State v. Hedgpeth
Decision Date | 21 November 2019 |
Docket Number | CC 14CR1014 (SC S065921) |
Citation | 452 P.3d 948,365 Or. 724 |
Parties | STATE of Oregon, Petitioner on Review, v. John Charles HEDGPETH, Respondent on Review. |
Court | Oregon Supreme Court |
Paul L. Smith, Deputy Solicitor General, Salem, argued the cause and filed the briefs for petitioner on review. Also on the briefs were Ellen F. Rosenblum, Attorney General, and Benjamin Gutman, Solicitor General.
Emily P. Seltzer, Deputy Public Defender, Office of Public Defense Services, Salem, argued the cause and filed the brief for the respondent on review. Also on the brief was Ernest G. Lannet, Chief Deputy Defender.
Before Walters, Chief Justice, and Balmer, Nakamoto, Flynn, Duncan, and Nelson, Justices, and Baldwin, Senior Justice pro tempore.**
This case arises out of defendant’s challenge to his conviction for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII) by driving with a blood alcohol concentration (BAC) of at least .08 percent. The record consisted solely of evidence that a breathalyzer test measured defendant’s BAC as .09 percent nearly two hours after he drove and that defendant had consumed no additional alcohol in the interim. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant that the state’s evidence was insufficient to demonstrate that defendant drove with a BAC of at least .08 percent. State v. Hedgpeth, 290 Or. App. 399, 415 P.3d 1080, rev. allowed , 363 Or. 119, 421 P.3d 354 (2018). We allowed the state’s petition for review to consider whether "common knowledge" of the proposition that blood alcohol levels dissipate over time permits a factfinder reasonably to infer that defendant drove with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit from evidence that defendant’s blood alcohol level two hours later was .09 percent, with no consumption in the interim. On those bare facts, we conclude that something more than the generic proposition that blood alcohol levels dissipate over time is needed to permit a nonspeculative inference that the defendant drove with a blood alcohol level above the legal limit.
As we have explained, the statute describes alternative methods for proving that a person drove while under the influence of intoxicants:
State v. Clark , 286 Or. 33, 39, 593 P.2d 123 (1979).
We also have emphasized two features of the statute that complicate the state’s burden of proof. First, under either method of proof, "the state must prove that the driver had the proscribed BAC or was perceptibly impaired at the time that he or she was driving. " Eumana-Moranchel , 352 Or. at 8, 277 P.3d 549 (emphasis in original). Second, proof of a per se violation based on blood alcohol concentration must be "shown by chemical analysis of the breath or blood." State v. O’Key , 321 Or. 285, 308, 899 P.2d 663 (1995) ( ).
Those requirements present a challenge when the state seeks to prove that a person has committed DUII based only on evidence from a chemical analysis of blood alcohol concentrations because, as we observed in Eumana-Moranchel , "it is virtually always the case that the chemical test of the breath or blood is administered some time after the person has stopped driving." 352 Or. at 9, 277 P.3d 549 (emphasis in original). From that premise and the additional premise that "a person’s BAC changes during the time between being stopped and undergoing a breath test[,] * * * [i]t follows that a chemical test result alone never ‘shows’ the actual BAC of the driver at the time of driving." Id . Thus, as we emphasized, "[s]omething more is necessary to connect the breath test result to the statutory requirement of a BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving." Id. at 9-10, 277 P.3d 549.
