State v. Hawthorne

• Decision Date: 02 March 2020
• Docket Number: No. 2019CA00055,2019CA00055
• Citation: 2020 Ohio 756,145 N.E.3d 372
• Parties: STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee v. Classie Nicole HAWTHORNE, Defendant-Appellant
• Court: Ohio Court of Appeals

145 N.E.3d 372

2020 Ohio 756

STATE of Ohio, Plaintiff-Appellee

v.Classie Nicole HAWTHORNE, Defendant-Appellant

No. 2019CA00055

Court of Appeals of Ohio, Fifth District, Stark County.

DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: March 2, 2020

OPINION

Wise, J.

{¶1} Appellant Classie Hawthorne appeals her conviction, in the Court of Common Pleas, Stark County, for voluntary manslaughter and other offenses. Appellee is the State of Ohio. The relevant facts leading to this appeal are as follows.

{¶2} On May 21, 2018, appellant fatally shot her estranged husband, Cleveland Hawthorne. She then left the scene of the shooting in southwest Canton and hid the weapon, a handgun, in some hedges near Aultman Hospital. However, she later returned to the scene.

{¶3} Just a few days before the shooting, appellant and her children had moved out of the marital residence, located on Concord Street S.W. in Canton. On Sunday evening, May 20, 2018, appellant and Cleveland exchanged several heated text messages, with Cleveland accusing appellant of pulling a gun on him three different times. Nonetheless, Cleveland said in one message that he wanted to meet with appellant.

{¶4} On the morning of May 21, 2018, appellant came to Cleveland's residence, sprayed charcoal lighter fluid onto his automobile, and lit it. This event was captured by one of Cleveland's home security cameras. Cleveland saw what had happened, and he yelled for someone to call the police as he stamped out the flames.

{¶5} Two of Cleveland's neighbors, Tammy M. and Rodney P., heard Cleveland yell. Appellant had left the area after lighting the fluid, so Cleveland decided to cope with the situation by asking Rodney to transport him to another location to retrieve his second vehicle, a pickup truck. Rodney and Cleveland left at about 10:30 AM to get the truck, and they returned about a half-hour later. Rodney then went to work.

{¶6} Despite the aforesaid incidents, appellant decided to get some fast food for Cleveland. The two then met at the Cedar School parking lot. Some of their encounter was recorded by a school security video camera. Cleveland got into appellant's Equinox, and the two sat there for a period of time. During this time, appellant got out of her SUV and then got back inside. The two then went together in the Equinox back to Concord Street, pulling into a gravel parking lot on the property of the church next to Cleveland's house.

{¶7} Appellant also exited, from the driver's side, armed with her .380 caliber Ruger semiautomatic handgun. Standing behind the opened door, appellant brought the handgun up and took aim at Cleveland, who stopped and turned to run away. Appellant fired one shot into Cleveland's chest, which penetrated his heart. Cleveland was able to run about thirty feet, but he collapsed and died a couple of minutes later. Tr. at 461-469, 550, 555.

{¶8} Keith E., who lived next to the church, later testified that on the day of the shooting, he was trimming some weeds in his yard and heard what turned out to be appellant's SUV pull into the church parking lot. Keith at first thought the vehicle belonged to the church's pastor. Seeking to avoid a long interruption in his yard work, Keith went into his garage. He then heard a quick honk of the horn from the vehicle, and then nothing until after three minutes later. At that time, Keith heard a high agitated female voice say, "You done messed with the wrong bitch, mother fucker!" which was then followed by a gunshot. Keith then heard a shocked and surprised male voice say, "You shot me! Fuck!" Tr. at 243. He then heard someone running on the gravel, and then falling.

{¶9} Keith ran into his house to retrieve his gun, fearing that there had been a gang shooting. While getting his gun, Keith called 911.

{¶10} In the meantime, Tammy M., the aforementioned neighbor, was with her son when she heard a "bang" sound. Her son went to investigate, and when she heard him yell, she ran to the church parking lot area to assist. Although Cleveland died quickly, Tammy at least noticed car keys lying next to Cleveland. These were later determined to belong to appellant's Equinox.

{¶11} One of appellant's friends, Rene B. came to the scene of the shooting. Responding police officers obtained Rene's assistance in convincing appellant to return to the scene. Appellant was subsequently taken into custody.

{¶12} Appellant was indicted on July 27, 2018 for felony murder ( R.C. 2903.02(B) ) with a firearm specification ( R.C. 2941.145 ), felonious assault ( R.C. 2903.11(A)(2) ) with a firearm specification ( R.C. 2941.145 ), and improperly handling firearms in a motor vehicle ( R.C. 2923.16(B) ).

