State v. Harrison
| Decision Date | 15 March 1994 |
| Docket Number | No. 14750,14750 |
| Citation | 638 A.2d 601,228 Conn. 758 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | STATE of Connecticut v. Jeffrey L. HARRISON. |
Barry N. Silver, New Haven, for appellant (defendant).
Susan C. Marks, Asst. State's Atty., with whom, on the brief, were Michael Dearington, State's Atty., and Joseph Corradino and Susan M. Naide, Asst. State's Attys., for appellee (state).
Before PETERS, C.J., and BORDEN, BERDON, KATZ and SANTANIELLO, JJ.
The defendant, Jeffrey L. Harrison, was convicted by a jury of operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicating liquor in violation of General Statutes § 14-227a(a)(1). 1 The defendant appealed his conviction to the Appellate Court claiming, inter alia, that his arrest in East Haven by a Branford police officer violated General Statutes § 54-1f. 2 The Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. State v. Harrison, 30 Conn.App. 108, 116, 618 A.2d 1381 (1993). We granted the defendant's petition for certification limited to the following issue: "Whether General Statutes § 14-227a is an 'offense' within the meaning of General Statutes § 54-1f, thus permitting an officer to pursue an offender outside his jurisdiction in order to make a stop at the first safe opportunity?" State v. Harrison, 225 Conn. 921, 625 A.2d 824 (1993). We affirm the judgment of the Appellate Court. 3
The following facts are relevant to this appeal. Officer Kevin Potter of the Branford police department was on patrol on Route 1 in the town of Branford on June 6, 1990. At about 11 p.m. he observed an unoccupied vehicle with its signal light on stopped in front of a bar. He looked into the vehicle and checked its registration through the police computer. Finding nothing unusual at the scene, and no record of the vehicle through the computer, he left the area. A short time later, he observed the same vehicle traveling westbound on Route 1. The vehicle was swaying from side to side within the lane. Potter believed that the driver might be intoxicated. He followed the vehicle with the intention of having the driver pull over so he could investigate. Because the vehicle was on a curve and Potter recognized that a stop at that point would be unsafe, he waited to stop the defendant's vehicle until it had reached a driveway. At that point, the vehicle had just crossed over the East Haven town line. After the defendant admitted that he had been drinking and failed several sobriety tests, Potter placed him under arrest. State v. Harrison, supra, 30 Conn.App. at 110-11, 618 A.2d 1381.
The defendant argues that § 14-227a is not an offense within the meaning of § 54-1f and, therefore, that § 54-1f does not authorize a police officer to pursue a suspected offender outside of his or her jurisdiction to make a stop at the first safe opportunity. Section 54-1f(c) authorizes police officers to continue immediate pursuit beyond their respective jurisdictions of any offender who may be arrested "under the provisions of this section." Accordingly, pursuit of the defendant is authorized if § 14-227a is considered an offense under § 54-1f.
The term "offense" is not defined within § 54-1f itself, or within chapter 959 () or title 54 (criminal procedure) of the General Statutes. When a term is not defined within a statute, the ordinary meaning of the term is used. General Statutes § 1-1. The ordinary meaning of the term "offense" 4 is so broad that it is not particularly instructive in determining whether a motor vehicle violation should be included within the meaning of "offense" under § 54-1f. Because an instructive definition is not available, State v. Guckian, 226 Conn. 191, 198, 627 A.2d 407 (1993).
The defendant urges the court to follow the direction of General Statutes § 53a-2 5 and to apply the definition of offense contained in General Statutes § 53a-24(a). 6 He argues that, because § 54-1f does not expressly provide an alternate definition, we are required to apply the penal code definition of "offense." We disagree.
