State v. Harding

• Citation: 260 Minn. 464,110 N.W.2d 463
• Decision Date: 21 July 1961
• Docket Number: No. 38119,38119
• Parties: STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard Ernest HARDING, Appellant.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 463

110 N.W.2d 463

260 Minn. 464

STATE of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Richard Ernest HARDING, Appellant.

No. 38119.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

July 21, 1961.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Under Minn.St. 630.29, trial court in its discretion may permit a defendant to withdraw a plea of Guilty and to substitute therefor a plea of Not guilty.

2. Where defendant's statements and admissions made at the time he entered a plea of guilty to the crime with which he was charged appear conclusive as to his guilt and he proffers nothing to indicate that a jury would arrive at any different conclusion, Held trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying his request to withdraw his plea of guilty and to substitute a plea of not guilty therefor.

Richard Ernest Harding, in pro. per.

Walter F. Mondale, Atty. Gen., George Scott, County Atty., Bruce Stone, Harlan M. Goulett, Asst. County Attys., Minneapolis, for respondent.

THOMAS GALLAGHER, Justice.

Defendant appeals from an order of the district court denying his motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty to the crime of attempted murder in the first degree with which he and three others were jointly charged; and from a judgment of conviction.

On July 18, 1959, defendant appeared in municipal court of Minneapolis and demanded a preliminary hearing with respect to the complaint. This was set for July 22, 1959, and on that date he appeared with his counsel, waived preliminary hearing, and was bound over to the district court to await trial.

On July 23, 1959, defendant appeared with counsel and was arraigned in the District Court of Hennepin County on an information which charged him with attempted murder in the first degree. He entered a plea of not guilty thereto and posted bail in the sum of $5,000. His trial was set for September 14, 1959. On August 11, 1959, his previous counsel having withdrawn, defendant retained Arthur Johnson as his counsel. On September 14, 1959, with his new counsel, he appeared in district court and consented that the date for his trial be set for September 21, 1959.

On September 15, 1959, prior to the date set for trial, defendant appeared before the Honorable John A. Weeks and requested permission to withdraw his plea of not guilty and enter a plea of guilty. Thereupon his plea of guilty was accepted and a presentence investigation was ordered. Defendant remained at liberty on bail until October 23, 1959, the date set for sentencing. On that date, defendant and his counsel again appeared. His counsel thereupon asked leave of the court to withdraw as counsel. At the same time, defendant asked leave to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty to the charge. The court took these requests under advisement and continued the case to November 2, 1959.

On November 2, 1959, Judge Weeks made an order denying defendant's motion to withdraw his plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty, but did not rule upon the motion of his counsel to withdraw. At that time defendant was sentenced to an indeterminate term at the State Prison in Stillwater. On April 29, 1960, he appealed to this court from the order denying his motion to withdraw the plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty and from the judgment entered. ¹

1. The basis for defendant's motion to change his plea to not guilty appears to have been his belief that in examination of witnesses sufficient evidence might be elicited to establish that he was not guilty. No statement as to what such evidence would be was submitted. The court, after reviewing detailed statements made by defendant when he entered his plea of guilty, denied the motion on the ground that a jury trial at this stage would be a farce. Minn.St. 630.29, the applicable statute, provides:

'A plea of guilty can in no case be put in except by the defendant himself in open court * * *. At any time before judgment the court may permit it to be withdrawn and a plea of not guilty substituted.'

Numerous decisions of this court establish beyond question that the motion to withdraw a plea of guilty and to enter a plea of not guilty is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court, subject to the usual rules governing its exercise. State v. Jones, 234 Minn. 438, 48 N.W.2d 662; State v. McDonnell, 165 Minn. 423, 206 N.W. 952; State v. Olson, 115 Minn. 153, 131 N.W. 1084; State v. Henspeter, 199 Minn. 359, 271 N.W. 700; State v. Prickett, 217 Minn. 629, 15 N.W.2d 95. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion in denying a motion such as here present, this court must consider all facts and surrounding circumstances which formed the basis of the trial court's determination. Here these would include defendant's statements made at the time he entered his plea of guilty, which appear conclusive as to his participation in a conspiracy to murder George Larsgard for the insurance carried upon his life of which defendant was to receive approximately $5,000. When such statements are considered and viewed in the light of all surrounding circumstances which the court considered, we cannot hold that the court abused its discretion.

