State v. Hatley

• Citation: 679 S.E.2d 579
• Decision Date: 13 March 2009
• Docket Number: No. 33919.,33919.
• Court: Supreme Court of West Virginia
• Parties: STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Billie Dawn HATLEY, Defendant Below, Appellant.

679 S.E.2d 579

STATE of West Virginia, Plaintiff Below, Appellee v. Billie Dawn HATLEY, Defendant Below, Appellant.

No. 33919.

Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia.

Submitted January 14, 2009.

Decided March 13, 2009.

Concurring Opinion of Justice Ketchum March 17, 2009.

Syllabus by the Court

1. "The true test as to whether a juror is qualified to serve on the panel is whether without bias or prejudice he can render a verdict solely on the evidence under the instructions of the court." Syllabus Point 1, State v. Wilson, 157 W.Va. 1036, 207 S.E.2d 174 (1974).

2. "Actual bias can be shown either by a juror's own admission of bias or by proof of specific facts which show the juror has such prejudice or connection with the parties at trial that bias is presumed." Syllabus Point 5, State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996).

3. "When considering whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause, a trial court is required to consider the totality of the circumstances and grounds relating to a potential request to excuse a prospective juror, to make a full inquiry to examine those circumstances and to resolve any doubts in favor of excusing the juror." Syllabus Point 3, O'Dell v. Miller, 211 W.Va. 285, 565 S.E.2d 407 (2002).

4. "Where a prospective juror is one of a class of persons represented by the prosecuting attorney at the time of trial, but there has been no actual contact between that juror and the prosecutor, the existence of the attorney-client relationship alone is not prima facie grounds for disqualification of that juror." Syllabus Point 3, State v. Audia, 171 W.Va. 568, 301 S.E.2d 199 (1983).

5. "[I]f a defendant validly challenges a prospective juror for cause and the trial court fails to remove the juror, reversible error results even if a defendant subsequently uses his peremptory challenge to correct the trial court's error." Syllabus Point 8, in part, State v. Phillips, 194 W.Va. 569, 461 S.E.2d 75 (1995).

Joseph W. Wagoner, Esq., Lewis County Prosecuting Attorney, Robert M. Morris, Esq., Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, Weston, WV, for Appellee.

Thomas J. Prall, Esq., and James E. Hawkins, Esq., Buckhannon, WV, for Appellant.

PER CURIAM.¹

Appellant Billie Dawn Hatley appeals her conviction for first degree robbery under W. Va.Code § 61-2-12 (2000), and her sentence of a ten-year determinate term of incarceration. Because we find that the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to strike a juror for cause, we reverse the appellant's conviction and sentence, and we remand for proceedings consistent with this opinion.²

I. FACTS

This case arises from a purse snatching. The evidence below indicates that Nancy Ellen Bailey was walking into a Walmart store when Billie Dawn Hatley, the appellant, came up to Ms. Bailey and tugged on her purse. There is evidence to indicate that Ms. Bailey was not otherwise touched by the appellant. Ms. Bailey briefly resisted before the appellant got Ms. Bailey's purse, jumped into a vehicle, and was driven away. The appellant later admitted to a police officer that she took $40 out of the purse and then discarded the purse and its contents, which the police subsequently found.

The appellant was indicted and tried for first degree robbery under W. Va.Code § 61-2-12 (2000).³ During voir dire, Prospective Juror Boyd Conrad disclosed that he had hired the prosecuting attorney, Joseph Wagoner, a couple of years earlier to prepare deeds for him, and that he would again use the services of Mr. Wagoner if the need arose. Mr. Conrad indicated, however, that he believed that he could be fair and impartial at trial. The appellant objected to Mr. Conrad remaining on the jury panel but the trial court overruled the objection. The appellant ultimately struck Mr. Conrad, and he did not serve on the jury.

At the close of the evidence, the jury returned a verdict of first-degree robbery, and the trial court sentenced the appellant to a determinate term of 10 years. The appellant now appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We are called upon in this case to decide whether a prospective juror should have been excused from the jury panel for cause. "The determination of whether a prospective juror should be excused to avoid bias or prejudice in the jury panel is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial judge." O'Dell v. Miller, 211 W.Va. 285, 288, 565 S.E.2d 407, 410 (2002) (citations omitted). Thus, we review the trial court's ultimate decision not to strike Prospective Juror Conrad for cause under an abuse of discretion standard.

III. DISCUSSION

The sole issue that we address in this case is whether Prospective Juror Conrad should have been disqualified from serving on the jury panel below because he had a prior attorney-client relationship with the prosecutor in the case and he professed that he would seek out the same relationship with the prosecutor in the future if the need arose.

