State v. Harper
| Decision Date | 26 January 1876 |
| Citation | 6 S.C. 464 |
| Parties | STATE v. HARPER. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
BEFORE SHAW, J., AT WILLIAMSBURG, MARCH TERM, 1875.
Indictment in the Circuit Court of General Sessions against Thomas Harper for petit larceny in stealing a watch alleged to be of the value of ten dollars.
The defendant was convicted, and when called up for sentence, Mr Maurice, his attorney, moved in arrest of judgment on the ground that the Court of General Sessions had no jurisdiction in cases of petit larceny, the jurisdiction being exclusively in the Courts of Trial Justices.
His Honor overruled the motion, and after sentence the defendant appealed to this Court.
Maurice , for appellant:
1. The different Courts provided for by the Constitution will be found in Article IV, Section 1.
2. The Court of General Sessions has no jurisdiction, where jurisdiction is given to another Court-in other words wherever jurisdiction in any case or class of cases is " otherwise provided for by law," the Court of General Sessions has no jurisdiction.-See Article IV, Section 18; and in McIver vs. State , (2 S. C., 3,) see the following pertinent and decisive language of Chief Justice Moses, directly in point, giving construction to this clause of the Constitution. He says: -See also Dud., 167.
3. For the jurisdiction of Justices of the Peace, see Article IV, Section 22.
4. That not only jurisdiction but exclusive jurisdiction of all offenses less than felony, and in which the punishment does not exceed a fine of $100 or imprisonment for thirty days, is given to Justices of the Peace or " other officers authorized by law ." -See Article I, Section 19.
5. That a Trial Justice, as now known in this State, is such " other officer," and that the General Assembly may confer upon such officer the powers and jurisdiction intended for Justices of the Peace.-See State vs. Fillebrown , 2 S. C., 404.
6. That the General Assembly has conferred upon Trial Justices the power and jurisdiction in criminal cases intended for Justices of the Peace, will appear in comparing Sections 21, 22 and 23 of Article IV, and Section 19, Article I, of the Constitution with Chapter XXV of the General Statutes, p. 196, relating to Trial Justices, and particularly that portion at p. 196, headed " " " " Criminal Jurisdiction."
7. By the statute last mentioned, Trial Justices have two classes of criminal jurisdiction, (consistent with and agreeable to Article I, Section 19, of the Constitution.) One is of any and all offenses which are subject to the penalties of either fine or forfeiture, not exceeding $100 or imprisonment in the jail or workhouse not exceeding thirty days. The other is of all offenses (less than felonies) of which they are expressly given jurisdiction, though the particular Section conferring jurisdiction is silent as to the punishment to be imposed. In other words, one Section gives jurisdiction on account of the character of the offense, (being less than felony,) while the other gives jurisdiction by the character and limitation of the punishment, (fine not exceeding $100 or imprisonment not exceeding thirty days.) These Sections must be taken in pari materia , and read together as a whole.-Gen. Stat., 196, §§ 8, 9, 12.
8. Petit larceny is the stealing of any article of property below the value of $20, and is a misdemeanor.-Gen. Stat., 716, § 12.
9. That jurisdiction of petit larceny is expressly given to Trial Justices, and is, therefore, otherwise provided for by law than by giving it to the Courts of General Sessions.-See Gen. Stat., 196, § 12. That no punishment is fixed in this particular Section makes no difference, as this is controlled by the joint effect of Sections 8, 12 and 9, the last of which fixes the punishment, consistently with the Constitution, in all cases of which jurisdiction is given to Trial Justices.
10. That the Court of General Sessions has no power to punish for petit larceny, and has not a concurrent jurisdiction of such an offense, will negatively appear by the absence from our statutes of any provision conferring such power or jurisdiction. The nearest approach to such authority may be found in Section 1, p. 749, of the General Statutes. But this does not apply to a case of petit larceny, for, as we have already seen, the punishment of that offense is provided for by statute.
