State v. Haney
| Decision Date | 30 June 1837 |
| Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | THE STATE v. JOHN HANEY. |
1. The unsupported testimony of an accomplice, if it produces entire belief of the prisoner's guilt, is sufficient to warrant a conviction. And the usual direction to the jury not to convict upon it, unless supported by other testimony, is only a precautionary measure to prevent improper confidence being reposed in it; and the propriety of giving this caution must be left to the discretion of the judge who tries the cause.
2. When there are several counts in an indictment, the state may be ruled to elect upon which the trial shall be had; but this is done only to prevent injury to the accused where the counts contain charges of distinct offences, but never where there are only variations in the mode of charging the same.
3. Where an association for a criminal purpose is proved to exist, the acts of one of the associates in furtherance of that purpose, as well as his declarations in respect of it, are admissible against the others; and this where the actor declaration is subsequent to the actual perpetration of the crime.
4. A judge is not bound to recapitulate all the evidence to the jury; it is sufficient for him to direct their attention to the principal questions which they have to investigate, and to explain the law applicable to the case; and this particularly, when he is not called upon by the counsel to give a more full charge.
5. An indictment under the act of 1779, (Rev. c. 142.) which charges the seduction of a slave to be with an intent "to sell, dispose of and convert to his own use," is sufficient. For the felony created by the
act, is sufficiently described by charging the seduction to be with an intent "to sell;" and the words, "dispose of and convert to his own use," do not extend the intention imputed, beyond that of an intention to sell, and at worst, are only redundant.
6. And charging the taking to be "by violence, seduction and other means," is not repugnant, as both violence and seduction may have been used; but if it were double, it is aided by a verdict finding the taking to be by seduction only.
7. The words, "other means," if used alone, would be too indefinite; but taken in connection with the words, "by violence and seduction," they are merely superfluous.
8. A count on the act of 1779, for the seduction of a slave, need not charge him to be of any value.
The prisoner, with two others, were indicted at Rutherford, on last Circuit, as follows:
Haney, by consent, was tried alone; and before the jury were impannelled, it was moved for the prisoner, that the solicitor should elect upon which count of the indictment the trial should be had; but his Honor Judge Pearson disallowed the motion. Besides those necessary to prove title in the prosecutrix, &c, the only witness for the prosecution, was one Robins, who was an accomplice, and who detailed at great length all the particulars of the seduction of the slave.
He stated that the plan for the seduction, was devised by Hardin and himself; that after the slave came into their possession, he, the witness, carried him to South Carolina and sold him. He was proceeding to state the particulars of the transaction, when he was asked by the prisoner's counsel, whether he had seen the prisoner after the plan was matured; he answered that he had not until his return from South Carolina, when he met the prisoner and Hardin, and divided the proceeds of the sale. It was objected for the prisoner, that testimony of intermediate acts was not admissible against him; but the objection was over-ruled. Other witnesses were called on both sides, but their testimony was either to confirm or impeach Robins; and the result of the evidence in the case was, that the guilt of the prisoner depended upon Robin's credibility.
His Honor instructed the jury, "that an accomplice was a competent witness; but that it was not safe to convict upon the testimony of an accomplice, unless itwas supported in some of its material parts, by the testimony of other witnesses, so as to carry to their minds full and entire conviction of its truth." The counsel for the prisoner, prayed his Honor to instruct the jury, that they ought not to find the prisoner guilty upon the testimony of Robins, unless his testimony as to the agency of the prisoner in the transaction, was supported by the testimony of other witnesses. This instruction his Honor refused to give, but charged that the law did not make such confirmation indispensable, although it would be more satisfactory; and that if the evidence of the accomplice, from the manner in which it was given, and from the support which his general narrative received from other testimony, carried to their minds full and entire conviction of its truth, it was sufficient to authorize a verdict against the prisoner, although the narrative was not supported by other evidence to that part of it in which the prisoner was stated to have had a personal agency.
The prisoner was acquitted upon the first count, and convicted upon the second; the words of the entry of the verdict being, "who find the defendant guilty of the felony and seduction in manner and form as charged in the second count of the bill of indictment, and not guilty in manner and form as charged in the first count of said bill."
