State v. Hartman

Decision Date15 March 2016
Docket NumberNo. SC 95110,SC 95110
Citation488 S.W.3d 53
PartiesState of Missouri, Respondent, v. Daniel Hartman, Appellant.
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Hartman was represented by Amy M. Bartholow of the public defender's office in Columbia, (573) 777–9977;

And the state was represented by Dora A. Fichter of the attorney general's office in Jefferson City, (573) 751–3321.

George W. Draper III, Judge

Following a jury trial, Daniel Hartman (hereinafter, Hartman) was found guilty of second-degree murder, section 565.021, RSMo 2000,1 armed criminal action, section 571.015, and first-degree burglary, section 569.160. The trial court sentenced Hartman to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for second-degree murder, life imprisonment for armed criminal action, and fifteen years' imprisonment for first-degree burglary. Hartman appeals.

Hartman claims that his due process rights were violated during the guilt phase of his trial because the trial court excluded reliable witness testimony, which could have provided a basis for him to be exonerated. Further, Hartman asserts that during closing argument, the state's request for the jury to draw an adverse inference from the omission of the excluded evidence was erroneous. This Court finds that excluding the evidence violated Hartman's due process rights. Accordingly, the trial court's judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded.

Factual and Procedural Background

On the night of July 5, 2012, J.W. (hereinafter, “Victim”), a known drug supplier, was shot in his home and killed from a single gunshot wound to the chest. While investigating Victim's death, the police discovered that Victim's wound was not from a contact or close-range shot. They found only three bullets in the home: one that killed Victim, one in the wall, and one in the floor. The police's subsequent investigation of the events and people surrounding Victim's homicide resulted in varied and inconsistent statements. Eventually, the state charged Hartman, Jonathan Taylor (hereinafter, Jonathan), Elijah Taylor (hereinafter, “Elijah”),2 Marcus Stephens (hereinafter, “Marcus”), and Cody Stephens (hereinafter, “Cody”),3 in connection with Victim's homicide.

Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment, the events surrounding the night of July 5, 2012, are as follows: Cody visited the apartment of his friend Jonathan, and Jonathan's pregnant girlfriend in Joplin, Missouri. When Cody arrived, Hartman and Marcus were present. The group drank alcohol, used drugs, and eventually decided they needed to rob Victim.

Jonathan called Travis Morris (hereinafter, “Morris”). Morris stated that he could obtain access for Jonathan and determine who was presently in Victim's house. Twenty minutes later, Morris called Jonathan to inform him that Victim and his girlfriend were sleeping inside the house. Morris and Paul Pena (hereinafter, “Pena”) went to Jonathan's apartment.

Then all of the men, except Cody,4 went to Victim's house.5 Morris informed the group that Victim had an assault rifle in the house and that Victim knew karate or kickboxing. The men discussed taking cash and drugs from Victim. Jonathan did not want to enter Victim's house at this time because he was acquainted with Victim.

Hartman, Elijah, Marcus, and Morris approached Victim's front door and knocked. There was no answer. Then the group went to the back door. They wanted to break in, but no one in the group wanted to kick the door down. So, they all returned to Jonathan's apartment.

Upon returning to Jonathan's apartment, Jonathan woke Cody, seeking his assistance in breaking into Victim's house. Jonathan wanted Cody to join the group not only for his assistance but also so that he would be involved and would not “rat out” anyone. The group then drove in two cars to a parking lot near Victim's home. Cody stated that both Hartman and Elijah had guns with them. Cody further explained that the gun Hartman carried was Jonathan's. Jonathan, Elijah, Cody, Hartman, and Marcus walked to Victim's home. There was conflicting testimony regarding who kicked in the back door, but either Hartman, Cody, or Elijah kicked in the back door, and everyone went inside.

Inside, Victim and his girlfriend were sleeping. There are conflicting recollections as to whether Victim merely woke when the group entered his room or whether Hartman and Elijah woke Victim, telling him to give them cash and drugs. Victim got up, stretched, and walked toward them. Victim was shot. Marcus testified that he took Victim's rifle and that after he walked away from Victim's bedroom, he heard six or seven gunshots.

Cody believed that Harman and Elijah fired their weapons.

The group returned to Jonathan's apartment. Everyone claimed to have shot Victim. Hartman claimed that had he realized Victim's girlfriend was present, he would have shot her too. Hartman and Elijah were upset the group did not take anything from Victim's house and wanted everyone else to return.

Cody, Jonathan, Elijah,6 and Pena returned to Victim's house. Hartman remained behind in Jonathan's apartment. Cody, Jonathan, and Elijah went back inside the house, ransacking it while Victim's girlfriend slept.

