-Lexington Airport Commission and without good cause or excuse did fail and refuse to leave immediately after being requested and ordered to leave by Carroll W. Day, Sheriff of Lexington County', in violation of Section 16--388 of the Code.

All of the defendants named in the warrants, with the exception of the appellants, entered guilty pleas in the Magistrate's Court to the disorderly conduct and trespass charges, and were fined $100.00. The appellants, represented by retained counsel, entered pleas of not guilty to both charges and were tried before a jury in the Magistrate's Court in the City of West Columbia and were found guilty as charged and were sentenced to sixty days imprisonment on the Lexington County chain gang. The appellants appealed from said conviction and sentence to the Court of General Sessions for Lexington County, asserting that the conviction in said Magistrate's Court should be reversed or at least a new trial should be granted, such being predicated upon exceptions charging error in the Magistrate's Court. The Honorable Louis Rosen, presiding judge, by order dated March 24, 1969, affirmed the conviction of the appellants and it is from this order that the appellants prosecute this appeal.

The appellants, by appropriate motions in the lower court and by exceptions here, contend that the evidence was insufficient to sustain their conviction and, therefore, there was error in refusing their motions for a directed verdict. In determining whether the trial judge should have granted a verdict of acquittal or submitted the case to the jury, test is whether there is any substantial evidence which reasonably tends to prove the guilt of the accused or from which their guilt may be fairly and logically deduced. State v. Hyder, 242 S.C. 372, 131 S.E.2d 96, and State v. Brazzell, 248 S.C. 118, 149 S.E.2d 339.

Sheriff Day testified that he first saw the appellants when they, along with several others, were about seventy-five yards from his station and approaching this point at a brisk pace. He said that some of the group were carrying signs and banners as they approached. Sheriff Day further testified that when this group of individuals reached his position that someone asked for Sheriff Day and that he stepped forward and introduced himself and informed them 'that they could not bring these objects in unless they were checked, and they had to dispose of the sticks. They made no effort to let us check these objects.' This witness additionally testified that some individuals in this group were carrying red banners and one had what appeared to be a large piece of red cloth rolled up, in which it would have been possible to have concealed a weapon. The sheriff stated that it appeared to him that this group had no intention of laying aside their signs and sticks and they crowded his position. He further testified that there was some rather loud and boisterous talk and he heard obscenities but he was unable to identify any one individual using...

To continue reading

Request your trial
3 cases
  • U.S. v. Bursey
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • July 25, 2005
    ...that the airport was public property and that the relevant South Carolina trespass statute was inapplicable. See South Carolina v. Hanapole, 255 S.C. 258, 178 S.E.2d 247 (1970). As a result, Bursey declined to leave the restricted area. See Verdict at 4, The entire confrontation between Bur......
  • Johnson v. Quattlebaum, 15-2133
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit
    • November 2, 2016
    ...cases Johnson submitted interpreting a prior version of the Statute also do not alter our conclusion about Sarratt. In State v. Hanapole, 178 S.E.2d 247 (S.C. 1970), the South Carolina Supreme Court ruled that the trial court should have directed a verdict in favor of several protesters who......
  • Joseph B., In Interest of, 21842
    • United States
    • South Carolina Supreme Court
    • January 4, 1983
    ...section 16-11-620 does not apply to conduct on public school property. In support of his argument he relies solely on State v. Hanapole, 255 S.C. 258, 178 S.E.2d 247 (1970), where we stated that section 16-11-620 applies only to trespasses on private property, and where we held that the sta......

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT