State v. Powell

Decision Date20 November 1979
Docket NumberNo. 6787,6787
Citation61 Haw. 316,603 P.2d 143
PartiesSTATE of Hawaii, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Palance POWELL, also known as Pat, Defendant-Appellee.
CourtHawaii Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is brief.

2. To justify an investigative stop, short of an arrest based on probable cause, the police officer making the stop must be able to point to specific, articulable facts which, when taken together with the rational inferences therefrom, would lead a man of reasonable caution to suspect that criminal activity was afoot and to believe that the action taken was appropriate.

3. When investigating a possible violation of a traffic law, an officer may properly ask a driver to display his license so that he may determine who he is dealing with and whether such person is qualified to drive.

4. A police officer may make an arrest without a warrant when he has probable cause to believe that a misdemeanor is being, or has been, committed in his presence.

5. The failure to procure a warrant prior to searching appellant's vehicle did not render such action unreasonable where the police officer involved had probable cause to search, the search took place on a public thoroughfare while the subject automobile was in actual transit, and the scope of the search was narrowly confined.

Arthur Ross, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu (Roy K. S. Chang, Deputy Pros. Atty., Honolulu, on the briefs), for plaintiff-appellant.

Edmund Yee, Sp. Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu (Myles T. Yamamoto, Deputy Public Defender, Honolulu, on the brief), for defendant-appellee.

Before RICHARDSON, C. J., OGATA and MENOR, JJ., Retired Justice KOBAYASHI and Circuit Judge LUM, assigned by reason of vacancies.

RICHARDSON, Chief Justice.

Defendant-appellee Palance Powell was charged with the offense of promoting a dangerous drug in the third degree in violation of HRS § 712-1243 (1976). Before trial, Powell moved to suppress certain evidence seized from his automobile at the time of his arrest. After a hearing on said motion, the court below determined that the evidence had been secured through improper means and, accordingly, ruled in the defendant's favor.

We reverse.

On the evening of April 16, 1977, while assisting in the investigation of a suspicious noise complaint in a residential area of Honolulu, Police Officer Bruce Weissich noticed an automobile without taillights turning out of a dead-end street. Following behind this vehicle, Officer Weissich observed that it was proceeding an an unusually slow rate of speed approximately five to ten miles per hour and that, upon reaching an intersection, it stopped ten to fifteen feet short of the stop line. Despite an absence of any other vehicular traffic, the driver of the automobile hesitated for approximately ten seconds before executing a turn and continuing on. Some two hundred feet before reaching the next intersection, the automobile's turn signal was activated and, as before, the vehicle stopped ten to fifteen feet short of the stop line. Again, the driver of the vehicle stopped for about ten seconds before negotiating the turn. No other vehicles were seen in the area.

Believing that the driver of the automobile was either lost, experiencing mechanical difficulties with his car, or intoxicated, Officer Weissich then ordered the vehicle to a stop. After identifying himself as a police officer, Weissich requested the sole occupant of the vehicle, defendant Powell, to produce his driver's license. At this time, Powell voluntarily got out of his car and began searching in his wallet for his license. Upon tendering it to the officer, Powell inquired as to why he had been stopped. The officer responded by asking him whether he was lost, and Powell indicated that he did not know where he was.

During his conversation with Officer Weissich, Powell appeared to be intoxicated: his speech was slurred and unresponsive; his eyes were bloodshot and his pupils dilated; he appeared unsteady on his feet; and his shirt was unbuttoned at the top and bottom. Nevertheless, according to the officer, there was no indication that Powell's apparent intoxication was attributable to the consumption of alcohol. The officer therefore inquired if Powell was on any medication or had any kind of physical defect that would explain his appearance. In reply, Powell indicated that he was taking Valium, and then handed the officer a prescription bottle which he had in his pocket. The bottle contained two tablets and was labeled "Thorazine."

