State v. Hearn

• Decision Date: 13 May 2011
• Docket Number: No. 09–0142.,09–0142.
• Citation: 797 N.W.2d 577
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee,v.Dalevonte Davelle HEARN, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

797 N.W.2d 577

STATE of Iowa, Appellee,

v.Dalevonte Davelle HEARN, Appellant.

No. 09–0142.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 13, 2011.

Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Nan Jennisch, Assistant State Appellate Defender, for appellant.Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Thomas S. Tauber, Assistant Attorney General, Michael J. Walton, County Attorney, and Jerald L. Feuerbach, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.APPEL, Justice.

Dalevonte Hearn was convicted after a bench trial of robbery, theft, and felony eluding. The district court found that he aided and abetted a carjacking in a Davenport Wal-Mart parking lot and then committed felony eluding by attempting to escape police officers who were responding to the scene. Hearn argues there is insufficient evidence to link him to the robbery and theft. He also argues that even if he participated in the carjacking, he had withdrawn from the scene prior to the police chase and therefore did not meet the requirements of felony eluding. The court of appeals upheld all three convictions. We granted further review.

I. Background Facts and Prior Proceedings.

Delores Morgan was parked in the Davenport Wal-Mart parking lot on West Kimberly Road when two males approached her car, told her to get out, took her keys, and drove off in her red 1994 Pontiac Grand Am. Morgan called police on her cell phone. Davenport police officer Dennis Colclasure responded to the call. As he was driving towards the crime scene, traveling west on West Kimberly Road, he spotted a car matching the description of the stolen car pulled over for the emergency vehicles in the eastbound lane of West Kimberly Road.

With his lights and sirens already activated, Officer Colclasure made a U-turn and pointed a spotlight into the Grand Am. The Grand Am did not pull over and turned onto Division Street, following a green Oldsmobile. While on Division, the Grand Am passed the Oldsmobile. When Officer Colclasure attempted to do the same, the Oldsmobile swerved at his police car. Officer Colclasure testified that neither the Grand Am nor the Oldsmobile pulled over and both were traveling well over the speed limit. When the vehicles reached a construction zone, the Grand Am and Oldsmobile collided. After the crash, the Oldsmobile started up again and Officer Colclasure pursued it. The Oldsmobile had a flat tire and someone, who was later identified as the defendant Dalevonte Hearn, jumped out of the car, began to run, and was apprehended by several other police officers. During Hearn's arrest, Officer James Quick suffered a laceration on his ankle. Police found the Rock Island High School I.D. of Hearn's brother in the Oldsmobile. The Grand Am had crashed into the front deck of a house and police found a pocket knife on the driver's side floorboard.

Detective Brandon Noonan interviewed Hearn shortly after Hearn's arrest. During the interview, Hearn stated that his younger brother, DeVon Hearn, and his cousin, Jacquez Dixon, were in the red car that wrecked. Hearn denied knowing anything about the Wal-Mart carjacking. Hearn also testified at trial, where he maintained that he took no part in planning or participating in the Wal-Mart carjacking. Hearn testified that he wanted to go see his girlfriend in Peoria, Illinois, he had taken his mother's car to visit family in Davenport, and he had driven by his cousin's house and saw his brother and cousin outside of the house with a red two-door Monte Carlo. He testified he did not know who was in the red Grand Am and that he began to flee the police because of outstanding warrants for his arrest in Rock Island.

Hearn was convicted after a bench trial of second-degree robbery in violation of Iowa Code section 711.3 (2009), second-degree theft in violation of Iowa Code section 714.2(2), and felony eluding in violation of Iowa Code section 321.279(3). Hearn's robbery and theft convictions were based on a finding that he aided and abetted the carjacking.

Hearn argues the district court lacked sufficient evidence to convict him of the three felonies. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions, and we granted further review.

II. Scope of Review.

Sufficiency of the evidence challenges are reviewed for correction of errors at law. State v. Hansen, 750 N.W.2d 111, 112 (Iowa 2008). “The district court's findings of guilt are binding on appeal if supported by substantial evidence. Evidence is substantial if it would convince a rational trier of fact the defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. (citation omitted). To determine whether substantial evidence supports the trial court's verdict, we consider all the evidence and the record in the light most favorable to the trial court's decision. State v. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d 116, 131 (Iowa 2004). To support the verdict, “ ‘[t]he evidence must be such that, when considered as a whole, a reasonable person could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” State v. Doss, 355 N.W.2d 874, 877 (Iowa 1984) (quoting State v. Mulder, 313 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Iowa 1981)). We draw all legitimate inferences in support of the verdict. Taylor, 689 N.W.2d at 131. However, “[e]vidence which merely raises suspicion, speculation, or conjecture is insufficient.” State v. Casady, 491 N.W.2d 782, 787 (Iowa 1992).