A defendant in a criminal trial is entitled to an impartial jury. "The object of jury selection is to secure jurors who are not only free from improper prejudice and bias, but who are also free from the suspicion of improper prejudice or bias." O'Dell, 211 W.Va. at 288, 565 S.E.2d at 410. This Court has explained that "[t]he true test as to whether a juror is qualified to serve on the panel is whether without bias or prejudice he can render a verdict solely on the evidence under the instructions of the court." Syllabus Point 1, State v. Wilson, 157 W.Va. 1036, 207 S.E.2d 174 (1974). We have further indicated that "[a]ctual bias can be shown either by a juror's own admission of bias or by proof of specific facts which show the juror has such prejudice or connection with the parties at trial that bias is presumed." Syllabus Point 5, State v. Miller, 197 W.Va. 588, 476 S.E.2d 535 (1996). Moreover, "as far as is practicable in the selection of jurors, trial courts should endeavor to secure those jurors who are not only free from but who are not even subject to any well-grounded suspicion of any bias or prejudice." O'Dell, 211 W.Va. at 289, 565 S.E.2d at 411 (citations omitted). Finally, we have held that,

When considering whether to excuse a prospective juror for cause, a trial court is required to consider the totality of the circumstances and grounds relating to a potential request to excuse a prospective juror, to make a full inquiry to examine those circumstances and to resolve any doubts in favor of excusing the juror.

Syllabus Point 3, O'Dell, supra.

This Court has had occasion to consider whether a prospective juror's current attorney-client relationship with the prosecuting attorney mandated the juror's disqualification. In State v. Audia, 171 W.Va. 568, 301 S.E.2d 199 (1983), the prosecuting attorney informed the court during voir dire that he represented prospective juror Hughes, along with 30 to 40 members of Mr. Hughes' family, in a partition suit then pending in the circuit court. While the prosecutor had dealt directly with Mr. Hughes' sister in the case, he had never met Mr. Hughes, and Mr. Hughes was not even aware that the prosecutor was involved. Defense counsel moved to excuse Mr. Hughes from the jury panel for cause because he was a client of the prosecutor, but the court denied the motion.

In discussing whether the trial court acted properly, this Court explained in Audia:

We have not yet considered the situation presented here, where the prospective juror is a client of the prosecuting attorney at the time of trial. Such a relationship is not one of the grounds for disqualification set forth in our statutes, [W. Va.Code § 52-1-8 (2007)] and 56-6-12 [1923],⁴ nor is it one of our common law causes of prima facie grounds for disqualification from jury service. See State v. Riley, 151 W.Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308, 320 (1966) [overruled on other grounds by Proudfoot v. Dan's Marine Service, Inc., 210 W.Va. 498, 558 S.E.2d 298 (2001)]; State v. Dushman, 79 W.Va. 747, 91 S.E. 809 (1917).⁵ In addition, we find no other jurisdiction which has held such a relationship to be prima facie grounds for disqualification of a prospective juror.⁶ We find no prejudice, per se, in the attorney-client relationship between the prosecutor and Hughes, particularly where, as here, the representation is of a class of people and he has little, if any, contact with the particular individual who is the juror.

171 W.Va. at 574, 301 S.E.2d at 205-206. The Court went on to note that,

Hughes' responses during voir dire revealed no bias or prejudice on his part, and showed that he would be able to render a fair and impartial verdict solely on the evidence presented to him. We have already noted the limited contact, if any, between Hughes and the prosecutor before this trial. Perhaps, the more prudent course by the trial court would have been to excuse Hughes. We hold, however, that its failure to do so in this case was not an abuse of discretion and was not reversible error.

Audia, 171 W.Va. at 574, 301 S.E.2d at 206. Finally, in Syllabus Point 3 of Audia, we held:

Where a prospective juror is one of a class of persons represented by the prosecuting attorney at the time of trial, but there has been no actual contact between that juror and the prosecutor, the existence of the attorney-client relationship alone is not prima facie grounds for disqualification of that juror.

Another case in which this Court considered attorney-client relationships between attorneys at trial and prospective jurors is O'Dell v. Miller, 211 W.Va. 285, 565 S.E.2d 407 (2002). In O'Dell, we determined that the trial court abused its discretion by not striking a challenged juror for cause where the juror was a former patient of the defendant doctor and was currently a client of the law firm that represented the defendant. We noted that,

While no West Virginia case squarely addresses the issue of attorney-client relationships between attorneys and prospective jurors, the Supreme Court of Virginia has...