State v. Haskins
| Decision Date | 21 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | No. 21520,21520 |
| Citation | 950 S.W.2d 613 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. David E. HASKINS, Defendant-Respondent. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Jeremiah W. (Jay) Nixon, Attorney General, Theodore A. Bruce, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, Brian Keedy, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Camden County, Camdenton, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Timothy R. Cisar, Lake Ozark, for Defendant-Respondent.
This case involves § 577.023 1, the statute that authorizes enhanced penalties for prior or persistent offenders who are found guilty or who plead guilty to a current charge of driving while intoxicated (DWI) or driving with excessive blood alcohol content (BAC) in violation of state law.
The issue is whether § 577.023 authorizes enhancement if the prior offense was in violation of a municipal ordinance against driving with excessive blood alcohol content. The trial court answered "no" and dismissed an information filed against David E. Haskins (Defendant). The State appealed. We reverse and remand.
The State filed an information charging Defendant with DWI on August 6, 1996, in violation of § 577.010. The information also charged that Defendant entered a guilty plea to a municipal ordinance violation of driving with an excessive BAC in 1993. Based on the BAC allegation and relying on § 577.023, the State charged Defendant with a class A misdemeanor rather than class B misdemeanor.
In his motion to dismiss information, Defendant pointed out that the State's effort to enhance his punishment per § 577.023 was based solely on his prior conviction for driving with excessive BAC contrary to a municipal ordinance. Defendant's motion also asserted--correctly so--that § 577.023.14 does not specifically list a BAC conviction under municipal ordinance as a prior conviction. Based on those facts, Defendant argued for dismissal of the information.
After a hearing, the trial court sustained Defendant's motion. This appeal followed.
The General Assembly enacted the present version of § 577.023 in 1993. Its pertinent provisions read:
"1(1) An 'intoxication-related traffic offense ' is driving while intoxicated, driving with excessive blood alcohol content, or driving under the influence of alcohol or drugs in violation of state law or a county or municipal ordinance, where the judge in such case was an attorney and the defendant was represented by or waived the right to an attorney in writing;
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When the General Assembly enacts legislation, it often becomes the task of the courts to interpret the meaning of the statutory language and determine the intent to be ascribed to the language used. Vice v. Thurston, 793 S.W.2d 900, 905 (Mo.App.1990). Construction of a statute is a question of law, not judicial discretion. Delta Air Lines, Inc. v. Director of Revenue, 908 S.W.2d 353, 355 (Mo.banc 1995).
We approach the task of statutory interpretation mindful that it is the function of the courts to construe and apply the law, and not to make it. Dees v. Mississippi River Fuel Corp., 192 S.W.2d 635, 640 (Mo.App.1946). In construing statutes, our primary responsibility is to ascertain legislative intent from the language used, to give effect to that intent if possible, and to consider the words used in their ordinary meaning. Angoff v. M & M Management Corp., 897 S.W.2d 649, 652-653 (Mo.App.1995); State v. Cox, 836 S.W.2d 43, 46 (Mo.App.1992). The General Assembly is presumed to have intended what the statute says; consequently, when the legislative intent is apparent from the words used and no ambiguity exists, there is no room for construction. See State v. Evers, 777 S.W.2d 344 (Mo.App.1989).
If § 577.023(14) is read in isolation--as Defendant insists we should do--it is as least arguable that no construction is necessary. As Defendant asserts, in enacting § 577.023.14, the legislature omitted BAC violations under municipal ordinance from the list of offenses that could be treated as evidence of a prior conviction. The language of that section is plain and definite. If § 577.023.14 stood alone, we would presume the legislature intended what it clearly said therein; hence, we would affirm.
However, it is fundamental that a section of a statute should not be read in isolation from the context of the whole act. Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 11, 82 S.Ct. 585, 592, 7 L.Ed.2d 492 (1962). In interpreting legislation, " 'we must not be guided by a single sentence ..., but [should] look to the provisions of the whole law, and its object and policy.' " Id. See National Adver. v. Highway and Transp. Comm'n, 862 S.W.2d 953, 955 (Mo.App.1993) ().
When all provisions of § 577.023 are read together, it could be read differently by reasonably well-informed persons; hence, the statute is ambiguous. 2A SUTHERLAND, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 45.02 at 6 (5th ed.1992). This follows because § 577.023.14 does not list a BAC conviction under municipal ordinance as one that can be used as evidence to enhance punishment; yet, there is clear and unmistakable language in §§ 577.023.1(1), 577.023.1(3) and 577.023.2 stating that when a driver has previously been found guilty or pled guilty to a DWI or BAC offense in violation of municipal ordinance, that fact may be used to enhance such driver's punishment if the municipal judge was a lawyer and the accused had a lawyer or waived a lawyer.
Specifically, unambiguous language in § 577.023.1(1) says that certain BAC offenses in violation of municipal ordinance are part of what is defined as "intoxication-related traffic offense[s]." A person found guilty or who pled guilty to an "intoxication-related traffic offense" in the past five years is defined in § 577.023.1(3) as a "prior offender." In § 577.023.2, provision is made for enhanced punishment for prior offenders. Consequently, from what the legislature said in each of these three sections, we discern that it intended to authorize the use of certain prior municipal BAC offenses to enhance punishment for a current "intoxication-related traffic offense;" yet, on their face those sections cannot be reconciled with the legislature's failure to list BAC convictions in municipal court as "prior convictions" under § 577.023.14.
Courts look beyond the plain and ordinary meaning of a statute when, as here, its meaning is ambiguous. See Angoff, 897 S.W.2d at 653 (). In such instance, rules or cannons of construction exist to assist us in our task of ascertaining legislative intent. Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 46. Even so, "[t]he ultimate guide is the intent of the legislature; the other rules of construction may be considered merely as aids in reaching that result; and the purpose and object of the legislation should not be lost sight of." Edwards v. St. Louis County, 429 S.W.2d 718, 722 (Mo.banc 1968).
Where there is genuine uncertainty concerning the application of a statute, it is fitting that we consider the statute's history, surrounding circumstances, and examine the problem in society to which the legislature addressed itself. Angoff, 897 S.W.2d at 653. Moreover, we are guided by the proposition that the General Assembly is presumed to be aware of existing declarations of law and the construction of existing statutes when it enacts a law on the same subject. Cox, 836 S.W.2d at 46.
Section 577.023 is clearly a legislative effort to address a matter of serious public concern, the repeat DWI offender. See State v. Zoellner, 920 S.W.2d 132, 135 (Mo.App.1996). "Clearly, the purpose of this statute [§ 577.023] is to deter prior DWI offenders, whether convicted in municipal or state court, from repeating the offense and 'to severely punish those who ignore the deterrent message.' " Id. (quoting A.B. v. Frank, 657 S.W.2d 625, 628 (Mo.banc 1983)).
The original form of Missouri's law authorizing enhanced punishment for prior alcohol-related traffic offenders was § 577.023 RSMo Cum.Supp.1982. 2 It was promptly replaced by a revised § 577.023 enacted by the General Assembly effective September 28, 1983. 3 The interpretation of the 1983 law by the Frank court included this holding:
"Because the legislature has chosen to base § 577.023 [RSMo Cum.Supp.1983] on prior violations of state law, but has omitted violations of municipal or county ordinances from the scope of its coverage, one cannot be convicted as a prior ... offender under the revised statute on...
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