State v. Heminover

• Decision Date: 16 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 98-1890.,98-1890.
• Parties: STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Keith HEMINOVER, Appellant.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

619 N.W.2d 353

STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Keith HEMINOVER, Appellant.

No. 98-1890.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

November 16, 2000.

Paul Demro of Correll, Sheerer, Benson, Engels, Galles & Demro, Cedar Falls, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Mary Tabor and Julie H. Brown, Assistant Attorneys General, Thomas J. Ferguson, County Attorney, and Joel Dalrymple, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.

Considered en banc.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

This appeal presents the question of whether the State is bound by the reasons an officer gives to justify a stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The court of appeals thought so and reversed a district court ruling that overruled defendant's Fourth Amendment motion to suppress in which the district court concluded that reasons other than those given by the stopping officer justified his stop of defendant's vehicle. On further review, we conclude that (1) in justifying a Terry investigatory stop, the State is not bound by the reasons given by the stopping officer; and (2) the district court was correct in overruling the motion on the grounds it gave. We therefore vacate the court of appeals decision and affirm the district court judgment.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On the evening of August 29, 1997, the Black Hawk County Sheriff's Office was conducting a traffic safety enforcement roadblock on Gilbertville Road at approximately 500 feet from the intersection of Plaza and Gilbertville Road. Plaza runs north and south. Gilbertville Road runs east and west.

At approximately 9 p.m., Keith Heminover was driving his van in a southerly direction on Plaza and turned west onto Gilbertville Road. At the time, Heminover's two minor sons were in the vehicle with him. When he was approximately 150 feet from the roadblock, Heminover stopped his vehicle. Deputy sheriff Ben Ramirez waived his flashlight at Heminover, directing him to move forward and pull over. At that point, Heminover placed his van in reverse, backed into the intersection of Plaza and Gilbertville Road, and drove south on Plaza away from the roadblock.

Ramirez followed Heminover in his patrol car and pulled him over. After stopping Heminover, Ramirez noticed that Heminover smelled of alcohol. The deputy asked Heminover if he had been drinking, and Heminover replied that he had consumed a few beers. Ramirez then asked Heminover to submit to a roadside sobriety test, to which Heminover agreed. Ramirez conducted a horizontal nystagmus test on Heminover, which Heminover failed. During the test, Heminover was swaying side to side and front to back. Heminover refused Ramirez's request to take a preliminary breath test, after which the deputy arrested him for operating while intoxicated.

The State charged Heminover with (1) OWI in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2 (1997), (2) two aggravated misdemeanor counts of child endangerment in violation of Iowa Code section 726.6(1)(a), and (3) one simple misdemeanor count of failure to obey a police officer in violation of Iowa Code section 321.229. The State later amended the trial information to elevate the OWI charge to a second offense.

Heminover moved to suppress any evidence regarding (1) the field sobriety tests, (2) comments about drinking, and (3) drinking prior to the field sobriety tests. Later, Heminover amended his motion, asserting that because the safety inspection roadblock was illegal from its inception, any evidence gathered or observed after Heminover encountered the roadblock was illegally seized and should be suppressed.

Following a hearing on the motion to suppress, district associate judge J.G. Johnson denied the motion. The court concluded that the roadblock safety check violated Iowa Code section 312K.1(2) because there was no evidence showing that (1) the roadblock was authorized by "policy-making administrative officers of the law enforcement agency" and (2) there were "advance warning signs ... erected to provide timely information to approaching motorists of the roadblock and its nature." On this basis, the court concluded Ramirez was not authorized to stop Heminover. The court further concluded that Heminover's failure to obey Ramirez's signals was not a violation of the law and did not create reasonable cause for the deputy to stop him.

Additionally, the court concluded that turning away from a roadblock does not alone constitute reasonable cause to stop a vehicle. Nevertheless, the court concluded that, in backing away from the roadblock and resuming travel in a different direction, Heminover violated state law. Citing this violation, the court concluded there was reasonable cause for Ramirez to pursue Heminover and make the initial stop.

