State v. Haviland

• Decision Date: 03 March 2015
• Docket Number: No. 45048–8–II.,45048–8–II.
• Citation: 186 Wash.App. 214,345 P.3d 831
• Court: Washington Court of Appeals
• Parties: STATE of Washington, Respondent v. David HAVILAND, Appellant.

186 Wash.App. 214

345 P.3d 831

STATE of Washington, Respondent

v.David HAVILAND, Appellant.

No. 45048–8–II.

Court of Appeals of Washington, Division 2.

March 3, 2015.

Jodi R. Backlund, Backlund & Mistry, Olympia, WA, for Appellant.

Sara I. Beigh, Lewis County Prosecutors Office, Chehalis, WA, for Respondent.

PUBLISHED IN PART OPINION

SUTTON, J.

¶ 1 David Christopher Haviland appeals his bench trial convictions and sentences for two counts of second degree child rape, RCW 9A.44.076, and three counts of third degree child rape, RCW 9A.44.079. He argues that his second degree child rape convictions must be reversed because the bill that amended RCW 9A.44.076, Second Substitute Senate Bill 6259, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash.1990) (2SSB 6259), is unconstitutional. We hold that the second degree rape of a child statute codified in RCW 9A.44.076does not violate article II, section 19's single-subject or subject-in-title requirements. In the unpublished portion of the opinion, we address and reject Haviland's remaining arguments. We affirm his convictions and sentences.

FACTS

¶ 2 The State charged Haviland with two counts of second degree child rape (Counts I and II); and three counts of third degree child rape (Counts III, IV, and V). All counts included a domestic violence enhancement. After a bench trial, the trial court found Haviland guilty as charged and sentenced him to an exceptional sentence totaling 340 months. Haviland appeals his convictions and sentences.

ANALYSIS

¶ 3 Haviland argues that 2SSB 6259,¹ which amended the second degree child rape statute,² is unconstitutional because the bill violates the single-subject and subject-in-title requirements in article II, section 19, of the Washington State Constitution. Thus, he argues that his convictions and sentences for second degree child rape must be vacated and the charges dismissed with prejudice. Haviland's argument fails because section 903 of the bill, which specifically amended RCW 9A.44.076, does not violate the single-subject or subject-in-title requirements.

A. Standard of Review

¶ 4 We review allegations of constitutional violations de novo. State v. Lynch, 178 Wash.2d 487, 491, 309 P.3d 482 (2013). A defendant may raise a “manifest error affecting a constitutional right” for the first time on appeal.

RAP 2.5(a)(3) ; State v. Robinson, 171 Wash.2d 292, 304, 253 P.3d 84 (2011). Courts presume that statutes are constitutional; a party challenging a “statute's constitutionality bears the heavy burden of establishing its unconstitutionality beyond a reasonable doubt.” Amalgamated Transit Union Local 587 v. State, 142 Wash.2d 183, 205, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608 (2001); see State v. Hunley, 175 Wash.2d 901, 908, 287 P.3d 584 (2012). This standard is met when “argument and research show that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute violates the constitution.” Pierce County v. State, 159 Wash.2d 16, 27, 148 P.3d 1002 (2006) (citing Larson v. Seattle Popular Monorail Auth., 156 Wash.2d 752, 757, 131 P.3d 892 (2006) ); Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 205, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608.

B. Article II, Section 19

¶ 5 Article II, section 19 of the Washington State Constitution provides that: “[n]o bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” Article II, section 19 established two specific requirements: (1) the single-subject rule, and (2) the subject-in-title rule. State v. Stannard, 134 Wash.App. 828, 834, 142 P.3d 641 (2006) (citing Citizens for Responsible Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 149 Wash.2d 622, 632, 71 P.3d 644 (2003) ).

1. Single–Subject Rule

¶ 6 Haviland argues that 2SSB 6259 violates the single-subject rule because it “covers a variety of other general topics,” unrelated to second degree rape of a child and that the various subjects contained in 2SSB 6259 have no rational unity. Br. of Appellant at 11. We disagree.

¶ 7 Article II, section 19 prohibits a bill from embracing more than one subject. “The single-subject requirement seeks to prevent grouping of incompatible measures as well as pushing through unpopular legislation by attaching it to popular or necessary legislation.” Pierce County v. State, 144 Wash.App. 783, 819, 185 P.3d 594 (2008).