A new trial was moved for—1st. Because the judge refused to instruct the jury to acquit the prisoner, unless the evidence of Robins was corroborated as to the prisoner's agency in the transaction.
2nd. Because the judge recited the testimony for the prosecution, and did not recite that for the defence. This motion being over-ruled, a motion in arrest of judgment was made: 1st. Because the indictment did not set forth the offence as described by the statute—it charging the seduction to be "with an intention to sell, dispose of and convert to their own use"—whereas the words of the statute were "with an intention to sell or dispose of to another, or appropriate to his own use."
2nd. Because the indictment was double, and repugnant in charging the taking to be "by violence, seductionand other means;" and, also, because the intent charged was to "sell, dispose of and convert to their own use."
3rd. Because the slave was not charged to be of any value. This motion being also over-ruled, and judgment of death pronounced, the prisoner appealed.
GASTON, Judge: We have deliberately considered of all the objections presented on this record to the regularity of the conviction of the prisoner.
The indictment contains two counts. The first charges "that John C. Hardin, John Haney and John W. Williams, on 1 Jan., 1837, with force and arms, in the county of Rutherford, one negro man slave, by the name of Eli, then and there being the property of Nancy Davis, of the value of fifty dollars, feloniously did steal, take and carry away, contrary to the form of the statute in that case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state;" and the second charges "that the said John C. Hardin, John Haney and John W. Williams, on the day and year aforesaid, with force and arms, in the county aforesaid, one other man slave, named Eli, then and there being the property of Nancy Davis, and then and there in the possession of her, the said
Nancy, feloniously by violence, seduction and other means, him the said man Eli, slave as aforesaid, against the will and consent of her, the said Nancy Davis, owner as aforesaid, did take and convey away from the possession of her, the said owner, with an intention the said slave to sell, dispose of and convert to their own use, contrary to the form of the statute in that case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the state." The said John C. Hardin, John Haney and John W. Williams having been arraigned, pleaded not guilty; and, by consent of the counsel for the state and of the prisoner, he was put upon his trial, separate and alone from the other two persons accused. The prisoner thereupon, by his counsel, prayed the Court that the solicitor for the state should elect upon which of the two counts he would try the prisoner; which prayer was over-ruled by the Court. The prisoner was then tried and found "guilty of the felony and seduction in manner and form as charged in the second count of the bill of indictment, and not guilty in manner and form as charged in the first count of said bill."
It is no objection on a demurrer, and is certainly, therefore, not good in arrest of judgment, that several felonies are charged against a prisoner in the same indictment, for on the face of an indictment, every distinct count imports to be for a different offence. It is, however, in the discretion of the Court, to quash an indictment, or compel the prosecutor to elect on which count he will proceed, when the counts charge offences actually distinct and separate. They exercise this discretion, lest the...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Tilley
...N.C. 484, 2 S.E. 363; State v. Stroud, 95 N.C. 626; State v. Holland, 83 N.C. 624, 35 Am.Rep. 587; State v. Hardin, 19 N.C. 407; State v. Haney, 19 N.C. 390. Bowman was entrusted at most with the bare custody of the goods, whose possession in contemplation of law remained in the Brown-Roger......
-
State v. Barnes
...first instances in which this Court dealt with the concerted actions of multiple defendants date back at least 160 years. In State v. Haney, 19 N.C. 390 (1837), we noted that "where a privity and community of design has been established, the act of any one of those who have combined togethe......
-
State v. Beal
...charge be plain, intelligible, and explicit, and sufficient matter appear in the bill to enable the court to proceed to judgment. State v. Haney, 19 N.C. 390. duplicity is ground only for a motion to quash, made in apt time, and is cured by verdict. State v. Burnett, 142 N.C. 577, 55 S.E. 7......
-
Diggs v. United States
... ... contenting himself by merely referring to it as having been ... taken, and by testifying to his state of mind for some days ... previous to the taking of that trip. Now this was the ... defendant's privilege, and, being a defendant, be could ... been set aside by reason of the court refusing so to ... instruct or advise.' ... The ... court, in that case, cited State v. Haney, 19 N.C ... 390, in which, it was said, the Supreme Court of North ... Carolina had declared the true rule upon the subject, which ... was that: ... ...