State v. Hawkins

• Decision Date: 20 December 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-0179.,99-0179.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Lee HAWKINS, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

620 N.W.2d 256

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Michael Lee HAWKINS, Appellant.

No. 99-0179.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

December 20, 2000.

Linda Del Gallo, State Appellate Defender, and John P. Messina, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Karen B. Doland, Assistant Attorney General, Michael Short, County Attorney, and Bruce C. McDonald, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

NEUMAN, Justice.

This is an appeal by defendant, Michael Lee Hawkins, from the judgment and sentence entered upon his convictions of two counts of perjury as an habitual offender in violation of Iowa Code sections 720.2 and 902.8 (1997). The perjury charges stem from Hawkins' testimony during a postconviction relief hearing. His testimony contradicted statements made in his prior guilty-plea colloquy to the charge of delivery of methamphetamine.

Hawkins now claims entitlement to reversal because (1) his voluntary dismissal of the postconviction relief action negated the materiality of his perjurious statements, (2) he would have prevailed on a statutory retraction defense but for counsel's failure to urge it, and (3) personal belief does not constitute a "fact" under the perjury statute, a dispositive legal issue his trial counsel failed to urge. Finding no merit in any of these contentions, we affirm the district court judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

The State charged Hawkins with two counts of delivery of a schedule II controlled substance (methamphetamine) by a trial information filed in January 1996. The charges stemmed from controlled drug buys involving a confidential informant named Rick Hardman. In exchange for dismissal of one of the charges, Hawkins agreed to plead guilty to one count of delivery of methamphetamine.

During the guilty-plea colloquy Hawkins affirmatively stated that no threats or promises had been made to induce his guilty plea. He also acknowledged that he had discussed the matter thoroughly with his counsel, was satisfied with his representation, and that he was, indeed, guilty as charged. Summing up the factual scenario, Hawkins told the court "I sold some crystal to Rick Hardman."

Although hoping for a deferred or suspended sentence, Hawkins received a prison term for his offense. Roughly four months later he filed a pro se petition for postconviction relief. The petition, as later amended by court-appointed counsel, asserted that Hawkins' guilty plea had not been knowing and voluntary but was instead the product of ineffective counsel who had failed to properly investigate the facts and charges, ultimately forcing him to plead guilty.

At the evidentiary hearing that followed, Hawkins denied that he delivered drugs and testified that his attorney pressured him into accepting the State's plea offer when he, in fact, wanted to go to trial. Because that testimony formed the basis for the perjury charges now under review, we quote it here:

Q. Do you recall the judge asking whether it was your voluntary act to plead guilty on that day? A. I remember him saying that.

Q. Did you tell him it was? A. Yeah, I did. I did, but I just felt like I was coerced into it.

Q. Why did you feel that way? A. `Cuz when I had mentioned that I had wanted a jury trial and things, Mr. Henson acted like he just didn't want to act on that. I just—You know, if you have a lawyer that you tell him what you want to do and he keeps talking against it, then when you know you got witnesses that you just want them to, you know, tell the truth about something and he doesn't want to call them, I guess you begin to feel a little disgusted about the whole deal anyway.

. . . .

Q. And the Court asked you to indicate what the facts of the case were at the time and you responded, "I sold some crystal to Rick Hardman." You recall saying that? A. Yes, I do.

Q. And today you're telling the Court that you did not sell crystal to Rick Hardman? A. No, I never.

Rather than rule from the bench, the court took Hawkins' postconviction application under advisement. About three weeks later, before the court had ruled, Hawkins sought the court's permission to dismiss the action. His motion stated that he believed it "would fail based on the current state of the law." The district court granted the motion.

The State then charged Hawkins with perjury based on his testimony at the postconviction hearing. The trial information specified two allegedly perjurious statements: Hawkins' denial that he sold drugs to Hardman and the claim he believed his attorney coerced his plea. Following a trial in which the State introduced Hawkins' contradictory testimony into evidence, the jury returned guilty verdicts on both charges. This appeal by Hawkins followed.

