State v. Hartley

• Decision Date: 05 May 2016
• Docket Number: No. 15AP–192.,15AP–192.
• Citation: 64 N.E.3d 472
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. Calin L. HARTLEY, Defendant–Appellee.
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

64 N.E.3d 472

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff–Appellant,

v.Calin L. HARTLEY, Defendant–Appellee.

No. 15AP–192.

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Tenth District, Franklin County.

May 5, 2016.

Ron O'Brien, Prosecuting Attorney, and Steven L. Taylor (argued), for appellant.

Timothy Young, Ohio Public Defender, and Brooke M. Burns (argued), Columbus, for appellee.

DORRIAN, P.J.

{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas granting a motion filed by defendant-appellee, Calin L. Hartley, to vacate his conviction for failure to provide notice of change of address, in violation of R.C. 2950.05. Because we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by granting the motion to vacate, we affirm.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 2} On May 21, 2010, a Franklin County Grand Jury indicted appellee on one count of failure to provide notice of change of address, a fourth-degree felony, in violation of R.C. 2950.05. The indictment asserted that appellee was subject to a change of address notification requirement pursuant to a conviction for importuning entered by the Vinton County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division ("Vinton County juvenile court"), on July 8, 2009. On July 13, 2010, appellee entered a plea of guilty to the charge of failure to provide notice of change of address, and the trial court subsequently issued a judgment entry convicting appellee of that charge and imposing a 5–year period of community control under intensive supervision, including a requirement that appellee undergo sex offender and mental health counseling. Appellee's probation officer filed a request for revocation of probation on May 23, 2011, asserting that appellee violated the terms of his community control. The trial court issued a judgment entry on July 1, 2011, revoking appellee's community control and imposing a sentence of 17 months of imprisonment. The judgment entry further indicated that, on release, appellee would be subject to an optional period of 3 years of postrelease control and that he would be subject to imprisonment for up to 9 months if he violated postrelease control.

{¶ 3} On November 22, 2013, appellee filed a motion to vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, for relief from judgment under Civ.R. 60(B). Appellee asserted that the Ohio Attorney General had removed him from Ohio's sex offender registration database pursuant to the Supreme Court of Ohio's decision in State v. Williams, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108. Appellee claimed that his sex offender classification was void and, therefore, that his conviction for failure to notify must be vacated. The state filed a memorandum contra asserting that appellee's motion should be denied. On December 12, 2013, the trial court issued a judgment entry granting the motion to vacate and terminated appellee's community control. The state requested leave to appeal the trial court's decision to this court, which we granted. We concluded that the trial court's judgment entry, which indicated that it granted the motion to vacate based on the motion "and the reasons outlined therein" failed to establish whether the trial court considered the arguments asserted in the state's memorandum contra the motion to vacate. State v. Hartley, 10th Dist. No. 14AP–29, 2014-Ohio-5300, 2014 WL 6725820, ¶ 9. We declined to address the state's arguments in the first instance and remanded the case to the trial court to consider the arguments contained in the state's memorandum contra. Id. at ¶ 10. On remand, the trial court issued a decision granting appellee's motion to vacate and setting forth its reasons for granting the motion.

II. Assignments of Error

{¶ 4} The state appeals from the trial court's judgment, assigning five errors for this court's review:

[I.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN ADOPTING DEFENDANT'S CONTENTION THAT HIS UNTIMELY RETROACTIVE–LAW CHALLENGE TO HIS TIER I CLASSIFICATION RENDERED THE CLASSIFICATION AND RESULTING CHANGE–OF–ADDRESS CONVICTION "VOID."

[II.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO APPLY RES JUDICATA TO BAR DEFENDANT'S UNTIMELY RETROACTIVE–LAW CHALLENGE.

[III.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE DECISION IN STATE v. WILLIAMS, 129 Ohio St.3d 344, 2011-Ohio-3374, 952 N.E.2d 1108, APPLIED TO DEFENDANT'S LONG–FINAL CONVICTION.

[IV.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO FIND THAT DEFENDANT'S GUILTY PLEA BARRED HIS UNTIMELY RETROACTIVE–LAW CHALLENGE.

[V.] THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AND ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN FAILING TO TREAT DEFENDANT'S "MOTION" AS A TIME–BARRED POST–CONVICTION PETITION.

