State v. Patterson, 7091

• Decision Date: 21 December 1994
• Docket Number: No. 7091,Docket No. W,7091
• Citation: 651 A.2d 362
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Steven C. PATTERSON. DecisionLawas-93-623.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 362

651 A.2d 362

STATE of Maine v. Steven C. PATTERSON.

Decision No. 7091.

Law Docket No. Was-93-623.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued May 11, 1994.

Decided Dec. 21, 1994.

Michael Povich, Dist. Atty., Steven A. Juskewitch (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Machias, for the state.

Richard W. Hall (orally), Hall & Lunn, Bangor, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, and DANA, JJ.

DANA, Justice.

The State appeals from an order entered in the Superior Court (Washington County, Marsano, J.) granting Steven C. Patterson's motion to exclude statements that he made voluntarily to a police detective in the course of interviews before and after a polygraph test. The State argues that the court erred in concluding that the statements were not admissions, not relevant, and unfairly prejudicial pursuant to M.R.Evid. 801(d)(2)(A), 401, and 403 respectively. Patterson responds that the State's appeal does not meet the jurisdictional requirements of 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(1) (1980) or, in the alternative, that the appeal is improvident. We agree with the State's contentions and vacate the court's order.

In May 1992, Dale Keegan, a Maine State Police Detective and Polygraph Examiner, conducted a polygraph test on Patterson, who had been accused of sexually abusing a ten-year old boy. According to Keegan's report, the accuracy of which is not disputed, Patterson made the following statements during the pretest interview:

(1) His only physical contact with the alleged victim occurred when he gave him a back rub two or three times on an exercise mat in his office.

(2) He "sat on [the victim's] legs, and rubbed his back with [his] shirt off so he could give him a more semantical and good feeling rub."

(3) He is a homosexual and has had sexual fantasies about the victim and other males.

During the post test interview, Patterson never denied having sex with the victim. The following statements and colloquies also occurred:

(1) Patterson stated that he did not "remember it happening."

(2) He stated that "[t]he only other thing that I can tell you is that when I got off [the victim], I felt strange.... There is a very remote possibility of a fugue state." ¹ Later in the interview, however, he stated, "I don't think a fugue state is a possibility because [the victim] wasn't upset afterwards. I had a strange feeling. That is all I am aware of."

(3) When asked whether the "strange feeling" was "like any other homosexual activities he had been involved in," Patterson paused and said, "It was like my head was swimming."

(4) Patterson stated he would not go to court for this case because he did not want to make the victim testify.

(5) Patterson stated that "he would be going to jail for this." When Keegan asked Patterson to explain this statement, he said, "[the victim] is a good witness."

(6) Patterson stated he had the "Ronald Reagan Syndrome," pointing out that they both say "I don't recall." When Keegan said that Reagan "did a lot of illegal things, just like you," Patterson agreed.

The post test interview ended when Patterson asked for his attorney. Patterson does not dispute that his statements to Keegan were voluntary.

In July 1992, an indictment was issued charging Patterson with one count of gross sexual assault, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 253(1)(B) (Supp.1993), and two counts of unlawful sexual contact, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 255 (Supp.1993). Patterson entered pleas of not guilty.

Prior to trial Patterson filed a motion in limine seeking to exclude the statements he made to Keegan before and after the polygraph test. Patterson argued that he could not adequately explain his statements without referring to the test, and that to do so would be extremely prejudicial.

During the hearing on Patterson's motion, which took place on the Friday afternoon before the Monday on which the trial was to commence, the State conceded that Patterson's statement that he was a homosexual should be excluded. The court ruled that the remaining statements would be excluded pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403 because they were more prejudicial than probative. As the court stated:

It's a 403 analysis, because if I get to 403, I definitely am going to keep them out ... I just think that the probative value suggests that even if they were statements that were admissible with respect to the affirmative obligation of the State to prove its case, the way in which they are said is excludable under . If I get to a 403 ruling, I will rule in his favor under .

The court later entered a written order in which it ruled, inter alia, as follows:

(1) the contested statements were not admissions of wrongdoing and "their impact would only be to prejudice the jury"; and

(2) even if the statements were relevant pursuant to M.R.Evid. 402, they are "excludable" pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403.