¶ 8 The first step in analyzing whether the legislature violated “the single-subject requirement is to determine whether the title of the bill is general or restrictive.” State v. Alexander, 184 Wash.App. 892, 340 P.3d 247, 250 (2014), petition for review filed, No. 91174–6 (Wash. Jan. 5, 2015); see Washington Ass'n of Neigh. Stores v. State, 149 Wash.2d 359, 368, 70 P.3d 920 (2003). “ ‘A general title is broad, comprehensive, and generic, as opposed to a restrictive title that is specific and narrow’ and ‘selects a particular part of a subject as the subject of the legislation.’ ” Alexander, 340 P.3d at 250 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted) (quoting Pierce County, 144 Wash.App. at 819–20, 185 P.3d 594 ). “To be considered a general title, the title need not ‘contain a general statement of the subject of an act; a few well-chosen words, suggestive of the general subject stated, is all that is necessary.’ ”³ On the other hand, “restrictive titles tend to deal with issues that are subsets of an overarching subject.” Pierce County, 144 Wash.App. at 820, 185 P.3d 594. If the bill has a general title, it “may constitutionally include all matters that are reasonably connected with it and all measures that may facilitate the accomplishment of the purpose stated.” Id. at 821, 185 P.3d 594.

¶ 9 The second step in analyzing the single-subject requirement is to determine the connection between the general subject and the incidental subjects of the enactment.

Alexander, 340 P.3d at 251 ; Pierce County, 144 Wash.App. at 821, 185 P.3d 594. “Where a general title is used, all that is required is rational unity between the general subject and the incidental subjects.” Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 209, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608; see Alexander, 340 P.3d at 251.

¶ 10 RCW 9A.44.076, the second degree rape of a child statute, was amended in 1990 as part of 2SSB 6259.⁴ The bill is titled, “Community Protection Act”: “AN ACT Relating to criminal offenders.” Laws of 1990, ch. 3, at 12. Haviland acknowledges that the title of the bill is general. Therefore, the question here is whether there is rational unity between the general subject and the incidental subjects. Amalgamated Transit, 142 Wash.2d at 209, 11 P.3d 762, 27 P.3d 608.

¶ 11 Haviland argues that the various subjects contained in 2SSB 6259 have no rational unity and points to the distinct “general topics” amended in 2SSB 6259:(1) “the Juvenile Justice Act,” (2) “civil detention” statutes, (3) “compensation for crime victims” statutes, (4) “sex offender treatment provider” statutes, (5) “civil commitment of sexually violent predators” statutes, (6) “background check” statutes, (7) “funding and grant” statutes, and (8) statutes concerning “treatment and supervision of parents” who have abused children. Br. of Appellant at 11–12. According to Haviland, the bill violates the single-subject rule because it “covers a variety of other general topics” unrelated to second degree child rape. Br. of Appellant at 11.

¶ 12 2SSB 6259 amended the second degree child rape statute from a Class B felony to a Class A felony.⁵ This amendment is reasonably connected to the other subjects related to criminal offenders because it creates a greater penalty for individuals who commit child rape. The subjects addressed in the bill are reasonably connected to each other (all are related to criminal offenses) and to the bill's title (criminal offenders and community protection). This bill is not like those where the Supreme Court found violations of the single-subject rule because there was no rational unity among the matters included in the act. See e.g., Barde v. State, 90 Wash.2d 470, 471–72, 584 P.2d 390 (1978) (where the Court held that an act that provided for criminal penalties for dognapping and the recovery of attorney's fees in some civil replevin actions lacked rational unity).

¶ 13 We hold that there is rational unity among the subjects in this bill. Haviland fails to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 2SSB 6259 violated the single-subject rule and his argument fails.

2. Subject–in–Title Rule

¶ 14 Haviland also argues that 2SSB 6259 violates the subject-in-title rule because it addresses subjects not encompassed in its title. He contends that, because the bill “also amends and enacts myriad statutes relating to juvenile offenders, civil commitment, treatment providers, employee background checks, funding for community organizations, and help for crime victims,” the bill violates the subject-in-title rule. Br. of Appellant at 14. He further contends that enumerating each RCW section does not cure this deficiency, and thus the entire act is unconstitutional. We disagree.

¶ 15 Article II, section 19 requires that a bill's title must state the subject of the bill: “No bill shall embrace more than one subject, and that shall be expressed in the title.” “This provision ensures that the public has notice of the [bill's] contents.” Stannard, 134 Wash.App. at 841, 142 P.3d 641 (citing Citizens, 149 Wash.2d at 639, 71 P.3d 644 ). “This requirement is satisfied if the title of the act gives notice that would lead to an inquiry into the body of the act or indicates the scope and purpose of the law to an inquiring mind.” Pierce County, 144 Wash.App. at 822, 185 P.3d 594. A title does not need to provide details or an exhaustive index. Id. “Any objections to a title must be grave, and the conflict between it and the constitution palpable, before we will hold an act unconstitutional for violating the subject-in-title requirement.” Pierce County, 144 Wash.App. at 822, 185 P.3d 594.

¶ 16 2SSB 6259, which amends RCW 9A.44.076, is titled “Community Protection Act”: “AN ACT Relating to criminal offenders.” Laws of 1990, ch. 3, at 12. The title plainly notifies...