State v. Harris
| Decision Date | 03 May 2012 |
| Docket Number | 2011–0010.,Nos. 2011–0008,s. 2011–0008 |
| Citation | 972 N.E.2d 509,132 Ohio St.3d 318,2012 -Ohio- 1908 |
| Parties | The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HARRIS, Appellee. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
[Ohio St.3d 318]Syllabus
of the Court
1. When a trial court fails to include a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of an offender's sentence, that part of the sentence void. Resentencing of the offender is limited to the imposition of the mandatory driver's license suspension.
2. A journal entry of conviction need not include a nonmandatory, related forfeiture in order to be a final, appealable order pursuant to Crim.R. 32(C).
William D. Mason, Cuyahoga County Prosecuting Attorney, and T. Allan Regas, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, for appellant.
Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Sarah G. LoPresti, Assistant Public Defender, for appellee.
{¶ 1} This matter involves a certified question related to a conflict between the First and Eighth District Courts of Appeals on whether the failure to include a mandatory driver's license suspension in a criminal sentence renders the sentence void. For the reasons that follow, we answer the question in the affirmative.
{¶ 2} We also accepted discretionary jurisdiction on the following proposition of law: “Because forfeiture of items contemplates actions and issues that extend beyond the criminal case and sentence, Crim.R. 32(C) does not require [that] the forfeiture of items be listed in the sentencing entry.” We agree and reverse the Eighth District Court of Appeals.
[Ohio St.3d 319]I. Factual and Procedural Background
{¶ 3} We are presented with two criminal cases against Mario S. Harris Jr. Because the facts in each case are different, we will refer to the cases as Harris I and Harris II for ease of discussion. In Harris I, Harris pleaded guilty to drug trafficking with schoolyard, firearm, and forfeiture specifications and to having a weapon while under a disability with a forfeiture specification. In a June 3, 2008 journal entry, the trial court imposed a prison sentence of five years but failed to impose a mandatory driver's license suspension and fine,1 as required by R.C. 2925.03(D) and (G). In a June 4, 2008 entry, the trial court ordered the forfeiture of the items specified in the indictment. On January 15, 2010, Harris filed a pro se motion for resentencing, which the court denied. On Harris's appeal, the Eighth District held that pursuant to State v. Baker, 119 Ohio St.3d 197, 2008-Ohio-3330, 893 N.E.2d 163, the trial court's denial of Harris's motion was not a final, appealable order, because the sentencing court had failed to include the terms of forfeiture in the 2008 judgment of conviction. State v. Harris, 190 Ohio App.3d 417, 2010-Ohio-5374, 942 N.E.2d 407, ¶ 7 (8th Dist.).
{¶ 4} In Harris II, Harris pleaded guilty to drug trafficking with an automobile-forfeiture specification. In a June 3, 2008 entry, the trial court imposed a prison sentence and ordered the forfeiture. The court, however, failed to suspend Harris's driver's license as required by R.C. 2925.03(D)(2) and (G). In 2010, the court denied Harris's motion for resentencing. On appeal, the Eighth District held that pursuant to State v. Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d 74, 471 N.E.2d 774 (1984), the sentence was void because the trial court had failed to include a mandatory driver's license suspension as part of Harris's sentence. Harris at ¶ 3. The court reversed the denial of the motion and remanded the case for resentencing. Id.
{¶ 5} The Eighth District certified a conflict between its decision and the First District Court of Appeals' decision in State v. Thomas, 1st Dist. Nos. C–090716 and C–090463, 2010-Ohio-4856, 2010 WL 3894963. We determined that a conflict exists. 128 Ohio St.3d 1423, 2011-Ohio-1049, 943 N.E.2d 571. The state also appealed the Eighth District's decision, and we accepted discretionary jurisdiction over the appeal to consider the state's second proposition of law. 128 Ohio St.3d 1425, 2011-Ohio-1049, 943 N.E.2d 572. We consolidated the cases for review.
II. Analysis
{¶ 6} We first address the conflict: “Does the failure to include a mandatory driver's license suspension in a criminal sentence render that sentence void?”
[Ohio St.3d 320]{¶ 7} This court has consistently recognized a narrow exception to the general rule that sentencing errors are not jurisdictional. Colegrove v. Burns, 175 Ohio St. 437, 195 N.E.2d 811 (1964); State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332. Where a trial court fails to impose a sentence in accordance with statutorily mandated terms, it is void. Colegrove at 438, 195 N.E.2d 811;Beasley, 14 Ohio St.3d at 75, 471 N.E.2d 774;Fischer at ¶ 8.
