State v. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co.

• Citation: 13 S.W. 406,101 Mo. 120
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri
• Decision Date: 10 March 1890
• Parties: STATE ex rel. LOVE v. HANNIBAL & ST. J. R. CO.

13 S.W. 406

101 Mo. 120

STATE ex rel. LOVE v. HANNIBAL & ST. J. R. CO.

Supreme Court of Missouri.

March 10, 1890.

RAILROAD COMPANIES—TAXATION FOR PAST YEARS — STATE BOARD OF EQUALIZATION—ROAD TAX.

1. Act Mo. 1871, pp. 56-59, creating a state board of equalization to adjust and equalize the valuation of railroad property, and authorizing them, on "the evidence produced before them," to increase or reduce the aggregate valuation of any railroad property as "they may deem just and right," does not require them to base their valuation on any other evidence than the report of the company's officer; nor does it require them to preserve the evidence in the record of their proceedings.

2. Section 3 of this act, providing for taxation for past years, on the valuation to be adjusted and equalized by such board, of property which "shall have been subjected to taxation" prior to the passage of the act, but shall not have been assessed, refers only to such property as before the passage of the act was subject and liable to taxation, but has escaped it through inattention of the owner or inadvertence of the county officers.

3. The fact that the board fixes the same valuation for past years as for the year in which the assessment is made does not raise such a suspicion that it has acted arbitrarily and without evidence as will overcome the legal presumption that it has honestly discharged its duties.

4. Const. Mo. 1875, prescribing a limit to taxation, applies only to taxes for years subsequent to its adoption, and does not affect the validity of levies made after its adoption for years prior thereto.

5. Act Mo. 1868, p. 151, repealing former acts relating to taxes for maintenance of public roads, provides in section 7 that county courts may borrow money on the credit of the county for the purpose of opening and repairing public roads, and levy a tax to meet the interest thereon. Section 27 provides that, for the purpose of opening, repairing, and improving roads, and in order to raise the necessary funds, the county courts shall levy a special tax, which shall be known as the "road tax," said levy to be made as the county revenue is levied; and that all property subject to pay a county tax shall be made subject to pay a road tax. Subsequent acts classify all taxes into state, county, township, school, and municipal taxes. Held, that the road tax is a county tax, within the meaning of the special charter of defendant company, (Act Mo. 1847, p. 157, § 4,) exempting said company from payment of county taxes.

Appeal from circuit court, Caldwell county; J. M. DAVIS, Judge.

Strong & Mosman and Thos. E. Turney, for appellant. Crosby Johnson, for respondent.

BRACE, J.

This is an action, brought in the name of the state, at the relation of the collector of Caldwell county, to recover certain taxes assessed and levied against the property of the defendant in said county for the years 1867, '68, '69, '70, '71, '72, '73, '74, '75, '76, and '77, with interest, and penalties for the non-payment of the same. The plaintiff recovered judgment for the amount of the road tax for all of said years except the year 1873, and for the amount of the school taxes for the years 1867 to 1872, both inclusive; the whole aggregating, with costs, the sum of $78,121.12. The court found for the defendant as to all the taxes for the year 1873, and as to all other taxes for other years sued for, except the items stated. The taxes for which judgment was recovered were upon the defendant's real estate and road-bed, together with the side tracks and station-houses appurtenant thereto, situate in said county. The errors assigned, and for which it is contended the judgment should be reversed, will be noticed in the order in which they are urged by counsel.