For reasons of strategy that have no bearing on this appeal, the state chose to prove that defendant committed the crime of DUII only under the per se method of proof—proving that he drove with a BAC of at least .08.2 The evidence at trial consisted exclusively of testimony from the arresting officer that (1) he had stopped defendant for riding a motorcycle without a helmet; (2) he subsequently took defendant into custody for DUII;3 (3) he took defendant to the police station where a breathalyzer test was administered one hour and 55 minutes after the stop; (4) defendant did not consume alcohol between the time of the stop and the administration of the breathalyzer test, and (5) the breathalyzer result showed a BAC of 0.09. Defendant argued to the trial court that the evidence was insufficient to permit a nonspeculative inference that his BAC was over the legal limit at the time he drove, but the court disagreed. Sitting as factfinder, the court explained:
On appeal, defendant renewed his challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, and the state responded by arguing that the "common knowledge" that alcohol rates dissipate over time permitted the factfinder to draw a reasonable inference that defendant’s BAC was at least .08 at the time of driving. The Court of Appeals agreed with defendant and reversed the conviction. The court reasoned that "the factfinder cannot, at least on this record, apply the common knowledge that blood alcohol goes up and down over time to make a reasonable inference about when defendant’s BAC likely reached .08 or above and whether that occurred while defendant was driving." Hedgpeth , 290 Or. App at 406, 415 P.3d 1080. The Court of Appeals identified three possible inferences that could be drawn: That defendant’s BAC was above .08 when he drove; that it was at .08 when he drove; or that it was under .08 when he drove. Id . at 407, 415 P.3d 1080. Because the state did not present "any evidence bearing on the movement of alcohol through defendant’s body or the presence of alcohol in defendant’s body at the time or shortly before defendant drove," the court concluded that "there is nothing but speculation that guides a factfinder to select from one of those three possible inferences." Id . at 406, 407, 415 P.3d 1080 (emphasis in original).
This court allowed review to address the role of inferences and "common knowledge" when a court tests the sufficiency of evidence to permit a criminal conviction. As we explain below, we agree with the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that "common knowledge" is not enough on this record to supply the "[s]omething more" that is "necessary to connect the breath test result to the statutory requirement of a BAC of .08 percent or more at the time of driving." See Eumana-Moranchel , 352 Or. at 9-10, 277 P.3d 549.
We turn to a preliminary dispute regarding the legal standard for granting a motion for judgment of acquittal.4 We have repeatedly explained that our standard for reviewing the denial of a motion for judgment of acquittal involves viewing the evidence in the "light most favorable to the state" to determine if the could find the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Clemente-Perez , 357 Or. 745, 756, 762, 359 P.3d 232 (2015) ; see also State v. Lupoli , 348 Or. 346, 366, 234 P.3d 117 (2010) (same).
According to the state, the trial court’s finding that defendant had a BAC of at least .08 at the time that he was driving was a reasonable inference from the evidence of three predicate facts: 1) the trooper placed defendant under arrest for DUII shortly after he observed defendant driving; 2) a chemical test performed nearly two hours later measured defendant’s BAC at...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
State v. Davis
...cross-examination, a nonspeculative showing of relevance is required to compel a witness's appearance at trial. See State v. Hedgpeth , 365 Or. 724, 732, 452 P.3d 948 (2019) (providing that "facts in issue can ‘be established by reasonable inferences, but not through speculation’ ") (quotin......
-
A. B. v. Or. Clinic
...(internal quotation marks omitted). Of course, the laws of logic include "principles of deduction or inference." State v. Hedgpeth , 365 Or. 724, 733, 452 P.3d 948 (2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). We keep in mind that multiple reasonable inferences may be drawn from the evidence, ......
-
State v. Reyes-Castro
...motion for judgment of acquittal and the trial court's restitution order in the light most favorable to the state. State v. Hedgpeth , 365 Or. 724, 730, 452 P.3d 948 (2019) ; State v. Howard , 292 Or. App. 517, 519, 424 P.3d 803 (2018). We state the facts in accordance with that standard.De......
-
State v. Ramirez
...se " cases. See ORS 813.010(1)(a) (prohibiting driving a vehicle when the driver has a BAC of .08 percent or more); State v. Hedgpeth , 365 Or. 724, 727, 452 P.3d 948 (2019) (describing prosecutions under ORS 813.010(1)(a) as "the per se method of proving DUII"). Two, the state can establis......