State v. Haskell

• Decision Date: 31 July 1985
• Citation: 495 A.2d 1341,100 N.J. 469
• Parties: STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James A. HASKELL and Mark C. Haskell, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

Page 469

100 N.J. 469

495 A.2d 1341

STATE of New Jersey, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. James A. HASKELL and Mark C. Haskell, Defendants-Respondents.

Supreme Court of New Jersey.

Argued March 18, 1985.

Decided July 31, 1985.

Denise H. Pappas, Asst. Prosecutor, for plaintiff-appellant (Lee S. Trumbull, Morris County Prosecutor, attorney; Allan J. Iskra, Asst. Prosecutor, on the letter-brief).

Diane Toscano, Deputy Public Defender, for defendant-respondent James A. Haskell (Thomas S. Smith, Jr., Acting Public Defender, Trenton attorney).

Craig V. O'Connor, Designated Counsel, Morristown, for defendant-respondent Mark C. Haskell (Thomas S. Smith, Jr., Acting Public Defender, Trenton, attorney).

Carol M. Henderson, Deputy Atty. Gen., for amicus curiae, Atty. Gen. (Irwin I. Kimmelman, Atty. Gen. of N.J., attorney).

The opinion of the Court was delivered by

POLLOCK, J.

This appeal raises the question whether co-defendants who have given statements to the police implicating each other should receive separate trials. The trial court ordered a joint trial after determining that the statements "interlocked" and that limiting jury instructions would adequately protect the defendants. The Appellate Division reversed and remanded "for multiple trials or such other action as may be consistent with R. 3:15-2(a)." 195 N.J.Super. 235, 239, 478 A.2d 1222 (1984). We affirm.

I

In the course of investigating the death of John Mastandrea, the Boonton Police obtained statements from the defendant brothers, James and Mark Haskell. As described by the Appellate Division, "[f]our statements were taken from defendant James Haskell, the last of which graphically describes how Mark Haskell killed the decedent. Mark gave five statements, the last of which admits the killing. The statements also depict James as at least an accessory after the fact." 195 N.J.Super. at 236, 478 A.2d 1222. To this we add our observation that James' statement does not acknowledge his prior knowledge of Mark's alleged intent to kill the decedent or James' participation in the killing.

One week after giving those statements, the defendants were indicted for murder and possession of a weapon with intent to use it unlawfully in connection with the murder of Mastandrea. Because the State intends to offer each defendant's statement in evidence, the parties filed cross-motions to determine whether Rule 3:15-2 requires separate trials. In denying the defendants' motion for separate trials, the trial court concluded that the statements were "interlocking" within the meaning of Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713 (1979). The Appellate Division reversed, holding that New Jersey case law and Rule 3:15-2(a) did not permit an exception for "interlocking confessions" to the requirement of separate trials.

II

At one time, both federal and New Jersey law permitted joint trials of co-defendants who had given separate confessions. Later, this Court and the United States Supreme Court independently determined that if references to a defendant could not effectively be deleted from a co-defendant's statement, the defendants should receive separate trials. More recently, in Parker v. Randolph, supra, 442 U.S. 62, 99 S.Ct. 2132, 60 L.Ed.2d 713, the United States Supreme Court has taken a different approach when the confessions of multiple defendants "interlock." It was the trial court's adoption of that approach that led in the present case to the order for a joint trial.

The issue of the propriety of a joint trial of a defendant and a confessing co-defendant first arose in New Jersey in State v. Rios, 17 N.J. 572, 112 A.2d 247 (1955). In Rios, four men were convicted in a joint trial for the robbery-murder of a luncheonette owner. Before trial, two defendants moved for separate trials on the grounds that the admission in evidence of statements or confessions of their non-testifying co-defendants would be prejudicial. The trial court denied the motions, and charged the jury that the defendants' statements were admissible only against the declarant. On appeal, this Court held that the trial court had not abused its discretion under former Rule 3:5-7 in denying the defendants' motion. Id. at 585, 112 A.2d 247.

Two years later, in Delli-Paoli v. United States, 352 U.S. 232, 77 S.Ct. 294, 1 L.Ed.2d 278 (1957), the United States Supreme Court reached a similar result. In Delli-Paoli, the Court ruled that a confession of one co-defendant after the termination of an alleged conspiracy was admissible in evidence against another of the remaining defendants in a joint trial. Underlying the decision was the assumption that the jury was capable of following the instruction to disregard the evidence implicating a non-confessing co-defendant. Finding nothing in the record to suggest that the jury had disregarded the limiting instruction and that substantial evidence in the record supported the guilty verdicts, the Court affirmed the convictions. 352 U.S. at 243, 77 S.Ct. at 300, 1 L.Ed.2d at 286.

