State v. Hartman, No. A04-1020 (MN 1/11/2005)
| Decision Date | 11 January 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. A04-1020.,A04-1020. |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Wayne Roger Hartman, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Appeal from the District Court, Scott County, File No. K-03-11764.
Mike Hatch, Attorney General, and Patrick J. Ciliberto, Scott County Attorney, Michael J. Groh, Assistant County Attorney, (for respondent).
Eric J. Nelson, Allan H. Caplan & Associates, P.A., (for appellant).
Considered and decided by Stoneburner, Presiding Judge; Harten, Judge; and Shumaker, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant Wayne Roger Hartman challenges the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his Alford plea, arguing that the condition that he admit guilt as part of sex-offender treatment violates its terms. Because appellant's plea and its conditions remain lawfully valid, we affirm.
The mother of a developmentally delayed 16-year-old girl (the victim) reported to police that her daughter had been sexually assaulted by appellant, whom the daughter met through a telephone dating service. Appellant invited the victim to stay at his apartment for two days during which he engaged in sexual contact and penetration with her.
Appellant was charged with two counts of third-degree and two counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct. He repeatedly denied guilt to his defense counsel and was ready to proceed with trial. After approximately three-and-a-half to four hours in court before the beginning of jury selection, he decided to accept a plea bargain and pleaded guilty to fourth-degree criminal sexual conduct using an Alford plea.1
After his plea was accepted and before sentencing, appellant met with a probation officer who, appellant claims, first told him that as a condition of probation, he would likely have to admit guilt in order to be accepted into a sex-offender treatment program. Appellant quickly moved to withdraw his plea, arguing that the condition would require him to violate his probation because he would refuse to admit guilt. The district court denied appellant's motion and proceeded to sentencing. At the sentencing hearing, appellant claimed that he felt pressured to accept the guilty plea. Appellant again requested that the district court reconsider his plea withdrawal motion, but the district court denied his request. Appellant was sentenced to six months in jail followed by ten years' probation. Appellant challenges the district court's denial of his motion to withdraw his plea.
A motion to withdraw a plea based on the manifest injustice standard can be brought before or after sentencing. State v. Abdisalan, 661 N.W.2d 691, 693 (Minn. App. 2003), review denied (Minn. 19 Aug. 2003). A manifest injustice does not occur when there is a valid guilty plea. Perkins v. State, 559 N.W.2d 678, 688 (Minn. 1997). To be valid, a guilty plea must be accurate, voluntary and intelligent. State v. Wukawitz, 662 N.W.2d 517, 521 (Minn. 2003).
Appellant does not dispute that his plea was accurate and voluntary, but he asserts that it was not intelligent. A defendant's plea is intelligently entered when he or she "understands the charges, the rights being waived and the consequences of the guilty plea." Brown v. State, 449 N.W.2d 180, 182 (Minn. 1989). The court should not accept a plea if it is doubtful that it is made intelligently. State v. Jones, 267 Minn. 421, 427, 127 N.W.2d 153, 157 (1964).
A collateral consequence of a guilty plea is defined as any consequence that does not flow definitely, immediately, and automatically from a guilty plea. State v. Henthorne, 637 N.W.2d 852, 856 (Minn. App. 2002), review denied (Minn. 27 Mar. 2002). Ignorance of a collateral consequence does not result in an unintelligent plea. See Alanis v. State, 583 N.W.2d 573 (Minn. 1998) (); Berkow v. State, 583 N.W.2d 562 (Minn. 1998) (). While the collateral consequence addressed in these cases was deportation, their precedent applies to all collateral consequences. See Alanis, 583 N.W.2d at 578 ().
The state asserts that because it is speculative, admission of guilt to obtain sex-offender treatment is a collateral consequence, not a direct consequence, of appellant's plea. Moreover, appellant's counsel conceded at oral argument that appellant's admission of guilt to obtain sex-offender treatment is a collateral consequence of a guilty plea. We conclude that this treatment consequence does not render appellant's plea unintelligent.
Appellant contends that the interests of fairness and justice compel withdrawal of his guilty plea. A court may, in its discretion, permit a defendant to withdraw a plea before sentencing "if it is fair and just to do so, giving due consideration to the reasons advanced by the defendant in support of the motion and any prejudice the granting of the motion would cause the prosecution by reason of actions taken in reliance upon the defendant's plea." Minn. R. Crim. P. 15.05, subd. 2. The showing required to withdraw a plea before sentencing is less than that required to withdraw a plea at any time to correct a "manifest injustice." State v. Williams, 373 N.W.2d 851, 853 (Minn. App. 1985) (). But a defendant is not given wide latitude to withdraw his plea without good reason because doing so "would undermine the integrity of the plea-taking process" and permit a defendant to use the guilty plea to lengthen the proceedings. Kim v. State, 434 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 1989). The defendant bears the burden of showing that plea withdrawal is fair and just. Id. A reviewing court will not reverse a district court's decision on allowing plea withdrawal under the fair and just standard absent an abuse of discretion. State v. Kaiser, 469 N.W.2d 316, 320 (Minn. 1991).
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