2. In State v. Jones, supra, relied upon by defendant, we stated (234 Minn. 441, 48 N.W.2d 664):

'* * * One who has already entered a plea to a criminal complaint does not have the absolute right to withdraw it. * * *

'While it is true that defendant here moved for permission to withdraw his plea of guilty before sentence, it is our opinion that under § 630.29 the matter of granting the request was discretionary with the trial court and not mandatory.' Citing Annotation, 20 A.L.R. 1445; Annotation, 66 A.L.R. 628; 14 Am.Jur., Criminal Law, § 286.

There, in holding that the trial court had abused its discretion in denying defendant's request to change his plea to not guilty, it was said (234 Minn. 443, 48 N.W.2d 665):

'* * * he presented testimony at the pre-sentence hearing from a college dean, students, his schoolmates, a home-town doctor, and a minister as to his apparent outstanding mental qualifications, his good family background, his service record, and his general reputation in college and in his community up to the time of his arrest. In addition to that, the record shows testimony from a medical specialist in neurology and psychiatry, from a member of the staff of the state hospital at Fergus Falls specializing in clinical psychology, and other so-called expert testimony in connection with the type of case involved, and examinations and tests made of defendant. While we are not passing on this testimony, it must be observed that it tended to favor defendant.'

It appears that the basis of our decision in that case was the fact that testimony presented at the presentence investigation clearly indicated that it might bear heavily upon the question of defendant's guilt or innocence. In the instant case such evidence and circumstances are entirely absent. A careful reading of the entire transcript indicates nothing upon which defendant might base support for his claim of innocence. On the contrary, his own admissions and statements appear conclusive as to his guilt of the crime charged and readily explain the trial court's reluctance to authorize his trial for a crime of which he had fully admitted his guilt. Nothing whatever indicative of his innocence, or of his failure to understand the proceedings, was presented, and under such circumstances we do not doubt that the trial court exercised reasonable discretion in denying his motion for a change of plea.

Affirmed.

1 On September 15, 1959, when defendant first changed his plea of not guilty to guilty the following proceedings were had:

'Q. (By the county attorney) Now, it is your desire * * * and you are pleading guilty to attempt to commit murder in the first degree * * *? A. Yes, sir.

'Q. Do you realize that you have a right to trial by jury? A. Yes.

'Q. You have consulted fully on this charge with your counsel, is that correct? A. I have, sir.

'Q. Do you realize the Court may sentence you up to ten years on this charge? A. I realize that, sir.

'Q. You realize that you are presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt if you chose to stand trial? A. Yes.

'Q. On the 9th of July, 1959, in the City of Minneapolis, County of Hennepin, State of Minnesota, you were at an unfinished apartment building at 2801 Pillsbury Avenue South, is that correct? A. That's right.

'Q. and you were with Robert Boyd Vandever on the second floor of that unfinished apartment building, is that correct? A. That's right.

'Q. And you were with Robert Boyd--your purpose of being there was for the demise of George G. Larsgard, is that correct? A. Yes, that was the plan, that Mr. Larsgard would be set upon there; however, if I may clear this up in my answer. The purpose of my being there was not part of that plan. I came there after Mr. Vandever did. In other words--

'Q. Now, my understanding, Mr. Harding, is that the evening before, July 8th, you and Mr. Tree visited this unfinished apartment building, is that correct? A. Yes.

'Q. And you went over a plan for the demise of Mr. George Larsgard for the purpose of collecting insurance that was on the life of Mr. Larsgard * * *? A. That is correct, sir.

'Q. Then the following evening on July 9, 1959, you were present in the building with Mr. Vandever, is that correct, to intercept Mr. Larsgard? A. I was present in the building, but not at first with Mr. Vandever.

'Q. But you were there with him? A. I was in the building. This is the point I wish to clear up, sir.

'Q. Then did Mr. Larsgard come in that building? A. Yes, he did.

'Q. Who did he come in with? A. He came in in the presence of William Hancox.

'Q. You had gone over this plan with William Hancox before that, is that correct? A. I primarily had gone over it with Robert Vandever. Mr. Hancox, I wasn't too familiar with. I hardly know him at this point.

'Q. I see. And then, in your...