Later, in a trial based on stipulated minutes, district associate judge James Moothart found Heminover guilty of all charges. District judge James C. Bauch entered judgment and sentence. Heminover appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals reversed the convictions.

We granted the State's application for further review. The sole issue is whether the district court correctly determined there was reasonable cause for Ramirez to stop Heminover's vehicle.

In his appeal, Heminover presents two arguments in support of his position that the evidence gathered, after the stop, was illegally obtained. First, he contends the roadblock was illegal. The State concedes the roadblock was illegal, so we give that contention no further consideration. Second, he contends that his conduct in backing up near the roadblock did not constitute reasonable cause for the stop.

Heminover's second contention raises a constitutional issue under the Fourth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. We review de novo the ultimate conclusion reached by the district court on a motion to suppress. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S.Ct. 1657, 1663, 134 L.Ed.2d 911, 920 (1996)

. Fact-findings underlying the district court's ruling on such a motion are binding on the appellate courts if supported by substantial evidence. State v. Cline, 617 N.W.2d 277, 280 (Iowa 2000).

II. Reasonable Cause for the Stop.

On this issue, the district court concluded that, in backing away from the roadblock and resuming travel in a different direction, Heminover violated, or at least potentially violated, state law. The court found that, when Heminover backed away from the roadblock, he traveled 150 feet eastbound on the westbound portion of a divided highway. The court likened this to traveling the wrong direction on a one-way street. The court similarly found that, in changing directions to head south, Heminover briefly backed his van north along a southbound road. Finally, the court found that, in backing into the intersection, Heminover engaged in inherently dangerous activity, as the intersection was very busy with semitrailer truck traffic.

Determining that there was at least a possible violation of law, the court concluded that there was reasonable cause for Ramirez to pursue Heminover and make the initial stop. On this basis, the district court denied Heminover's motion to suppress.

On appeal, Heminover challenged the district court's rationale, contending that Ramirez did not charge him with "improper backing." For this reason, Heminover says, Ramirez did not believe Heminover violated the law.

The State contended that Ramirez had reasonable cause to stop Heminover because he engaged in "improper backing," and this constituted a traffic violation. A traffic violation, the State further contended, gives an officer probable cause to stop a motorist.

The court of appeals noted that Ramirez testified that he did not stop Heminover for "improper backing" but instead stopped him because Ramirez believed that Heminover was attempting to avoid a roadblock. Relying on language in our prior cases, the court of appeals concluded that (1) officers are held to their true reasons for stopping a vehicle and (2) a court will not allow officers to justify a stop with reasons upon which they did not actually act. The court therefore refused to consider "improper backing" as grounds for the stop.

The court then considered Ramirez's stated reason for the stop—avoidance of the roadblock—and concluded that Heminover's actions in turning back did not give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.

The court of appeals' reasons for refusing to consider "improper backing" as grounds for the stop raises the following issue: Is the State limited to the reasons stated by the investigating officer in justifying the challenged stop based on reasonable cause? We have said "no" when the stop was premised on probable cause. See Cline, 617 N.W.2d at 280-81

; State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 206 (Iowa 1996). We have said "yes" in several cases before Cline when the stop was premised on reasonable cause. See, e.g., State v. Jones, 586 N.W.2d 379, 382 (Iowa 1998); State v. Wiese, 525 N.W.2d 412, 415 (Iowa 1994); State v. Jamison, 482 N.W.2d 409, 413 (Iowa 1992); State v. Rosenstiel, 473 N.W.2d 59, 61 (Iowa 1991); State v. Bailey, 452 N.W.2d 181, 182 (Iowa 1990); State v. Lamp, 322 N.W.2d 48, 51 (Iowa 1982); State v. Aschenbrenner, 289 N.W.2d 618, 619 (Iowa 1980). For reasons that follow, we now think the State should not be limited to the reasons stated by the investigating officer in either instance.

A. Background. The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures...." The Fourth Amendment is made applicable to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L.Ed.2d 1081, 1090 (1961); State v. Ceron, 573 N.W.2d 587, 592 (Iowa 1997). Regardless of its relevancy or probative value, evidence obtained in violation of this provision is inadmissible. Predka, 555...