State v. Hatley
| Decision Date | 16 September 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 14461-8-I,14461-8-I |
| Citation | 41 Wn.App. 789,706 P.2d 1083 |
| Court | Washington Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE of Washington, Appellant, v. Charles R. HATLEY, Respondent. |
David F. Thiele, Island County Pros. Atty., David L. Jamieson, Deputy Pros. Atty., Coupeville, for appellant.
Wolfe & Cullen, James E. Lobsenz, Seattle, (Court-appointed), for respondent.
The State appeals an order granting a new trial to defendant Charles R. Hatley and the denial of its motion for reconsideration of that order. Hatley cross-appeals, contending that (1) the court's reasonable doubt instruction was erroneous, (2) the court erred in admitting two gruesome photographs of one of the victims, (3) his claim of "imperfect" self-defense reduced the degree of homicide to manslaughter, and (4) the State improperly commented upon his right to remain silent. We reverse.
Hatley was charged with the first degree murder of Hector Alvarez and Paula Vanderveen and the unlawful possession Elizabeth Ann Chamberlin lived in a second-story apartment nearby. She heard the first shot, then loud voices, and went to her window. She saw two figures struggling and then heard a woman's voice cry out, "Please, don't", and then, "I'll run from you", followed by a second shot. Chamberlin then saw a car, later identified as Hatley's, speed from the scene.
of a controlled substance (cocaine). Alvarez and Vanderveen were shot and killed at about midnight on March 16, 1983 in a tavern parking lot in Langley on Whidbey Island. Alvarez was shot in the face from approximately 12 to 18 inches away while sitting in the driver's seat of his car. Vanderveen was shot through the back of her head at point blank range while standing next to the passenger side of the car.
Hatley was apprehended within minutes approximately 4 miles away. Blood and tissue were removed from his body and clothing. A .44-magnum revolver with two expended rounds and four unexpended rounds was discovered on the floor of his car. An amount of cocaine, drug paraphernalia, and the wallet of Hector Alvarez were seized from his person. Expert witnesses testified that the residue on Hatley's hands was consistent with the recent firing of a handgun and that the tissue removed from his body and clothing matched Vanderveen's.
Hatley's testimony may be summarized as follows: He was a cocaine middle-man in need of a new source for the drug. He met Vanderveen at a friend's house for the first time that day, and she told him that she had a good cocaine connection. He was in the process of sampling cocaine to purchase it from Vanderveen and her connection, Alvarez, when they attempted to rob him. He handed over all the money in his possession and then became very nervous when they discovered that an envelope that he was carrying did not contain any money. He knocked Vanderveen's gun out of her hand and pulled his own. He did not remember shooting Alvarez. He remembered struggling with Vanderveen and falling down, but did not remember shooting her The State charged Hatley with committing the murders either with premeditation or during the course of a felony (robbery). The jury found Hatley guilty on all counts, including the premeditated and felony murder of Vanderveen, but only the felony murder of Alvarez.
or driving away. The next thing that he remembered was being stopped by the police.
Hatley moved for a new trial based on the alleged misconduct of juror Joseph Hamernik. Elmer Wolford testified at an evidentiary hearing that he had been hitchhiking when Hamernik picked him up. He testified that he knew Hamernik as an acquaintance from high school. He testified that Hamernik told him that he was sitting on a jury and that the defendant on trial was "guilty as sin."
On cross examination, Wolford stated that Hamernik had not discussed any of the evidence in the case. He also disclosed that he knew nothing about Hatley or the murders and that he had not urged Hamernik to find Hatley guilty.
At the hearing, Hamernik admitted that he had picked up Wolford during the second week of the 3-week trial, but denied that he had ever expressed any opinion about Hatley's guilt. He also testified that he had listened to all the witnesses and that when deliberations began, he did not have a fixed opinion, but, rather, had discussed the case with the other jurors. However, when asked directly whether he had made up his mind before or after the jury began to deliberate, he stated that it had been before.
The trial court found that the conversation between Hamernik and Wolford had taken place and that Wolford had been truthful when he testified that Hamernik had said that Hatley was "guilty as sin." It found that Hamernik had made his final decision concerning Hatley's guilt or innocence before the jury had retired to deliberate. The court held that Hamernik's misconduct demonstrated bias and prejudice and that Hatley's right to a fair trial before an impartial jury had been violated. The court granted Hatley's motion for a new trial.