On the date of this order, the State filed a notice of appeal pursuant to 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A and M.R.Crim.P. 37B. The State alleged that the granting of Patterson's motion in limine has "a reasonable likelihood of causing serious impairment or termination of the prosecution." The Attorney General filed a written approval of the appeal.

I. The Interlocutory Appeal

Title 15 M.R.S.A. § 2115-A(1) provides that an appeal may be taken by the State with written approval of the Attorney General from any pretrial order which, "either under the particular circumstances of the case or generally for the type of order in question, has a reasonable likelihood of causing either serious impairment to or termination of the prosecution." To determine whether a State's appeal from a pretrial order meets the requirements of section 2115-A, we look for "any reasonable likelihood that the State will be handicapped in trying the defendant." State v. Doucette, 544 A.2d 1290, 1292 (Me.1988) (quoting State v. Drown, 447 A.2d 466, 471 (Me.1982)).

We have construed section 2115-A "with the following two principles of appellate review firmly in mind: (1) the appealing party must have suffered a legal detriment as a result of the lower court's order and (2) the strong public policy against piecemeal appellate review." State v. Hickey, 459 A.2d 573, 578 (Me.1983) (citing Drown, 447 A.2d at 471-72). The Attorney General's approval for an appeal does not relieve us of our own responsibility "to examine each case independently to determine whether entertaining the appeal is consistent with the strong public policy against piecemeal appeals and the impossibility of this court's serving as an advisory board to trial lawyers and judges." Doucette, 544 A.2d at 1294.

Patterson argues that the State's case will not be impaired by the exclusion of his statements to Keegan because there are other witnesses who will be testifying for the prosecution. First, the trial court already ruled that the alleged victim is competent to testify. Second, other witnesses will testify to Patterson's opportunity to commit the alleged offense. ² Patterson concludes that since the order did not impair or terminate the prosecution, this appeal must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. We disagree.

As the State points out, the test for determining whether we have jurisdiction pursuant to section 2115-A is "whether there is a reasonable likelihood that the State will be handicapped in trying the defendant as a result of the order ... being appealed." See Doucette, 544 A.2d at 1292. Although in the present case the exclusion of the statements might not terminate the prosecution, there is a "reasonable likelihood" that the exclusion will impair the State's case against Patterson. If Keegan were not allowed to testify, there would most likely be no evidence of Patterson's sexual fantasies of the alleged victim, Patterson's state of mind and his inability to recall significant portions of the contact, an admission that he did "illegal things," and an admission that the victim was a good witness. Aside from Patterson, the record contains no evidence that another witness would be able to testify about these subjects.

Patterson also argues that the State's appeal should be dismissed as improvident. He asserts that by entertaining the present appeal, the Court would be transformed into an advisory board for the direction of the trial court's business. See Doucette, 544 A.2d at 1293. Again we disagree.

In Doucette, we held that "[a]n interlocutory appeal that involves a question with an answer readily available from research is improvident and becomes even more obviously so when ... the answer is plainly adverse to the appellant." 544 A.2d at 1294. The resolution of the present appeal depends primarily on the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in excluding the statements pursuant to M.R.Evid. 403. This inquiry depends on the specific facts and circumstances of this case and is not readily answered by a study of existing law. We have found no cases standing for the proposition that statements made before and after a polygraph test should be excluded where the defendant can explain those statements only by referring to the test. To the contrary, in State v. Bowden, 342 A.2d 281, 285 (Me.1975), we held that although polygraph test results are inadmissible, "admissions made by an accused after the polygraph testing ... are admissible if such admissions are found to be voluntary beyond a reasonable doubt." Since Patterson does not dispute the issue of voluntariness, precedent is on the State's side.

Patterson could have also argued that the State's appeal from the order granting his motion in limine is premature because the court might have exercised its discretion in favor of the State during the trial. See State v. Pinkham, 586 A.2d 730, 731 (Me.1991) (ruling on motion in limine does not become final until the evidence is offered at trial). Although we would normally hesitate to entertain an appeal from an order granting a motion in limine for this very reason, see id., the Superior Court justice who...