II. Scope of Review.

Claims of insufficient evidence, preserved by motion for judgment of acquittal, are reviewed on appeal for errors at law. State v. Walker, 574 N.W.2d 280, 283-84 (Iowa 1998). We are bound by the jury's verdict unless we determine it is not supported by substantial evidence. Id. at 284. In making that determination, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the State. Id.

Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, being constitutional in nature, are reviewed by this court de novo. State v. Westeen, 591 N.W.2d 203, 207 (Iowa 1999).

III. Issues on Appeal.

A. Effect of dismissal. Hawkins begins by asserting he was entitled to judgment of acquittal, as a matter of law, because the voluntary dismissal of his postconviction action negated the materiality of the false testimony he gave during the postconviction hearing. The State counters that, for purposes of a criminal prosecution, the materiality of a statement is measured at the time it is made. Hawkins does not disagree with this assertion but insists that, under the record before us, when he "cancelled his case, he cancelled his falsehoods."

We begin with the undisputed premise that proof of the materiality of a factual assertion is an essential element of the crime of perjury. The governing statute, Iowa Code section 720.2, states in pertinent part:

A person who, while under oath or affirmation in any proceeding or other matter in which statements under oath or affirmation are required or authorized by law, knowingly makes a false statement of material facts or who falsely denies knowledge of material facts, commits a class "D" felony.

(Emphasis added.) A statement of fact is material if it

directly or circumstantially (1) supports or attacks the credibility of a witness, or (2) has a legitimate tendency to prove or disprove some relevant fact irrespective of the main fact at issue, or (3) is capable of influencing the court, officer, tribunal or other body created by law on any proper matter of inquiry.

Walker, 574 N.W.2d at 284 (quoting State v. Deets, 195 N.W.2d 118, 122 (Iowa 1972)).

We have not before had occasion to address the effect of a dismissal on the materiality element of a perjury prosecution. At least one federal court has wrangled with the question, however. In United States v. McFarland, 371 F.2d 701 (2d Cir.1966), the court of appeals reviewed the perjury convictions of a prison warden investigated for permitting prostitution with inmates. The warden had been charged and convicted of lying under oath to the grand jury but claimed on appeal that false statements given in connection with the investigation of dismissed charges could not be considered material. McFarland, 371 F.2d at 703. The appeals court, observing materiality must be established as of the time the false answers are given, rejected the notion that perjury can "vanish" if a count to which it pertains is withdrawn from the jury's consideration. Id. In other words, the court held, materiality turns on the relationship between the interrogation and the matters under investigation at the time. Id. at 704; see also United States v. Norris, 300 U.S. 564, 574, 57 S.Ct. 535, 539, 81 L.Ed. 808, 813 (1937)

(retraction defense unavailable to senator charged with perjury because perjury complete "when a witness's statement has once been made"); United States v. Lococo, 450 F.2d 1196, 1199 n.3 (9th Cir.1971) (because materiality tested as of time of inquiry, later proof that truthful statement would not have helped grand jury does not render false testimony immaterial).

Implicit in these decisions is the notion that the essential nature of a statement does not change depending on the outcome of the proceedings in which it is asserted. Hawkins urges us to reject this rationale in favor of permitting a misguided prisoner to abandon a fraudulent claim without penalty, ostensibly on the ground such second thoughts would be rejected anyway. We are not inclined to do so. As the United States Supreme Court has observed, accepting such an argument would effectively ignore the fact

that the oath administered to the witness calls on him freely to disclose the truth in the first instance and not to put the court and the parties to the disadvantage, hindrance, and delay of ultimately extracting the truth by cross-examination, by extraneous investigation, or other collateral means.

Norris, 300 U.S. at 574, 57 S.Ct. at 539, 81 L.Ed. at 813.

If, as we firmly believe, the pursuit of truth is at the heart of all judicial proceedings, neither precedent nor policy supports the argument Hawkins advances. We hold that dismissal of an action does not negate the materiality of false statements made therein under oath. The district court correctly rejected Hawkins' argument to the contrary.

B. Retraction defense. Hawkins next claims that trial counsel in his perjury case was ineffective because he failed to plead and assert the retraction defense that is incorporated into Iowa Code section 720.2. The statutory defense states: "No person shall be guilty of perjury if the person retracts the false statement in the course of the proceedings where it was made before the false statement has...