Harman was charged by information with first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree burglary. At trial, Cody testified pursuant to a plea agreement in which he pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and first-degree burglary with a fifteen-year cap, but hoped for less than fifteen years' imprisonment based upon his cooperation. Elijah testified pursuant to the same plea agreement with the same anticipation for a reduced sentence. Jonathan was subpoenaed to testify, but the state stipulated he was unavailable for trial and would refuse to testify by invoking his Fifth Amendment rights. Defense counsel sought to call Harlin King (hereinafter, “King”) to testify regarding Jonathan's statements to him immediately following Victim's death. The state objected to King's testimony, claiming that it was inadmissible hearsay. The trial court sustained the state's objection, but it allowed Hartman to make an offer of proof, which would show that Jonathan confessed to shooting Victim. Hartman did not testify during the guilt phase of his trial. Hartman's counsel argued in closing that the witnesses were not honest about the identity of the shooter, and they were covering for Jonathan, their brother and friend. The jury found Hartman guilty of first-degree murder, armed criminal action, and first-degree burglary.

During the penalty phase, Hartman testified. Hartman maintained he did not cause Victim's death and he was not present at Victim's house. When the jury was unable to agree on a sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of probation or parole, the trial court vacated the jury's verdicts for first-degree murder and armed criminal action and found Hartman guilty of second-degree murder under section 565.021.1(1), and armed criminal action in connection with second-degree murder.7 The trial court sentenced Hartman to concurrent terms of life imprisonment for second-degree murder, life imprisonment for armed criminal action, and fifteen years' imprisonment for first-degree burglary.

Hartman appeals his conviction and sentence. After an opinion by the court of appeals, the case was transferred to this Court. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.

Exclusion of testimony

Hartman asserts the trial court abused its discretion and committed reversible error in excluding King's testimony because Jonathan admitted to King that he shot Victim. Hartman believes this was not inadmissible hearsay because the testimony would have been an admission against interest made to one of Jonathan's close friends, shortly after the murder, and it was sufficiently reliable. Further, Hartman argues that the exclusion of this testimony violated his due process rights.

A trial court “has broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence during a criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion.” Hart, 404 S.W.3d at 248. “Reversal due to an evidentiary error requires a showing of prejudice.” State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Mo. banc 2012) (quoting State v. Taylor, 298 S.W.3d 482, 492 (Mo. banc 2009) ). If there is a reasonable probability that the trial court's error affected the outcome of the trial, there is prejudice. State v. Clark, 364 S.W.3d 540, 544 (Mo. banc 2012).

Hearsay statements, or out-of-court statements used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, generally are inadmissible. State v. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d 1, 6 (Mo. banc 1992). Yet, there is a recognized constitutionally-based hearsay exception in the due process clause founded upon Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 35 L.Ed.2d 297 (1973). This narrow exception applies to out-of-court statements that exonerate the accused and are “originally made and subsequently offered at trial under circumstances providing considerable assurance of their reliability.” Id. at 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. The Supreme Court set forth three indicators of reliability. Blankenship, 830 S.W.2d at 7. First, the confession “was made spontaneously to a close acquaintance shortly after” the crime occurred. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 300, 93 S.Ct. 1038. Second, the confession “was corroborated by some of the evidence in the case....” Id. Finally, the confession was made “in a very real sense self-incriminatory and unquestionably against interest.” Id. at 301, 93 S.Ct. 1038.

Prior to the commencement of Hartman's trial, the state filed a motion in limine to exclude King's statements that Jonathan told him that Jonathan shot Victim three times. The state asserted King's testimony would be inadmissible as hearsay and the testimony would not violate Hartman's due process rights. The trial court sustained the state's objection. At trial, Hartman again requested King to testify, and the state again objected. Thereafter, Hartman made an...

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  • State v. Wood
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 16, 2019
    ...to admit or exclude evidence during a criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion." State v. Hartman , 488 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Mo. banc 2016) (internal quotation omitted). "A trial court abuses its discretion only if its decision to admit or exclude evide......
  • State v. Minor
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    ...a criminal trial, and error occurs only when there is a clear abuse of this discretion.’ " Loper , 609 S.W.3d at 731 (quoting State v. Hartman , 488 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Mo. banc 2016) ). "Demonstrative evidence ... is admissible if the evidence is both legally and logically relevant." State v. B......
  • State v. Smith
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    • Missouri Court of Appeals
    • April 27, 2021
    ..."Hearsay statements, or out-of-court statements used to prove the truth of the matter asserted, generally are inadmissible." State v. Hartman, 488 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Mo. banc 2016). However, "otherwise inadmissible evidence can become admissible if its purpose is to explain subsequent police co......
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    ...State v. Hart, 404 S.W.3d 232, 248 (Mo. banc 2013). "Reversal due to an evidentiary error requires a showing of prejudice." State v. Hartman, 488 S.W.3d 53, 57 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting State v. McFadden, 369 S.W.3d 727, 736 (2012) ). "If there is a reasonable probability that the trial cour......
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