{¶13} A jury trial commenced on January 22, 2019. Appellant's defense counsel initially pursued a battered woman syndrome defense, but she did not maintain same through the end of the case. In addition, among other things, appellant via counsel objected to the State's request for a voluntary-manslaughter instruction, but the trial court overruled her objection.

{¶14} The jury reached a verdict on January 30, 2019. Appellant was found not guilty of felony murder, but guilty of voluntary manslaughter and the remaining counts. A sentencing hearing was held on February 11, 2019, following which appellant was sentenced to a total of thirteen years in prison. The trial court issued its final judgment entry of sentencing on February 13, 2019.

{¶15} In the meantime, on February 6, 2019, appellant filed a post-conviction motion for a new trial regarding the offense of voluntary manslaughter. In her motion, appellant argued that the trial court had erred in instructing the jury on the inferior offense of voluntary manslaughter, contending this offense is not a lesser included offense or inferior degree offense of the charged offense of felony murder ( R.C. 2903.02(B) ). The State responded in writing on February 22, 2019. Via a judgment entry issued on March 19, 2019, the trial court overruled appellant's motion for a new trial. Appellant then filed a motion for reconsideration of that ruling; however, the court overruled same on April 10, 2019.

{¶16} On April 10, 2019, appellant filed a notice of appeal, covering both the final sentencing entry and the denial of her motion for a new trial. She herein raises the following four Assignments of Error:

{¶17} "I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE JURY ON THE INFERIOR DEGREE OFFENSE OF VOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER AS REQUESTED BY APPELLEE AND OVERRULING APPELLANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL PURSUANT TO CRIMINAL RULE 33.

{¶18} "II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY ADMISSION OF THE DVR VIDEO WHEN IT WAS THE PRODUCT OF AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND WAS NOT AUTHENTICATED AT TRIAL.

{¶19} "III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY PERMITTING SPECIAL AGENT VOLPE OF THE FBI TO READ TEXT MESSAGES INTO EVIDENCE IN OPEN COURT BETWEEN THE DEFENDANT AND CLEVELAND HAWTHORNE.

{¶20} "IV. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT PERMITTING THE CRIMINAL HISTORY AND FBI INVESTIGATION OF CLEVELAND HAWTHORNE TO BE PRESENTED AT TRIAL."

I.

{¶21} In her First Assignment of Error, appellant contends the trial court erred by (1) instructing the jury on the inferior degree offense of voluntary manslaughter as requested by the State and (2) subsequently overruling appellant's motion for a new trial pursuant to Crim.R. 33. We agree on the first point.

{¶22} Section 10, Article I of the Ohio Constitution states: "No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury." This constitutional provision guarantees the accused that the essential facts constituting the offense for which he is tried will be found in the indictment of the grand jury. State v. Thompson , 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 85843, 2006-Ohio-3162, 2006 WL 1705136, ¶ 14.

{¶23} The Ohio Supreme Court has explained that, under Crim.R. 31(C) and R.C. 2945.74, a jury may consider lesser unindicted offenses only if the evidence supports the lesser charge and the lesser charge falls into one of three groups. State v. Deem, 40 Ohio St.3d 205, 208, 533 N.E.2d 294 (1988). A jury may consider lesser unindicted crimes that are (1) a lesser-included offense of the crime charged, (2) an inferior degree of the crime charged, or (3) an attempt to commit the crime charged, if such an attempt is an offense at law. State v. Davis , 9th Dist. Summit No. 25826, 2012-Ohio-1440, 2012 WL 1080530, ¶ 20, citing Deem , infra .

{¶24} Thus, under the circumstances of the present appeal, our analysis of whether or not the jury in appellant's case should have been instructed on the unindicted offense of voluntary manslaughter "begins by first determining whether the requested instruction falls within the statutory definition of a lesser included offense or inferior degree offense." See State v. Ledbetter , 2nd Dist. Greene No. 93-CA-54, 1994 WL 558996. However, the parties herein are not primarily focused on the question of whether voluntary manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of felony murder.¹ Instead, we are tasked with determining whether voluntary manslaughter is an inferior degree offense of felony murder. An offense is an "inferior degree" of the indicted offense where its elements are identical to or contained within the indicted offense, except for one or more additional "mitigating elements" which will generally be presented in the defendant's case. See State v. Booker , 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-10-1140, 2013-Ohio-45, 2013 WL 139588, ¶ 20 ; State v. Pennington , 5th Dist. Guernsey No. 16CA14, 2017-Ohio-1423, 2017 WL 1658750, ¶ 17.

{¶25} In the case sub judice , appellant was indicted inter alia on one count of felony murder, although she was ultimately found not guilty on said count. R.C. 2903.02(B) states as follows: "No person shall cause the death of another as a proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commit an offense of violence that is a felony of the first or second degree and that is not a violation of section 2903.03 or 2903.04 of the Revised Code."

{¶26}...