{¶ 8} After comprehensive changes were made to the criminal sentencing code under 1995 Am.Sub.S.B. No. 2, effective July 1, 1996, we have had cause to consider numerous cases involving instances in which a trial court has failed to properly include a statutorily mandated term in an offender's sentence. Woods v. Telb, 89 Ohio St.3d 504, 733 N.E.2d 1103 (2000); State v. Jordan, 104 Ohio St.3d 21, 2004-Ohio-6085, 817 N.E.2d 864;Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301;State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958;State v. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-954, 926 N.E.2d 278;Fischer.
{¶ 9} In Jordan, we reviewed the statutory requirements for the imposition of postrelease control and held that because a trial court has a statutory duty to provide notice of postrelease control at the sentencing hearing, any sentence imposed without that notification is contrary to law. Jordan at ¶ 23. The court determined that a trial court is required to notify the offender about postrelease control at the sentencing hearing and is further required to incorporate that notice into its journal entry imposing sentence. Id. at ¶ 9. The court determined that the proper remedy for any sentencing error was to remand to the trial court for resentencing. Jordan at ¶ 27.
{¶ 10} The court reiterated this principle in State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 16, in which the court held that when an offender is convicted of or pleads guilty to one or more offenses and postrelease control is not properly included in a sentence for a particular offense, the sentence for that offense is void. Id. at ¶ 16. In considering the type of resentencing, the court held that when a court of appeals remands a case for resentencing because of the trial court's failure to inform the offender at the sentencing hearing that he or she may be subject to postrelease control, the court must conduct a new sentencing hearing in its entirety rather than a hearing limited to reimposing the original sentence with proper notice of postrelease control. Id. at ¶ 13,overruled,Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, ¶ 36.
{¶ 11} In Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-954, 926 N.E.2d 278, we considered whether a trial court's failure to inform an offender in open court of mandatory court costs rendered the offender's entire sentence void. We held that it did not. We explained that there were significant differences between [Ohio St.3d 321]postrelease control and court costs. Specifically, a trial court has a statutory duty to impose postrelease control, while an order to require payment of court costs is discretionary. Id. at ¶ 14–18. Moreover, we noted that the civil nature of court costs distinguished it from the criminal punishment of postrelease control. Id. at ¶ 20–22.
{¶ 12} The court in Fischer reaffirmed part of the holding in Bezak, finding that a sentence that fails to include postrelease control is void, but added the proviso that only the offending portion of the sentence is subject to review and correction. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, at ¶ 27. The court modified the Bezak holding in respect to the type of resentencing that an offender is entitled to receive, Fischer at ¶ 28, and held that the new sentencing hearing is limited to proper imposition of postrelease control, id. at ¶ 29.
{¶ 13} In this case, the Eighth District held that the trial court's failure to include a mandatory driver's license suspension rendered the criminal sentence void pursuant to Beasley. The First District in State v. Thomas, 2010-Ohio-4856, 2010 WL 3894963, held that because “a [mandatory] driver's license suspension is not * * * akin to postrelease control,” a sentence lacking the mandatory driver's license suspension term is not void. Id. at ¶ 11, citing State v. Fain, 188 Ohio App.3d 531, 2010-Ohio-2455, 936 N.E.2d 93, ¶ 6 (1st Dist.).
{¶ 14} We acknowledge that the First District's decision in Fain relies on our decision in Joseph. However, a mandatory driver's license suspension is akin to postrelease control. Like postrelease control, a driver's license suspension is required by law to be part of an offender's sentence. R.C. 2925.03(D)(2) and (G). In addition, if a trial court fails to include either mandatory term, the executive branch is unable to impose either postrelease control or a driver's license suspension once an offender leaves prison. Joseph, 125 Ohio St.3d 76, 2010-Ohio-954, 926 N.E.2d 278, at ¶ 17. Unlike the imposition of court costs, a mandatory driver's license suspension is a criminal sanction.
{¶ 15} Because a mandatory driver's license suspension is a statutorily mandated term, we hold that a trial court's failure to include this term in a criminal sentence renders the sentence void in part. Fischer. Our conclusion reflects the well-established principle that a court acts contrary to law if it fails to impose a statutorily required term as part of an offender's sentence. Colegrove; Beasley.
{¶ 16} Our conclusion, however, resolves only one part of the matter before us. As we discussed in Fischer, the scope of relief is a critical aspect of void...
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