The State moved for reconsideration. It presented the affidavits of six jurors, some of whom stated that Hamernik was one of three jurors who were the last to agree that Hatley was guilty of the felony murder of Alvarez, and some of whom stated that they had seen Hamernik change his vote during deliberations on at least one occasion. The court denied this motion.
The State contends that the evidence concerning when Hamernik decided upon Hatley's guilt was inadmissible because it "inhered in the verdict". It also contends that, even if this evidence were admissible, the fact that Hamernik made up his mind before deliberations began does not mean that he was prejudiced and that therefore a new trial was required. 1 We agree. 2
Testimony may not be considered if " 'the facts alleged are linked to the juror's motive, intent, or belief, or described their effect upon him' "; however, it may be considered if " 'that to which the juror testifies can be rebutted by other testimony without probing a juror's mental processes.' " State v. Crowell, supra, 92 Wash.2d at 146, 594 P.2d 905 (quoting Gardner v. Malone, 60 Wash.2d 836, 841, 376 P.2d 651 (1962)). Evidence concerning the mental processes of jurors, including their expressed opinions, State v. Aker, 54 Wash. 342, 345-46, 103 P. 420 (1909), and when they made up their minds, Hosner v. Olympia Shingle Co., 128 Wash. 152, 154-55, 222 P. 466 (1924), inheres in the verdict. See State v. Hall, 40 Wash.App.
162, 169, 697 P.2d 597 (1985) ().
The trial court improperly considered both Wolford's testimony regarding Hamernik's statement of Hatley's guilt and Hamernik's testimony regarding when he made up his mind. The facts alleged in this testimony were "linked to [Hamernik's] motive, intent, or belief", Crowell, 92 Wash.2d at 146, 594 P.2d 905 they concerned his mental processes. The need for finality in litigation requires a public policy making inadmissible evidence that inheres in a jury verdict. If every verdict were subject to impeachment if the losing side could obtain an affidavit indicating that in making up his or her mind, the juror reached certain critical conclusions prior to commencement of deliberations, disregarded some evidence, misunderstood an instruction, misapplied the rules of law, or completely misunderstood the testimony of one or more witnesses, then a jury verdict would simply be the first round in an interminably prolonged trial process. We hold that the evidence in this case should not have been considered because it directly involved Hamernik's thought processes and therefore inhered in the verdict. Gardner v. Malone, supra.
We also agree that even if Hamernik did make up his mind before deliberations began, this misconduct does not mean that he was prejudiced or biased. In Tate v. Rommel, 3 Wash.App. 933, 478 P.2d 242 (1970), review denied, 78 Wash.2d 997 (1971), the trial court found that a juror had formed a conclusion and expressed an opinion as to the proper outcome of the case after only the first day of trial. The trial court concluded that the juror was not fair and impartial and granted a new trial, holding that such misconduct was prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reversed. It held that because the juror had not been biased before the trial and because he had not based his opinion regarding the ultimate outcome of the case on evidence received outside of the trial, his misconduct was not prejudicial. We Common experience indicates a juror, or a judge, may form impressions or opinions as to the outcome of a case as he hears each bit of evidence. These impressions or opinions may change from time to time throughout the case. Such opinions or impressions normally are not revealed, and they should not be revealed, until the case is ready for decision. Here, juror Cyrus revealed his private opinion after the first day of trial. It is not unreasonable to expect that many of the other jurors, had they been questioned during the trial, would have formed some like opinion as to the outcome as did juror Cyrus. If we were to adopt the trial court's conclusion that the mere revealing of his private opinion or impression constitutes such misconduct as to justify a new trial without a further showing that such misconduct prejudiced the outcome of the trial, it would open the door to interrogation of jurors after trial for the purpose of discovering such unrevealed opinions as a basis for the filing of a motion for new trial.
find Judge Green's reasoning leading to this result quite persuasive:
Tate v. Rommel, supra, 3 Wash.App. at 937, 478 P.2d 242.
In this case, a review of Hamernik's voir dire examination reveals that he had no existing bias, and Hatley does not contend that Hamernik gave any false...
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