State v. Heitz

• Decision Date: 20 November 1951
• Docket Number: No. 7765,7765
• Citation: 238 P.2d 439,72 Idaho 107
• Parties: STATE v. HEITZ.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 439

238 P.2d 439

72 Idaho 107

STATE v. HEITZ.

No. 7765.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Nov. 20, 1951.

Beckwith & Langley, Twin Falls, for appellant.

Robert E. Smylie, Atty. Gen. of Idaho and William H. Bakes, Asst. Atty. Gen., Graydon W. Smith, Pros. Atty. and Leonard H. Jocab, Deputy Pros. Atty., Twin Falls, for respondent.

KEETON, Justice.

Appellant, defendant below, was charged with the crime of driving a motor vehicle upon a public highway of the state, loaded in excess of weight limitations as promulgated, posted and prescribed by the Commissioner of Public Works under authority of Sec. 49-606, I.C. By a promulgated and prescribed regulation made pursuant to the powers conferred in this section, 49-606, I.C., Highway #93 leading from Los Angeles, California to Twin Falls, Idaho, and other points beyond Twin Falls, was posted at the Nevada-Idaho border, limiting the load limits of a motor vehicle traveling this highway in Idaho to 350 lbs. per inch width of tire, or 12,000 lbs. for any axle.

The appellant, on March 1, 1950, while said road was so posted and limited as to weights and load to be carried, operated a truck and trailer, driven from Los Angeles to Twin Falls, carrying 76,490 lbs. The maximum load limit under the regulation was 60,000 lbs. The weight was 16,490 lbs. in excess of the load limit for axles on the motor vehicle so operated by the appellant on the Idaho road. The truck in question entered Idaho at the Nevada-Idaho boarder, was owned by the Idaho Pacific Freight Lines and was properly licensed as required by Sec. 49-127, I.C.

Appellant was first tried in the justice court, found guilty and sentenced. He appealed to the district court, was there found guilty and sentence authorized by Sec. 49-609, I.C., imposed. From the judgment of conviction and sentence he appealed.

In his brief and oral argument, appellant specifies errors which summarized present the questions herein discussed.

Appellant contends that Secs. 49-605, 49-606, 49-609 and 49-611, I.C., are unconstitutional, in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 2, Idaho Constitution: 'All political power is inherent in the people. Government is instituted for their equal protection and benefit, and they have the right to alter, reform or abolish the same whenever they may deem it necessary; and no special privileges or immunities shall ever be granted that may not be altered, revoked, or repealed by the legislature.' And Art. 3, Sec. 1: 'The legislative power of the state shall be vested in a senate and house of representatives. * * *' And Art. 3, Sec. 19: 'The legislature shall not pass local or special laws in any of the following enumerated cases, that is to say: * * * For the punishment of crimes and misdemeanors. * * *' and are in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution of the United States: 'The Congress shall have Power * * *: To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, * * *' and further contends that statutes challenged deny equal protection to all persons and are in conflict with the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution: '* * * No State shall * * * deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.' By the provisions of Sec. 49-602, I.C., a general regulation limiting loads and weights of vehicles traversing highways of the state is prescribed. Sec. 49-606, I.C. (Section under which appellant was convicted), authorizes the Commissioner of Public Works to make regulations reducing the permissible sizes, weights and speeds of vehicles driven on state highways for such periods as may be necessary for the protection of the road and for the public safety, and authority to erect and maintain signs informative of such regulation at designated places. There is no contention that the Commissioner did not make a regulation reducing the permissible sizes, weights and speed limits allowed by Secs. 49-602, 49-603, I.C., and post such regulation notices as required.

That the legislature may delegate its authority to make findings of fact, and within limitations set by the legislature, promulgate rules and regulations for the use of the highways, and limitation of load weights on highways prescribed by those authorized by the legislature so to do has been upheld and enforced in practically unanimous decisions of all courts.