We have previously held that " '[w]hat may or may not be a criminal offense for purposes of a particular statutory categorization is not necessarily determinative of whether it is a criminal offense for [other] purposes....' " (Citation omitted.) State v. Guckian, supra, 198, 627 A.2d 407. We do not mechanistically apply penal code definitions to a statute but interpret the language in a manner that implements the statute's purpose. See, e.g., id., 202 (); State v. Dukes, 209 Conn. 98, 122, 547 A.2d 10 (1988) (); see also State v. Brown, 22 Conn.App. 108, 112, 575 A.2d 699, cert. denied, 216 Conn. 811, 580 A.2d 61 (1990) (); State v. Kluttz, 9 Conn.App. 686, 698-700, 521 A.2d 178 (1987) (); accord Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 100 S.Ct. 2260, 65 L.Ed.2d 228 (1980) (). Additionally, the Appellate Court has noted that motor vehicle violations are treated as criminal offenses under the Practice Book rules governing procedure in criminal cases. State v. Kluttz, supra, 698 n. 9.
The functions and purposes of § 54-1f determine whether a motor vehicle violation is included within the meaning of "offense." Section 54-1f was enacted before the legislature adopted the penal code. It is instructive, therefore, to consider the legislative history of § 54-1f and the interpretation of that statute by the courts.
Subsection (c) of § 54-1f, the subsection at issue in the present case, was enacted in 1961 to "enact into statutory form the present doctrine of hot pursuit that has been developed in the case law for the benefit of organized police officers...." 9 S. Proc., Pt. 5, 1961 Sess., p. 1593, comments of Senator Paul J. Falsey; see also 9 H.R.Proc., Pt. 3, 1961 Sess., pp. 1559-60. The subsection authorizes police officers to pursue outside their jurisdictions any person who may be arrested under the provisions of § 54-1f(a) or (b). Accordingly, if a person may be arrested under § 54-1f(a) or (b) for a motor vehicle violation, that person may be pursued into another jurisdiction.
The application of § 54-1f(a) has not been restricted to felonies or misdemeanors as defined in the penal code, and thus may be applied to motor vehicle violations. Subsection (a) assumed its present form in 1875 and did not distinguish "between misdemeanors and felonies, but define[d] and prescribe[d] the limitations upon peace officers in making arrests without a warrant 'for any offense.' " Sims v. Smith, 115 Conn. 279, 282, 161 A. 239 (1932). Prior to 1875, the statute had enumerated specific offenses for which an offender could be arrested without a warrant, including " 'profane swearing, drunkenness, or sabbath breaking.' " Id., quoting General Statutes (1821 Rev.) tit. 17, § 2. Section 54-1f(a), formerly § 6-49, which authorizes warrantless arrests under certain circumstances, has been applied to various offenses. See, e.g., State v. Holmes, 160 Conn. 140, 274 A.2d 153 (1970) (); State v. Elliott, 153 Conn. 147, 215 A.2d 108 (1965) (); State v. Spellman, 153 Conn. 65, 212 A.2d 413 (1965) (); McKenna v. Whipple, 97 Conn. 695, 118 A. 40 (1922) (); Price v. Tehan, 84 Conn. 164, 79 A. 68 (1911) ().
Section 54-1f(c) has been applied previously to extrajurisdictional pursuits for motor vehicle violations. See, e.g., State v. Jarvis, 6 Conn.Cir.Ct. 55, 264 A.2d 370 (App.Div.1969); State v. Potter, 3 Conn.Cir.Ct. 41, 207 A.2d 75 (1964). To date, the legislature has not revised the statute.
Furthermore, General Statutes § 53a-2 qualifies its directive to apply the penal code definition of "offense" to other portions of the General Statutes with the phrase "unless the context otherwise requires." Connecticut's statutory scheme reflects "an unambiguous policy aimed at ensuring that our highways are safe from the carnage associated with drunken drivers." State v. Stevens, 224 Conn. 730, 739, 620 A.2d 789 (1993), and cases cited therein. (Citations omitted.) State v. Siano, 216 Conn. 273, 278, 579 A.2d 79 (1990), and cases cited therein. The context of § 54-1f requires us to conclude that the term "offense" as used therein includes motor vehicle violations. Otherwise, the policy stated above could be frustrated by the fortuitous crossing of a town line.
The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.
In this opinion the other Justices concurred.
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