State v. Hastey
| Decision Date | 06 November 2018 |
| Docket Number | Docket: Aro-16-556 |
| Citation | 196 A.3d 432 |
| Parties | STATE of Maine v. Troy D. HASTEY |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
Todd R. Collins, District Attorney, and Kurt A. Kafferlin, Asst. Dist. Atty. (orally), 8th Prosecutorial District, Houlton, for appellant State of Maine
Kirk D. Bloomer, Esq. (orally), Houlton, for appellee Troy D. Hastey
Panel: SAUFLEY, C.J., and ALEXANDER, MEAD, GORMAN, JABAR, HJELM, and HUMPHREY, JJ.
[¶ 1] In this appeal we address the question of whether evidence of the factual circumstances underpinning a defendant's prior manslaughter conviction is admissible to establish an enhancing factor necessary to convict the defendant of the Class B offense of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicants.
[¶ 2] In February 2016, Troy D. Hastey was indicted for aggravated criminal OUI (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(2) (2017).1 The enhancing factor alleged in the indictment is Hastey's 1991 manslaughter conviction that the State alleges "involve[ed] or result[ed] from the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs." 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(2).
[¶ 3] The State appeals from an order of the Unified Criminal Docket (Aroostook County, Stewart, J. ) granting Hastey's motion in limine to exclude evidence of his alleged intoxication at the time he committed the manslaughter offense. The State argues that the trial court erred when it ruled that the State's proof regarding Hastey's prior conviction is limited to the face of the 1990 indictment and 1991 judgment and commitment, which do not establish that Hastey was operating while under the influence at the time of the homicide. We agree, and we vacate the court's order granting Hastey's motion in limine and remand for the entry of an order denying the motion.
[¶ 4] On March 8, 1990, Hastey was indicted for (1) one count of manslaughter for "reckless and criminally negligent operation of a motor vehicle" causing the death of another person (Class B), see 17-A M.R.S.A. § 203 (Supp. 1989), and (2) one count of OUI (Class D), 29 M.R.S.A. § 1312-B (Supp. 1989).2 On May 23, 1991, Hastey pleaded guilty to the manslaughter offense and was sentenced. The OUI charge was dismissed.
[¶ 5] On December 12, 2015, Hastey was arrested for allegedly operating a motor vehicle under the influence of intoxicants. He was later indicted for aggravated criminal OUI (Class B), 29-A M.R.S. § 2411(1-A)(D)(2). The indictment alleged that Hastey "had a prior conviction for a prior criminal homicide involving or resulting from the operation of a motor vehicle while under the influence."
[¶ 6] On April 26, 2016, Hastey moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that because the 1990 OUI charge had been dismissed and there were no findings of fact regarding the 1991 manslaughter conviction, he had not been convicted of a criminal homicide involving or resulting from operation under the influence as required to trigger the enhanced charge and sentencing pursuant to section 2411(1-A)(D)(2). Hastey also argued that if the State is allowed to present evidence that he was intoxicated when he committed the manslaughter offense, then "the State would have to, in effect, re-prosecute the 1990 charges" which would violate the "Double Jeopardy Clause's protection against a second prosecution for the same offense."See U.S. Const. amend. V ; Me. Const. art. I, § 8.
[¶ 7] On July 1, 2016, the court denied Hastey's motion to dismiss. Citing the "categorical approach"3 established by federal courts to determine whether certain prior state convictions qualify as predicate offenses under certain federal laws, see, e.g. , Taylor v. United States , 495 U.S. 575, 601-02, 110 S.Ct. 2143, 109 L.Ed.2d 607 (1990), the court noted that Hastey's motion to dismiss "raise[d] significant and legitimate questions as to admissible evidence and how evidence of prior convictions may be reviewed at trial."
[¶ 8] On August 19, 2016, Hastey moved in limine to exclude any evidence of his alleged intoxication at the time of the 1990 offense, arguing that the admission of such proof would contravene the categorical approach and the Double Jeopardy Clause.4 The State opposed the motion, asserting that the phrase "involving or resulting from" in section 2411(1-A)(D)(2) introduces an evidentiary element that the government must prove in the prosecution of the new case—that Hastey's prior criminal homicide (manslaughter) conviction in fact involved or resulted from the operation of a motor vehicle while he was under the influence of intoxicants. The State indicated its intention to present at trial testimonial evidence, certified records from the Bureau of Motor Vehicles, and "properly sworn test results from the blood test administered to [Hastey] in 1990." The court granted Hastey's motion. The State filed a "motion for reconsideration and further conclusions of law," which the court denied on October 27, 2016.