In a dissenting opinion, Justice Frankfurter disagreed that a cautionary instruction could prevent prejudice to an implicated co-defendant. 352 U.S. at 247, 77 S.Ct. at 302, 1 L.Ed.2d at 288. He contended that there was no justification for allowing the prosecution "the windfall of having the jury be influenced by evidence against a defendant which, as a matter of law, they should not consider but which they cannot put out of their minds." Id. at 248, 77 S.Ct. at 303, 1 L.Ed.2d at 289.

Ten years after our decision in State v. Rios, we held that a trial court must grant a defendant's motion "to eliminate references to himself from a codefendant's statement which the prosecution proposes to place in evidence * * *." State v. Young, 46 N.J. 152, 157, 215 A.2d 352 (1965). In Young, we rejected the State's contention that a limiting instruction was sufficient to safeguard the implicated defendant's right to a fair trial. Justice Proctor wrote: "Not only is there a grave question as to the efficacy of this type of instruction in guiding the jury's deliberations, but, wherever there is a potentiality for prejudice in a criminal trial, our courts should take all reasonable measures to protect those defendants whose rights are endangered." Id. at 157, 215 A.2d 352. The Court distinguished Rios, stating that in that case the issue of prejudice caused by a joint trial arose on the defendants' appeals following their convictions. Rios, the Court said, held only that the trial court had not abused its discretion under former Rule 3:5-7 in denying the motions for severance. Id.

Consistent with the procedure outlined in State v. Young, supra, 46 N.J. at 158-59, 215 A.2d 352, the Court subsequently adopted Rule 3:15-2(a), which provides:

Motion by State Before Trial. If 2 or more defendants are to be jointly tried and the prosecuting attorney intends to introduce at trial a statement, confession or admission of one defendant involving any other defendant, he shall move before trial on notice to all defendants for a determination by the court as to whether such portion of the statement, confession, or admission involving such other defendant can be effectively deleted therefrom. The court shall direct the specific deletions to be made, or, if it finds that effective deletions cannot practically be made, it shall order separate trials of the defendants. Upon failure of the prosecuting attorney to so move before trial, the court may refuse to admit such statement, confession or admission into evidence at trial, or take such other action as the interest of justice requires.

As the rule states, a joint trial is permissible if references to a co-defendant can be effectively deleted from a statement, confession, or admission. See State v. Broxton, 49 N.J. 373, 376, 230 A.2d 489 (1967). The rule requires separate trials, or other appropriate action, however, if a defendant will suffer any prejudice from the introduction of a co-defendant's confession.

Three years after our decision in Young, the United States Supreme Court reached the same result under federal law in Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 88 S.Ct. 1620, 20 L.Ed.2d 476 (1968). In that case, defendants Bruton and Evans were convicted of armed postal robbery. At trial, a postal inspector testified that Evans had orally confessed that both Evans and Bruton committed the crime. On appeal, the Supreme Court expressly overruled its Delli Paoli decision and held that "because of the substantial risk that the jury, despite instructions to the contrary, looked to the incriminating extrajudicial statements in determining [Bruton's] guilt, admission of Evans' confession in this joint trial violated [Bruton's] right of cross-examination secured by the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 126, 88 S.Ct. at 1622, 20 L.Ed.2d at 479. The Court's rejection of Delli Paoli was predicated on its belief that juries could not disregard the prejudicial impact of a co-defendant's confession.

In certain decisions since Bruton, the Court has, in the face of overwhelming evidence of guilt, sustained a conviction when a co-defendant's admission involving the defendant was allowed into evidence with a limiting instruction. The admission of the statement into evidence in those cases was viewed as "harmless" error. See, e.g., Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 89 S.Ct. 1726, 23 L.Ed.2d 284 (1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 92 S.Ct. 1056, 31 L.Ed.2d 340 (1972); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 93 S.Ct. 1565, 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973). Notwithstanding the recognition of a harmless error exception, Bruton remained undisturbed until the plurality decision in Parker v. Randolph.

In Parker, the Court held that Bruton does not apply when the confession of a co-defendant is supported by and "interlocks" with a defendant's own confession. The convictions in Parker stemmed from the defendants' involvement in a scheme to rob...