III. Discussion

A. Standard of Review

{¶ 5} We begin our review of this appeal by considering the proper standard of review for the trial court's decision. Appellee's motion was captioned as a motion to vacate his conviction or, in the alternative, for relief from judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 60(B). The Ohio Rules of Criminal Procedure do not expressly provide for a motion to vacate a conviction; however, "[c]ourts may recast irregular motions into whatever category necessary to identify and establish the criteria by which the motion should be judged." State v. Schlee, 117 Ohio St.3d 153, 2008-Ohio-545, 882 N.E.2d 431, ¶ 12. Pursuant to R.C. 2953.21, a person who has been convicted of a criminal offense or adjudicated a delinquent child and who claims that there was such a denial or infringement of his rights as to render the judgment void or voidable under the state or federal constitution may file a petition asking the court to vacate or set aside the judgment or sentence. R.C. 2953.21(A)(1)(a). In this case, appellee's motion asserted that the trial court was required to vacate his failure to notify conviction because the underlying sex offender classification that formed the basis for that conviction was unconstitutional and void. Accordingly, we will construe appellee's motion to vacate his conviction as a petition for postconviction relief. See State v. Reynolds, 79 Ohio St.3d 158, 160, 679 N.E.2d 1131 (1997) ("[W]here a criminal defendant, subsequent to his or her direct appeal, files a motion seeking vacation or correction of his or her sentence on the basis that his or her constitutional rights have been violated, such a motion is a petition for postconviction relief as defined in R.C. 2953.21.").

{¶ 6} We review a trial court's decision on a petition for postconviction relief for abuse of discretion. State v. Sidibeh, 10th Dist. No. 12AP–498, 2013-Ohio-2309, 2013 WL 2444627, ¶ 7. An abuse of discretion occurs where the trial court's determination is "unreasonable, arbitrary or unconscionable." Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140 (1983). As discussed more fully herein, appellee's petition required the trial court to determine whether appellee's sex offender classification and subsequent failure to notify conviction were void. The determination of whether a judgment is void is a question of law. See Blaine v. Blaine, 4th Dist. No. 10CA15, 2011-Ohio-1654, 2011 WL 1258620, ¶ 19 ("The determination of whether a judgment is void presents a question of law."); State v. Jones, 9th Dist. No. 26854, 2013-Ohio-3710, 2013 WL 4677489, ¶ 6 (quoting Blaine ). We review questions of law under the de novo standard of review. See State v. Blake, 10th Dist. No. 10AP–992, 2011-Ohio-3318, 2011 WL 2586719, ¶ 17.

B. Determination that Failure to Notify Conviction was Void

{¶ 7} The state's main argument is that the trial court erred in concluding that appellee's failure to notify conviction was void and, therefore, abused its discretion by granting appellee's motion. Appellee argued that both the failure to notify conviction and the underlying Tier I sex offender classification that formed the basis for that conviction were void. Although the Vinton County juvenile court's judgment was not subject to direct review by the trial court, the arguments set forth in appellee's motion required the trial court to consider the validity of appellee's classification. "Any court in any jurisdiction certainly has the right to decline to recognize the validity of a void judgment of any other court." Lingo v. State, 138 Ohio St.3d 427, 2014-Ohio-1052, 7 N.E.3d 1188, ¶ 46. Ultimately, the trial court concluded that appellee's classification as a Tier I sex offender was void pursuant to the Williams decision. Therefore, before considering whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting the motion to vacate appellee's failure to notify conviction, we must address whether the trial court erred in determining that appellee's sex offender classification was void.

1. Validity of Underlying Sex Offender Classification

{¶ 8} In the first assignment of error, the state asserts the trial court erred by holding that appellee's Tier I sex offender classification and his conviction for failure to notify were void. In the third assignment of error, the state asserts the trial court erred by concluding that Williams applied to appellee's Tier I sex offender classification. To the extent that the first and third assignments of error both address the trial court's conclusion that appellee's classification as a Tier I sex offender was void, we will address them together.

{¶ 9} Sex offender registration laws are not a recent development in Ohio—in 1963, the General Assembly created a designation of "habitual sexual offender" for individuals convicted two or more times of specified crimes and imposed registration and change of address notification duties on those individuals. Am.S.B. No. 160, 130 Ohio Laws 669–71. In 1996, the General Assembly enacted Ohio's version of the federal "Megan's Law" legislation, which created a comprehensive registration and classification system for sex offenders. State v. Bodyke, 126 Ohio St.3d 266, 2010-Ohio-2424, 933 N.E.2d 753, ¶ 6–7. Under Megan's Law, a sentencing court was required to...