[¶ 9] On November 10, 2016, after obtaining the written approval of the Attorney General, the State timely appealed the court's order granting Hastey's motion in limine and the order denying the motion for reconsideration and further conclusions of law. See 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1) (2017) ; M.R. App. P. 2(b)(2)(A), 21 (Tower 2016).5
[¶ 10] As a preliminary matter, Hastey argues that the State's appeal of the in-limine order is interlocutory and not ripe for appeal because the ruling is subject to reconsideration by the trial court and is not final until the challenged evidence is offered by the State at trial. See M.R.U. Crim. P. 12(c) ; State v. Brackett , 2000 ME 54, ¶ 6, 754 A.2d 337.
[¶ 11] The State may appeal an interlocutory "order of the court prior to trial which, either under the particular circumstances of the case or generally for the type of order in question, has a reasonable likelihood of causing either serious impairment to or termination of the prosecution." 15 M.R.S. § 2115-A(1).
[¶ 12] In our assessment of whether the State's appeal meets the requirements of section 2115-A(1), we first consider whether there is "any reasonable likelihood that the State will be handicapped in trying the defendant." Brackett , 2000 ME 54, ¶ 5, 754 A.2d 337 (quotation marks omitted). Without question, the State will be handicapped. Contrary to Hastey's contention, it is hard to imagine that the court's in-limine order would not impede the State's ability to proceed in the trial of the case. In the absence of evidence outside of the 1990 indictment and the 1991 judgment and commitment, the State will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that Hastey was intoxicated at the time he committed the predicate manslaughter offense.
[¶ 13] We next consider "whether entertaining the appeal is consistent with the strong public policy against piecemeal appeals and the impossibility of this [C]ourt's serving as an advisory board to trial lawyers and judges." Id. ¶ 6 (quotation marks omitted). In Brackett , we dismissed as interlocutory the appeal of a motion in limine argued on the grounds that the evidence was inadmissible under Maine Rule of Evidence 412. See id at ¶¶ 2, 7. We noted that we are hesitant to entertain appeals from in-limine rulings involving relevancy, probative value, and the prejudicial effect of evidence because "the theoretical facts presented in the motion in limine may differ from the actual facts presented at trial." Id. ¶ 7 (discussing M.R. Evid. 403 ). In contrast, in State v. Patterson , we determined that the appeal of a motion in limine was not premature because the justice who granted the motion was to preside at the trial the following week and clearly stated his intention to exclude the contested evidence. 651 A.2d 362, 366 (Me. 1994).
[¶ 14] As in Patterson, it is appropriate for us to entertain this appeal because it is not premature. Although it is possible that the justice who granted Hastey's motion may not preside at the eventual trial, the in limine ruling was stated with finality. The court clearly excluded any extrinsic evidence that Hastey was intoxicated at the time of the 1990 manslaughter offense, thus creating a reasonable likelihood that the prosecution would be terminated.
[¶ 16] The State argues that the court erred by depriving the State of the opportunity to present extrinsic evidence at trial of Hastey's alleged intoxication because the statutory phrase "involving or resulting from" introduces a specific enhancing element separate and distinct from the homicide conviction that...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Beeler
...intent, we first look to the plain language of the provision[ ] to determine [its] meaning." State v. Hastey , 2018 ME 147, ¶ 23, 196 A.3d 432 (citation and quotation marks omitted). By its plain terms, paragraph K does not require that the State's expert witness testify about the matters c......
-
State v. Conroy
...of statutory construction are familiar. We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. State v. Hastey , 2018 ME 147, ¶ 23, 196 A.3d 432. We look first to the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning if we can do so while avoiding absurd, illogical, or inconsistent r......
-
State v. Robbins
..."the question presented ... is a purely legal one," we review the court's ruling de novo, see State v. Hastey , 2018 ME 147, ¶¶ 22-23, 196 A.3d 432, and conclude that it was incorrect. "We have held that generally, a witness may revive her memory and achieve a present recollection from any ......
-
State v. Beeler
......"In. interpreting a statute, our single goal is to give effect to. the Legislature's intent in enacting the statute. To. determine that legislative intent, we first look to the plain. language of the provision[] to determine [its] meaning.". State v. Hastey, 2018 ME 147, ¶ 23, 196 A.3d. 432 (citation and quotation marks omitted). By its plain. terms, paragraph K does not require that the State's. expert witness testify about the matters contained in. paragraphs H and I; rather, it requires only that the expert. witness testify about the ......