A legislature, or other law-making body, in enacting a law complete in itself, designed to accomplish the regulation of particular matters falling within its jurisdiction may expressly authorize an administrative commission (in this case the Commissioner of Public Workds) within definite limits, to provide rules and regulations for the complete operation and enforcement of the law within its expressed general purpose, and in so doing, the administrative officer or board so empowered may be given the right to prescribe or vary regulations concerning motor vehicles used on public highways. 11 Am.Jur. 955, Sec. 240. For collection and review of authorities sustaining the rule above, see 87 A.L.R. 547.

A legislative body cannot delegate legislative power to make laws to other body or authority, State v. Nelson, 36 Idaho 713, 213 P. 358, but this rule does not preclude conferring upon local subdivisions or administrative officers the power to prescribe or vary regulations concerning motor vehicles used on public highways within definite limits fixed by the legislative body. Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct 581, 76 L.Ed. 1167; Zackary v. Morris, 78 Fla. 316, 82 So. 830; State v. Wetzel, 208 Wis. 603, 243 N.W. 768, 86 A.L.R. 274; Ashland Transfer Co. v. State Tax Commission, 247 Ky. 144, 56 S.W.2d 691, 87 A.L.R. 534; Diefendorf v. Gallet, 51 Idaho 619, 10 P.2d 307; La Forest v. Board of Commissioners, 67 App.D.C. 396, 92 F.2d 547; Baltimore & Ohio Ry. Co. v. District of Columbia. 10 App.D.C. 111; Blumenthal v. City of Cheyenne, 64 Wyo. 75, 186 P.2d 556; Northern Pac. Ry. Co. v. Bennett, 83 Mont. 483, 272 P. 987; Mutual Film Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 236 U.S. 230, 35 S.Ct. 387, 59 L.Ed. 552; Maner v. Dykes, 52 Ga.App. 715, 184 S.E. 438; Britton v. Smith, Tex.Civ.App., 82 S.W.2d 1065; State v. Nelson, supra.

Nor are such rules and regulations prescribed by administrative boards where applicable to all persons and authorized by the legislature unconstitutional. Such authority to make rules and regulations to carry out an express legislative purpose or to effect the operation and enforcement of the same is not exclusively a legislative power, but is administrative in its nature. 11 Am.Jur. 955, Sec. 240; State of Florida v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 56 Fla. 617, 47 So. 969, 32 L.R.A.,N.S., 639; Thompson v. Smith, 155 Va. 367, 154 S.E. 579, 71 A.L.R. 604. For collection of authorities see 32 L.R.A., N.S., 639.

Hence the statute, Sec. 49-606, I.C., is not in violation of Art. 1, Sec. 2, Art. 3, Sec. 1, Art. 3, Sec. 19 of the Idaho Constitution.

The appellant argues that the state cannot by law impose a restraint or penalty on interstate commerce where regulations and penalties do not apply equally to each.

Conceding appellant's general statement as correct, it has no application here. The law and regulation thereunder, under which the appellant was convicted applies equally to all persons using the highway at the particular places so designated and posted.

That the states have the right to regulate and determine what use, within prescribed conditions and limitations, shall be made of highways has been upheld in numerous decisions, and a regulation made pursuant to a statute by a body or board (in this case the Commissioner of Public Works) is not, in the absence of Federal legislation, repugnant to the interstate commerce clause, Art. 1, Sec. 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution.

Thus in Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374, 52 S.Ct. 581, 585, 76 L.Ed. 1167, the United States Supreme Court speaking through Chief Justice Hughes said:

'In exercising its authority over its highways the state * * * may also prevent the wear and hazards due to excessive size of vehicles and weight of load. Limitations of size and weight are manifestly subjects within the broad range of legislative discretion. To make scientific precision a criterion of constitutional power would be to subject the state to an intolerable supervision hostile to the basic principles of our government and wholly beyond the protection which the general clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was intended to secure. * * * When the subject lies within the police power of the state, debatable questions as to reasonableness are not for the courts but for the Legislature, which is entitled to form its own judgment, and its action within its range of discretion cannot be set aside because compliance is burdensome. * * *

'The objection to the prescribed limitation as repugnant to the commerce clause is also without merit. The court, in Morris v. Duby, supra, 274 U.S. at page 143, 47 S.Ct. 548, 550, 71 L.Ed. 966, answered a similar objection to the...