State v. Hawkins
| Decision Date | 30 December 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. SD 29928.,SD 29928. |
| Citation | 328 S.W.3d 799 |
| Parties | STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Rodney A. HAWKINS, Appellant. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Nancy R. Price, of Springfield, MO, for Appellant.
Chris Koster, Attorney General, and Daniel N. McPherson, Assistant Attorney General, of Jefferson City, MO, for Respondent.
A jury convicted Rodney A. Hawkins ("Appellant") of sodomy in violation of section 566.060, RSMo Cum.Supp.1992.1 Appellant was sentenced to fifteen years' imprisonment.This appeal followed. We affirm the trial court's judgment.
On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict. State v. Forrest, 183 S.W.3d 218, 223 (Mo. banc 2006). Employing this standard, the following was adduced at trial.
Appellant's daughter ("Victim") was born in 1979. When Victim was seven or eight years old, Appellant took her into his bedroom, removed her pants and underwear, and inserted his finger into her vagina. Appellant then warned Victim not to tell anyone saying no one would believe her, and it was her fault. Victim told no one because she was scared and did not think anyone would believe her. Appellant continued to molest her in his bedroom. When Victim was nine or ten years old, she moved into her own bedroom. Subsequently, Appellant began molesting her in her bedroom and the frequency of this abuse increased. She still did not tell anyone because she was scared, humiliated, and did not think anyone would believe her.
When Victim was eleven or twelve years old, her younger sister began sharing her bedroom, and the sexual abuse temporarily stopped. The abuse resumed when Victim was twelve years old and in the seventh grade. Appellant stopped sexually abusing Victim when she was thirteen or fourteen years old and in the eighth grade. Victim again did not tell anyone because she was scared, humiliated, and it made her feel dirty. Each incident of abuse involved Appellant inserting his fingers into her vagina.
When Victim was seventeen years old, she was admitted for thirty days to Lakeland Regional Hospital ("Lakeland"), a drug rehabilitation and mental health facility. When a Lakeland counselor asked if she had been sexually abused she answered, "No."
When Victim was twenty-six years old, her younger sister disclosed to Victim that Appellant had "done something to her." Victim accompanied her sister to a child advocacy center ("CAC"). After her sister had been interviewed, a police officer asked Victim if she believed her sister's story. Victim told the officer she did believe her sister because the same thing had happened to her. Victim then told the officer more details about how Appellant had abused her.
Appellant's counsel subpoenaed Victim's Lakeland medical records (the "records"). After an in camera review, the trial court determined that two statements from the records were relevant and allowed disclosure of that portion of the records containing those statements. The two disclosed records documented Victim's denial of any prior physical or sexual abuse. The trial court ruled the defense could cross-examine Victim about the two statements she had made at Lakeland. The trial court denied the request of Appellant's counsel to personally review the records to determine if they contained any additional information he could utilize at trial.
The State filed a "Trial Brief/Motion in Limine" in which it disclosed its intent to elicit information from Victim regarding her initial disclosure to authorities. The trial court ruled the prosecutor could inquire as to how Victim happened to disclose the abuse. The trial court ruled Victim could testify that: (1) she was with another child during an interview at the CAC, (2) she was asked whether she believed the child, and (3) her response was she did believe the child because it had happened to her. The trial court prohibited testimony that the child was a familymember or had been placed in the protective custody of Victim.
Victim was the State's sole witness at trial. She testified Appellant sexually abused her repeatedly when she was younger, as described above. The prosecutor sought and received permission to lead Victim regarding her disclosure to the police officer so her testimony would stay within the boundaries set by the trial court's ruling. Defense counsel objected to the entire line of questioning on the grounds of "bolstering and ... prior bad acts evidence." The trial court overruled the objection and granted defense counsel a continuing objection.
Victim testified she was at the CAC with a teenage girl who had made allegations about being molested. The prosecutor proceeded to question Victim about her disclosure:
Victim testified she did not tell anyone about being molested by Appellant because she was scared of Appellant, she was humiliated, she did not want people to know about it, and it made her feel dirty.
She also testified she was sent to Lakeland after being arrested for "minor in possession [of alcohol]," Appellant bailed her out, and then he beat her up after they got home. She explained Appellant had hit her when she was little and that was part of the reason she was scared of him. The prosecutor asked Victim why she had denied being abused when asked at Lakeland:
On cross-examination, Victim testified she knew Lakeland was a secure facility. Victim admitted the staff at Lakeland, including her doctor—Dr. David Trobaugh—asked her if she had been sexually abused:
Defense counsel was permitted to cross-examine Victim using one of the records as a prior inconsistent statement. The record revealed Victim told a social worker her mother had hit her with an open hand on the night Victim was arrested on the alcohol charges. Victim acknowledged making that statement and said her mother had hit her. Victim also acknowledged not telling the social worker Appellant had beat her up. Victim said she did not say anything in her direct examination about being hit by her mother because the case being tried was not about her mother.
During a break in the testimony, Appellant's counsel asked the trial court for leave to review the Lakeland records to see if the records included any physical examinations that would show either signs of a beating or the lack thereof. Appellant's counsel requested ten minutes to conduct that review. The trial court granted his request. Appellant's counsel informed the trial court he found a record of a physical examination, but because there was no indication of when it was conducted, he conceded he would not be able to use that information. Appellant's counsel also requested use of records showing Victim had been diagnosed with major depression and prescribed Lithium to counter Victim's testimony she had not been diagnosed with a mental illness. 2 Appellant's counsel was permitted to inquire into Victim's depression diagnosis, but was not permitted to use the records to show she was prescribed Lithium. Counsel asked Victim on re-cross if she had been diagnosed with major depression at Lakeland. Victim replied she was not sure; she volunteered she had been put on anti-depressants while there but she was not sure of her diagnosis.
Appellant did not testify or present any evidence.
The prosecuting attorney's closing argument included multiple references thatVictim's evidence was the only or the uncontradicted evidence in the case. By way of example, his remarks included:
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