State v. Hayes

• Decision Date: 13 December 1971
• Docket Number: No. 56044,No. 2,56044,2
• Citation: 473 S.W.2d 688
• Parties: STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Elmer Richard HAYES, Appellant
• Court: Missouri Supreme Court

Page 688

473 S.W.2d 688

54 A.L.R.3d 93

STATE of Missouri, Respondent, v. Elmer Richard HAYES, Appellant.

No. 56044.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 2.

Dec. 13, 1971.

John C. Danforth, Atty. Gen., Neil MacFarlane, Asst. Atty. Gen., Jefferson City, for respondent.

J. Richard Roberts, G. William Weier, Dearing, Richeson, Roberts & Wegmann, Hillsboro, for defendant-appellant.

STOCKARD, Commissioner.

Appellant, Elmer Richard Hayes, was charged in separate informations with murder in the first degree of Thomas Jasper Hayes and Dorothy Hayes. Although the last names are the same, the victims were of no relation to appellant. The two cases were consolidated for trial, and appellant was found guilty of both murders and sentenced to life imprisonment on each charge.

From the evidence, including the contents of a confession, a jury reasonably could find that on February 12, 1967, appellant entered Club 8-East in Washington County Missouri, displayed a pistol, and told Mr. and Mrs. Hayes that 'it was a robbery.' He told them to lie face down on the floor behind the counter, and appellant then 'crawled over the bar and shot (each of) them in the head' three times.

Appellant's first contention is that the court erred in admitting into evidence a written signed confession for the reason that it was involuntarily given.

The trial court held a hearing out of the presence of the jury on appellant's motion to suppress, and at the conclusion thereof it entered detailed findings that the confession was understandingly and voluntarily given without promise, threat or inducement.

Shortly after the murders, appellant was questioned concerning them while he was in jail for parole violation, and he denied any knowledge thereof. He was returned to the Missouri Department of Corrections, and served the remainder of the sentence from which he had been paroled. Thereafter, in the State of Nevada he entered a plea of guilty to the crime of robbery committed in that State and was sentenced to imprisonment for a term of fifteen years.

At the hearing on the motion to suppress and at the trial appellant denied that he committed the murders, and he testified that he made the confession in order not to be subject to the conditions imposed on him in the Nevada prison. We shall briefly set forth the circumstances leading up to the confession.

On September 15, 1968, appellant was placed in the maximum security section of the Nevada prison, and because of violation of prison rules he remained in some type of maximum security until he was released to the prosecuting attorney and sheriff of Washington County on July 16, 1969.

On January 15, 1969 the prosecuting attorney of Washington County received a letter from appellant in which he indicated he had knowledge concerning the murders of Mr. and Mrs. Hayes, and in which he stated 'it would be to the best interest to you and your office if you could come and talk to me.' The prosecuting attorney went to the Nevada prison, and appellant orally confessed that he had murdered Mr. and Mrs. Hayes, but he refused to sign a written statement until certain conditions were met. He wanted the prosecuting attorney to get some money from a person in Las Vegas, Nevada which appellant claimed was his. In addition, according to the prosecuting attorney, 'before he would agree to come back to Missouri and stand prosecution and enter pleas to these two crimes, the Sheriff of Washington County would have to promise him that he would be kept in the jail at Washington County so that it would be convenient for him to visit with his family,' and that 'he not be rushed away to the Missouri penitentiary after he entered his guilty pleas, but that he be permitted to stay at the Potosi jail for awhile so that he could visit with his family.' On January 22, the prosecuting attorney advised appellant by letter that he could not obtain the money, that the sheriff had agreed to confine him in Washington County until transferred to the penitentiary, that he would not have control over the length of time necessary to process the cases, but he believed that appellant would be in the Washington County jail four to eight weeks before transfer to the penitentiary. On April 27 appellant answered the prosecutor's letter and said, 'I am ready and willing to come to Missouri with you anytime you can make arrangements to come and get me.' The prosecuting attorney again went to Nevada, and appellant waived extradition but he refused to sign a statement so the prosecutor returned to Missouri without him. However, the prosecutor later returned to Nevada, and on July 16 appellant was released to his custody. Before leaving for Missouri by airplane appellant signed the written confession, and he testified at the hearing on the motion to suppress that the prosecuting attorney made no threat or promise to him to obtain his confession. He also said that no one at the Nevada prison made any threat or promise to him, but, without further explanation, he added that 'they led me to believe that it would be better for me' if he signed a confession.

There is no contention that appellant was not given all the warnings required by Miranda v. State of Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694, 10 A.L.R.3d 974, or that he did not understand that his confession could be used against him in court, or that he did not understand the maximum and minimum punishment for the two crimes to which he confessed. In fact, before the confession was signed, the prosecutor advised appellant by letter that he had filed two charges of first degree murder against him, that the punishment for first degree murder was death or life imprisonment, and that he was 'free to recommend the death penalty or life imprisonment,' and that the 'sentencing judge will be entirely free to make his own decision whether to impose the death penalty or life imprisonment.'

'In order to render a confession allegedly induced by force or violence inadmissible, the force or violence must have been exercised for the purpose of inducing the confession, and the confession must have been in consequence of the unnecessary force used. The use of such violence or force as is necessary to effectuate the arrest or confinement of the accused will not affect the voluntary character of a confession made after his arrest.' 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 567. In this case, appellant opened the discussion concerning the murders by asking the prosecutor to talk to him, and by orally confessing to the murders. There was no inducement, or benefit, or reward extended to him by anyone. Appellant now makes the somewhat unusual contention that he desired to get out of the Nevada prison where he had a fifteen year sentence, and thereby avoid the disciplinary punishment brought on by his misconduct, so he could be returned to Missouri to face two charges of first degree murder even though he knew that the only punishment for first degree murder was life imprisonment or death. But, he unequivocally testified that the signing of the written confession was his choice, and that his decision was not the result of any threat, promise or inducement made by anyone in authority. In fact, in one of his letters to the prosecuting attorney he stated: 'As I told you before seeing him (appellant's father who was in poor health) before he dies is the only reason I am agreeing to come back there.' Apparently it was only after appellant got back to Missouri that he decided that the reason he confessed to the two murders was to escape the punishment at the Nevada penitentiary.

'The fact that an accused may think that it will be better for him if he confesses, or worse for him if he does not confess, is of no importance on the question of the voluntary character of his confession, if that condition of mind is brought about by his own independent reasoning.' 29 Am.Jur.2d Evidence § 559. For a comparable...