11. For the power to punish after conviction, the Court cannot fall back upon the common law, for petit larceny is exclusively a statutory offense since the Act of 1866. The indictment must be under the statute, ( State vs. Gray , 14 Rich. 174,) and so must the punishment. The Act of 1866 is re-enacted in the General Statutes, 616, Section 12, and Sections 8, 9 and 12, p. 196, fix the questions of jurisdiction and punishment beyond all doubt. It follows, therefore, that the Court of General Sessions has no jurisdiction either to try or to punish a case of petit larceny.
Melton , Attorney General, with whom was Atkinson , Solicitor, contra:
First . The argument of appellant depends upon the decision of this Court in McIver vs. State , (2 S. C., 1.) This case is not in point, because-
1. The writ of mandamus is not " a criminal case" in the sense intended by Section 18 of Article IV of the Constitution. On the contrary, " it is reasonable to suppose," says the Chief Justice, " that, by vesting in the Court of Common Pleas the right to issue it, the Convention regarded the writ, contrary to what had been the received and accepted opinion in South Carolina, and intended, in the language of Tappan, 7, to assimilate it, both in its direct and incidental process, to an action." Upon this, rather than upon the dictum relied upon by the appellant, the case turns.
2. The case involved the construction of two Sections of the same Article of the Constitution-the fifteenth, which gave to the Courts of Common Pleas " power to issue writs of mandamus ," and the eighteenth, which gave to the Court of General Sessions " exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal cases ," in such juxtaposition that plainly the one could not have been intended to include the other; whereas the case now before the Court involves the construction of the eighteenth Section, with reference to an Act of the General Assembly, itself of doubtful meaning.
3. This proposition is enforced by reference to the decision of this Court in State vs. Fillebrown , (2 S. C.,) in which (page 408) the Chief Justice declares that " the Court rested its refusal in McIver vs. The State on the fact that the Constitution took from the Sessions jurisdiction in all criminal cases whenever it gave it to another Court , and, therefore, the former jurisdiction of the Court of Sessions was gone."
4. For the purposes of the argument, it may be admitted that exclusive jurisdiction is given to Trial Justices by Section 19, Article I, of the Constitution over " all offenses less than felony and in which the punishment does not exceed a fine of $100 or imprisonment for thirty days; " but it is not, therefore, to be inferred that the jurisdiction is exclusive in other cases where it is conferred upon Trial Justices by the General Assembly. The power of the General Assembly to confer such jurisdiction need not here be questioned; only the power to make it exclusive is denied.
The language of Section 18, Article IV, of the Constitution is: " The Court of General Sessions shall have exclusive jurisdiction over all criminal cases which shall not be otherwise provided for by law." The decisions under consideration go to the point that this Section does not include or refer to " " cases otherwise provided for" by the Constitution , and they decide nothing in reference to criminal cases, which are otherwise provided for by law -that is, by statute. In reference to the latter cases, where the Constitution is silent and the statute makes provision, the construction is plain that the jurisdiction of the Court of General Sessions, if not exclusive, is at least concurrent .
5. On this point, however, the manuscript decision in Burge vs. Willis , heard before this Court at November Term, 1873, is conclusive, and establishes the proposition that in the case now before the Court the Court of General Sessions has at least concurrent jurisdiction. The words of Section 15 of Article IV, conferring jurisdiction upon the Court of Common Pleas, are almost identical with, and clearly have the same effect as, those of Section 18, conferring jurisdiction upon the General Sessions. In relation to the former, the Court say: " The Court of Common Pleas, being a Court of general original jurisdiction in civil cases, and having exclusive original jurisdiction in certain other cases mentioned, it has concurrent jurisdiction in other cases which are cognizable before Justices of the Peace." -See also State vs. Simmons , 4 S. C., 72.
Second . The Court of General Sessions is not a new creation. The name itself imports a reference to a...
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