Questions regarding the proper interpretation of a statute raise questions of law. Van Sloun v. Agans Bros., Inc., 778 N.W.2d 174, 182 (Iowa 2010).

III. Merits.A. Robbery and Theft.

Hearn was convicted of second-degree robbery and second-degree theft, based on the theory of aiding and abetting. The Iowa Code provides that those who aid and abet in the commission of a public offense “shall be charged, tried and punished as principals.” Iowa Code § 703.1. To sustain a conviction under a theory of aiding and abetting, “the record must contain substantial evidence the accused assented to or lent countenance and approval to the criminal act by either actively participating or encouraging it prior to or at the time of its commission.” State v. Ramirez, 616 N.W.2d 587, 591–92 (Iowa 2000), overruled on other grounds by State v. Reeves, 636 N.W.2d 22, 25–26 (Iowa 2001). “Knowledge is essential; however, neither knowledge nor presence at the scene of the crime is sufficient to prove aiding and abetting.” State v. Barnes, 204 N.W.2d 827, 828 (Iowa 1972). A defendant's participation may, however, be proven by circumstantial evidence. ¹ Doss, 355 N.W.2d at 878.

Hearn argues the evidence is insufficient to link him to the carjacking. He argues the circumstantial evidence of his actions after the crime and the fact that he saw the principals earlier that day do not provide substantial evidence to support his conviction. The State argues Hearn's convictions may be sustained because of the reasons cited by the district court: Hearn admitted to police that his brother and cousin were in the red Grand Am; Hearn stated to police that he was with his brother and cousin near the Wal-Mart shortly before the carjacking; Hearn had a motive to steal the car because he wanted to go visit his girlfriend in Peoria, Illinois, but was only able to use his mother's car for a short time period; Hearn was present near the red Grand Am; and Hearn's actions directly after the carjacking.

A person commits theft when the person “[t]akes possession or control of the property of another, or property in the possession of another, with the intent to deprive the other thereof.” Iowa Code § 714.1(1). Theft is in the second degree when the property is a motor vehicle not exceeding $10,000 in value. Id. § 714.2(2).

A person commits robbery when, having the intent to commit a theft, the person does any of the following acts to assist or further the commission of the intended theft or the person's escape from the scene thereof with or without the stolen property:

1. Commits an assault upon another.

2. Threatens another with or purposely puts another in fear of immediate serious injury.

3. Threatens to commit immediately any forcible felony.

Id. § 711.1.

The district court held, based on the totality of the circumstances, the two individuals who took Morgan's car “intended to physically intimidate the victim into surrendering her car to them, and that they actually succeeded in placing her in fear of immediate physical contact.” The district court relied on evidence of Hearn's actions before and “within minutes after” the carjacking, as well as evidence of motive, to find Hearn aided and abetted the robbery and theft of Morgan's car.

Hearn admitted to police that he had been at his cousin's house near the Wal-Mart prior to the theft of the car. Hearn also told police that his cousin and brother were the individuals in the other car when it crashed. This testimony puts Hearn with those who committed the carjacking prior to the incident and demonstrates Hearn's knowledge of who was in the Grand Am. The district court found that Hearn's inconsistent trial testimony—in which Hearn claimed he had not stopped at his cousin's house and did not know who was in the Grand Am—was not credible.

Hearn's actions after the carjacking also provide circumstantial evidence of his guilt. Hearn was found in proximity to the scene of the carjacking (still on West Kimberly Road); he was in close proximity to the stolen Grand Am (he first drove the Oldsmobile in front of the Grand Am and then behind it); and Hearn swerved at Officer Colclasure, which the district court found was an attempt to obstruct Officer Colclasure's pursuit of the Grand Am. This evidence suggests Hearn was involved in the carjacking because he was trying to help the principal carjackers escape the scene of the crime. See Barnes, 204 N.W.2d at 828–29 (finding insufficient evidence of guilt where defendant did not flee the scene of his companion's crime and instead purchased cigarettes and spoke with police).

The district court also relied on circumstantial evidence of Hearn's motive. Hearn admitted he wanted to...