State v. Henderson
Decision Date | 16 May 1979 |
Docket Number | No. 78-1158,78-1158 |
Citation | 58 Ohio St.2d 171,12 O.O.3d 177,389 N.E.2d 494 |
Parties | , 12 O.O.3d 177 The STATE of Ohio, Appellant, v. HENDERSON, Appellee. |
Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Where an accused has entered a plea of guilty to a theft offense but has not been sentenced by the court on that charge, such offender has not been previously convicted of a theft offense within the meaning of R.C. 2913.02(B).
2. To constitute a prior conviction for a theft offense, there must be a judgment of conviction, as defined in Crim.R. 32(B), for the prior offense.
On August 31, 1976, in case No. Cr. 26285, Carl T. Henderson, defendant-appellee herein, plead guilty in the trial court to a charge of receiving stolen property in violation of R.C. 2913.51. On November 8, 1976, appellee was indicted for grand theft pursuant to R.C. 2913.02. The indictment alleged that the theft involved a radio with a value of less than $150. However, it also indicated that appellee had been previously "convicted" of the charge of receiving stolen property. The allegation of a prior conviction raised the offense from petty theft to grand theft transforming it into a felony of the fourth degree.
At a hearing in the trial court on November 17, 1976, counsel for appellee moved to dismiss the charge or, in the alternative, to reduce it to petty theft. It was asserted that appellee had yet to be sentenced in case No. Cr 26285, and therefore no "prior conviction" existed as alleged in the indictment.
The trial judge overruled the alternative motions concluding that a plea of guilty was sufficient under the statute to enhance the character of the offense.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a judgment of conviction was necessary to constitute a "conviction" for purposes of R.C. 2913.02(B). Accordingly, the court held it was prejudicial error to have overruled the motion to reduce the indictment's charge to petty theft. The appellate court reduced the charge, rendered judgment pursuant to App.R. 12(B), and remanded the cause for further proceedings in accordance with law.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion for leave to appeal.
John T. Corrigan, Pros. Atty., and Regis E. McGann, Cleveland, for appellant.
Lynn A. Lazzaro and Jonathan H. Soucek, Cleveland, for appellee.
Appellant has raised a sole proposition of law that reads as follows: "When a trial judge accepts a plea of guilty of an accused, this operates as a conviction despite the fact that the judge delays sentencing." More specifically, the issue to be resolved on this appeal concerns the intent of the General Assembly in enacting the phrase "previously been convicted of a theft offense" as it is used in R.C. 2913.02(B).
The provisions of that statute indicate the following:
As illustrated by the statutory language, a critical distinction is made between the offenses of grand and petty theft. The more serious offense arises if any of three circumstances is present: (1) the value of the property is over $150, (2) R.C. 2913.71 property is involved or, as in the present appeal, (3) there has been a previous Conviction for a theft offense.
In State v. Gordon (1971), 28 Ohio St.2d 45, 276 N.E.2d 243, this court addressed the subject of a "second offense" for purposes of enhancing the penalty provided by R.C. 4549.99, to be imposed for a violation of R.C. 4549.04(B) operating a motor vehicle without the owner's consent. The court concluded that the existence of a prior offense was an "element" of the subsequent crime and that the burden of proof imposed upon the state was the same as that required for any other element of the offense stating, at page 48, 276 N.E.2d at page 245, as follows:
That same reasoning is equally pertinent in the present appeal and we conclude, therefore, that a prior conviction for purposes of R.C. 2913.02(B) is an element of the offense of grand theft and must be demonstrated beyond a reasonable doubt.
Moreover, since a prior conviction is considered an integral element of the crime of grand theft, R.C. 2901.04(A) requires that its definition "shall be strictly construed against the state, and liberally construed in favor of the accused." With that emphasis on a liberal construction in mind, the question becomes, "How do we define the word 'convicted' for purposes of R.C. 2913.02(B)?"
Appellant contends that the trial court's finding that a guilty plea had been entered in the earlier case was sufficient to increase the penalty provisions of the statute. Thus, the word "convicted" should be defined as the legal ascertainment of guilt, exhibited in the record before us as the entry of a plea of guilty to the charge of receiving stolen property.
In support of its argument, appellant refers us to State v. Brantley (1965), 1 Ohio St.2d 139, 205 N.E.2d 391. In Brantley, as in Gordon, supra, the court was confronted with a statute which punished an initial violation of its provisions as a misdemeanor and raised the penalty to that of a felony "for each subsequent offense." The issue raised in that appeal, however, was whether a "subsequent offense" under the statute must occur after a conviction for a first offense. The terms "offense" and "conviction" were analyzed and defined, at pages 141-142, 205 N.E.2d at page 393, in the following manner:
Although the court in Brantley, supra, utilized the restricted definition of conviction, as urged by the appellant herein, it did so for the sole purpose of ascertaining the difference between the words "conviction" and "offense" for purposes of that Particular statute. There is no indication the court intended that narrow definition to be universally applied throughout the Criminal Code.
The opinion of the court merely stated, for purposes of the statute before it, that a "subsequent offense" need only occur after a prior offense, rather than a prior conviction, to enhance the penalty contained therein. In contrast, R.C. 2913.02(B) does not merely refer to a theft "offense," but further qualifies that term by indicating that a conviction is also required to increase the punishment.
Guided by the mandate of R.C. 2901.04(A) and the fact that a prior conviction is an element of the crime of grand theft, we are convinced the General Assembly intended more than the mere ascertainment of guilt when it referred to one who had been "previously convicted of a theft offense." Prior case law, as well as provisions found in both the Criminal Rules and the new Criminal Code, enacted together with R.C. 2913.02, lead us to the conclusion that a final judgment of conviction was intended in R.C. 2913.02(B).
For example, in State v. Winters (1965), 2 Ohio St.2d 325, 209 N.E.2d 131, dealing with an analogous situation involving the former habitual criminal statute, we determined that a plea of guilty was not synonymous with a conviction. In that appeal, the indictment alleged the defendant had been previously indicted for several crimes and plead guilty to three of those offenses.
However, the court held that the method employed to plead three "convictions," for purposes of the...
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