After admitting that he had taken some of the medication that evening and based on his erratic driving and apparent state of inebriation, Powell was then placed under arrest for driving under the influence of drugs. 1 By that time, another officer had arrived at the scene and had joined Weissich and Powell at the rear of Powell's automobile. Upon returning to secure the arrestee's vehicle, 2 Officer Weissich with the aid of his flashlight then noticed a crystalline substance in a spoon he had previously seen when Powell initially stepped out of his car. The spoon was located on the floorboard of the vehicle, near the accelerator pedal. Based on his familiarity with narcotics paraphernalia and with various methods of narcotics ingestion, Officer Weissich suspected that the substance on the spoon was somehow related to Powell's apparent drug-induced state of intoxication. Accordingly, he immediately returned to the rear of the vehicle to examine Powell's arms. At this time, he found what appeared to be needle marks on the interior portions of appellee's elbows, directly in line with the veins in his arms. Thereupon, Powell was placed under arrest for promoting a dangerous drug.

Following the second arrest, Officer Weissich again returned to Powell's vehicle this time, to recover the spoon. While seizing the spoon, the officer searched under the driver's seat using his flashlight and came upon a hypodermic syringe and a plastic vial containing a clear liquid. These two items were also recovered at this time.

On July 13, 1977, an Oahu grand jury returned an indictment against Powell charging him with the knowing possession of cocaine, a "dangerous drug" within the meaning of HRS § 712-1240(1) (1976). 3 Thereafter, appellee Powell filed a pretrial motion requesting an order suppressing for use at trial all evidence seized during his arrest and during the subsequent search of his vehicle on the ground that such evidence was secured through illegal means. The court below, on October 25, 1977, granted the motion following a hearing thereon, reasoning, in essence, that Officer Weissich's initial stop of Powell's automobile was unlawful. This appeal followed.

In its brief, the State contends that stopping and detaining appellee's vehicle for purposes of questioning him as to his driving behavior and checking his driver's license was reasonable under the circumstances and not violative of appellee's constitutional rights. Further, it argues that the warrantless search of appellee's car and the subsequent seizure of certain items found therein were justified under exceptions to the warrant requirement. 4

I

The propriety of the search of appellee's automobile and the subsequent seizures of the spoon, hypodermic syringe, and plastic vial hinges in part upon the validity of initial stop by Officer Weissich. If it is ultimately determined that the stop was constitutionally objectionable, the items seized from the vehicle as fruits of an unlawful "seizure" would be the proper subjects of a suppression order. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963); State v. Boynton, 58 Haw. 530, 535, 574 P.2d 1330, 1334 (1978).

It is beyond challenge that stopping an automobile and detaining its occupants constitute a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 7 of the Hawaii Constitution, 5 even though the purpose of the stop is limited and the resulting detention is brief. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653, 99 S.Ct. 1391, 1396, 59 L.Ed.2d 660 (1979); State v. Bonds, 59 Haw. 130, 577 P.2d 781 (1978). The legitimacy of such action, therefore, is dependent on whether or not it is found to be reasonable, upon balancing the public interest it promotes and the individual's right to be free from arbitrary interference by government officials. See Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 98 S.Ct. 330, 54 L.Ed.2d 331 (1977); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 536-37, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 18 L.Ed.2d 930 (1967); State v. Martinez, 59 Haw. 336, 368, 580 P.2d 1282, 1284-85 (1978).

We believe that the State has a legitimate and substantial interest in promoting the safe use of its streets and highways. Accordingly, its authority to stop vehicles in cases of Observed traffic or equipment violations cannot be seriously questioned. State v. Bonds, 59 Haw. at 135, 577 P.2d at 785. However, when weighed against the individual's Fourth Amendment rights, the State's interest is not so compelling as to justify subjecting every vehicle to seizure at the unrestrained discretion of law-enforcement officials. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 660, 99 S.Ct. at 1400; State v. Bonds, supra. As stated by the Supreme Court in Prouse :

An individual operating or travelling in an automobile does not lose all reasonable expectation of privacy simply because the automobile and its use are subject to government regulation. Automobile travel is a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one's home,...

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