1. It is conceded by counsel that it was shown by competent evidence that the road and school taxes for the years 1867 to 1872, inclusive, were levied in pursuance of the valuation placed upon defendant's property in said county by the state special board of equalization for railroad property, created by act of the general assembly. Sess. Acts 1871, pp. 56-59. But it is contended that that evidence, consisting in part of the journal of the proceedings of said board, also shows that the valuation of defendant's property made by its president was increased by the board without notice, — arbitrarily, and without hearing any evidence. It appears satisfactorily from the evidence that the board met and continued in session at the time and place when and where the assessment was made as required by law, of which time and place it was the duty of the defendant to take notice; that they took up the return made by the defendant of its property, and made this assessment "after mature deliberation." The only ground for the contention that they made the increase without evidence is that the record of their proceedings does not show affirmatively that such increase was made upon any other evidence than the return of defendant's officers. The law did not require that the evidence upon which they based their valuation should be preserved, or upon what evidence it should be based. Upon "the evidence produced before them," they were required to increase or reduce the aggregate valuation of any railroad company as "they may deem just and right." Section 7, p. 57, supra. There is no foundation for the contention that there was no evidence before them upon which to base an increase. They had the report of the defendant of its own valuation of its property, and of every other railroad company in the state, as a basis for equalization, — for increase or reduction to such a standard as to them might "seem just and right." What other evidence they may have had in regard to the value of defendant's property does not appear upon the face of the record of the board, nor was it necessary that it should so appear. Hannibal & St. J. R. Co. v. State Board, 64 Mo. 294. That the board fixed the same valuation upon defendant's property for the precedent years that they did for 1872 may raise a suspicion in the minds of counsel that they acted arbitrarily and without evidence, but such a suspicion, surely, ought not to be permitted to overcome the legal presumption that these sworn officers, acting in a quasi judicial capacity, honestly discharged their duties; and against any mere mistake of their judgment no court can give relief except by a direct review of such judgment in a manner provided by law. We find no error in the ruling of the court that the taxes were legally assessed in this respect, if the defendant's property was subject to taxation for the years for which they were so assessed.

2. It is contended that the defendant's property is not liable for the school taxes for the years 1867-1872, for which plaintiff recovered judgment, for the reason that, although subject to taxation for school purposes for those years, (Livingston Co. v. Railroad Co., 60 Mo. 516,) yet, not having been subjected to taxation for such purposes, by appropriate legislation, prior to the act of March 10, 1871, it could not be subjected to taxation, under the provisions of that act, for those years. For support of this contention, reliance is placed on the language of the third section of said act, and upon the decision in State v. Railroad Co., 77 Mo. 202. Said section reads as follows: "Sec. 3. In case any such railroad or other property of any such company, heretofore specified, shall have been subjected to taxation, prior to the passage of this act, for any year for which it shall not have been assessed and paid taxes, then," etc. In Livingston Co. v. Railroad Co., supra, in construing this section in an action for taxes levied under the same act against the property of defendant in that county, the court, per NAPTON, J., uses this language: "This section does not undertake to subject to taxation property which at the date of the ordered assessment was not liable to taxation, but merely to declare that, in case property which has been subject to taxation prior to the passage of the act has escaped taxation either through the inattention of the owner or of the county officers, those back taxes shall be assessed and collected." School taxes for the same years were included in the action in that case, as in this; and that case would seem to be decisive of the question, unless the contention can be maintained upon the authority of the case in 77 Mo. 202, in which, in effect, it was held, in favor of a subsequent purchaser, that a lien in favor of the state could not be created against the property in specie of the defendant railroad company, for taxes for the years preceding the levy and assessment under that act, whose capital stock during those years had been subjected by appropriate legislation to taxation, upon the principle that it was not to be held that the legislature intended to favor double taxation, and that, having provided for the taxation of the capital stock during those years, the property of the company in specie could not be subjected to a lien attempted to be thereafter created for such taxes upon the property in specie. The case at bar is to be distinguished from that in this: that the capital stock of the defendant during those years was neither subject to nor subjected to taxation for school purposes for the reason that, by legislative enactment, its capital stock was exempt from taxation for such purposes, and its property in specie was subject to taxation therefor, as will more fully appear in the subsequent discussion of another branch of the case, and was subjected thereto by the general legislation providing for the levy and collection of taxes upon such property in specie. Sess. Acts 1852, p. 15, § 3; Gen. St. 1865, c. 11, p. 95, § 1, and c. 46, pp. 262, 263, § 21 et seq. Consequently, there is no question of double taxation in this case, the vital one, which lay at the root of the controversy in that case, and...