State v. Michael v. Haley
| Decision Date | 25 July 1997 |
| Docket Number | 97-LW-1860,96-CA-50 |
| Court | Ohio Court of Appeals |
| Parties | STATE OF OHIO, Plaintiff-Appellee v. MICHAEL V. HALEY, Defendant-Appellant Case |
Risa C McCray, S.C. Regis. No. 0032119; Sipi L. A. Pierce, S.C Regis. No. 0062056, McCray & Associates, 827 W. Grand Avenue Dayton, Ohio 45407, Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant
William F. Schenck, S.C. Regis. No. 0015243, Greene County, Prosecuting Attorney; Robert K. Hendrix, S.C. Regis. No. 0037351, Assistant Prosecutor, 45 N. Detroit Street, Xenia, Ohio 45385, Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
Appellant-Defendant Michael V. Haley appeals from his convictions on a variety of felony counts, including several counts of Aggravated Robbery and Rape, after a jury trial held in the Greene County Court of Common Pleas. We affirm.
Appellant Haley's trial arose from the robbery or attempted robbery of two small retail shops in Greene County, Ohio. The incidents occurred at the Fashion Bug Store located at 3310 New Germany-Trebein Road in Beavercreek, Ohio, on April 20, 1995, and at the Sugar Shack Candy Company located at 2628A Colonel Glenn Highway in Fairborn, Ohio, on October 9, 1995. The Fashion Bug incident was an approximately two hour ordeal during which an armed perpetrator held up the store and forced four employees and a small child into a back room, where he ordered the adult women to strip naked, forced the store manager to perform oral sex on him, anally and vaginally raped the manager, and forced the manager and three other employees to perform oral sex acts on each other. The Sugar Shack incident involved an attempted robbery that was apparently foiled by employees of the store.
On December 8, 1995, the Grand Jury presented a twenty seven count secret indictment against Michael V. Haley. Two of the counts pertained to the attempted robbery of the Sugar Shack, while the other twenty-five arose from the incident at the Beavercreek Fashion Bug. A warrant was issued and Haley was arraigned on December 15, 1995. He pleaded not guilty and a jury trial was held on March 19-26, 1996. Voir dire was conducted on March 19, 1996, and the trial began the next day.
At trial, the State called several witnesses, including all four of the Beavercreek Fashion Bug employees who were victims of the hold-up and related crimes. Each of the victims detailed a terrifying ordeal during which an armed man held them captive in a storage room, forced all of them - except for the four-year old girl who merely witnessed the events - to undress and engage in humiliating sexual conduct, threatened their lives, robbed them of personal belongings, fired a handgun twice, and threatened retribution if the women went to the police. All four women described the perpetrator as a tall black man wearing black pants and a purple sweatshirt, who, after entering the store, pulled a woman's stocking partially over his face. Tr. 340-341, 351; 491, 493; 581; 605, 613. Three of the four also made in-court identifications of Michael V. Haley as the perpetrator. Tr. 390; 491; 636.
The prosecution introduced several items of physical evidence uncovered during an examination of the scene and a search of Haley's apartment, that seemed to tie Haley to the Fashion Bug robbery. This evidence included fingerprints identified as Haley's from the storage room door of the Fashion Bug, and black jeans, a women's stocking, .22 caliber ammunition, parts of a disassembled firearm, and a pager discovered in Michael Haley's apartment.
The State also presented a witness who identified Haley as the perpetrator of the attempted robbery of the Sugar Shack. Tr. 961. The perpetrator of that crime also allegedly wore a purple sweatshirt and black pants. Furthermore, the State presented witnesses from the November 2, 1995, attempted robbery of a Fashion Bug store located in Riverside, Montgomery County. One witness-passerby testified that he followed the perpetrator to his car and wrote down the license plate number of the vehicle. Tr. 1046. The number led police officers to Michael Haley. The Riverside police, with the assistance of the Beavercreek police, put together a photo lineup including a photograph of Haley. Two witnesses who were in the store identified Michael Haley's picture from the photo lineup. Tr. 993; 1024. While this evidence was introduced at trial, Haley was apparently never charged with any crime arising from the Riverside Fashion Bug incident.
The jury acquitted Haley of the count of Attempted Aggravated Robbery and the count of Kidnaping arising from the Sugar Shack Candy Company incident. Additionally, two counts of Attempted Felonious Assault in connection with the Fashion Bug hold-up were dismissed. However, with respect to the Fashion Bug hold-up, the jury returned guilty verdicts on the following: four counts of Aggravated Robbery, an aggravated first degree felony under R.C. 2911.01 (A) (1), with a firearm specification; five counts of Kidnaping, an aggravated first degree felony under R.C. 2905.01 (A) (2), with a firearm specification; four counts of Rape, an aggravated first degree felony under R.C. 2907.05 (A) (1) with a weapon specification; six counts of Gross Sexual Imposition, a fourth degree felony under R.C. 2907.05 (A) (1); and four counts of Intimidation of a Crime Victim or Witness, a third degree felony in violation of R.C. 2921.04 (B). On May 6, 1996, Judge Rose merged several of the counts and imposed sentence.
Appellant Haley filed a timely notice of appeal and asserts eleven assignments of error, most of which pertain to the trial court's disposition of the parties' pre-trial motions or involve allegations of prosecutorial misconduct. He argues that these errors individually or taken as a whole operated to deprive him of a fair trial. We have attempted to organize the assignments of error according to their broader themes. Accordingly, we first consider the allegations relating to the admissibility of the State's evidence. We then turn to the appellant's concerns about the identification procedures and testimony in the investigation and trial of this case. Next, we address Haley's allegations that, for a variety of reasons, he was effectively deprived of his right to an impartial jury. Finally, we consider Haley's general assertion that the trial court abused its discretion by allowing both his trial and sentencing to be marred by irregularities.
Three of Haley's assignments of error pertain to the trial court's rulings on whether to admit or exclude certain items of evidence. Before turning to Haley's specific arguments, we note that a trial judge is vested with broad discretion with respect to the admitting of evidence. State v. Long (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 7 O.O.3d 178, 372 N.E.2d 804. Thus, we will reverse a judge's determination only where the appellant demonstrates that the judge has abused that discretion. "'The term discretion itself involves the idea of choice, of an exercise of the will, of a determination made between competing considerations.'" State v. Jenkins (1984), 15 Ohio St.3d 164, 222, 15 OBR 311, 361, 473 N.E.2d 264, 313, certiorari denied, 472 U.S. 1032, 105 S.Ct. 3514, 87 L.Ed.2d 642, rehearing denied, 473 U.S. 927, 106 S.Ct. 19, 87 L.Ed.2d 697, quoting Spalding v. Spalding (1959), 355 Mich. 382, 384-385, 94 N.W.2d 810, 811-812. In order to constitute an abuse of discretion, the challenged ruling must be "so palpably and grossly violative of fact or logic that it evidences not the exercise of will but the perversity of will, not the exercise of judgment but the defiance of judgment, not the exercise of reason but instead passion or bias." Nakoff v. Fairview Gen. Hosp. (1996), 75 Ohio St.3d 254, 256, 662 N.E.2d 1, 3. We find that none of the judge's evidentiary rulings constituted an abuse of discretion.
Under this assignment of error, Haley argues that a latent fingerprint lifted from the inner side of the stockroom door of the Beavercreek Fashion Bug should have been excluded from evidence. Haley does not dispute the State's assertion that the fingerprint was left by him, but argues that the print was inadmissible as irrelevant under Evid.R. 402, or, in the alternative, as excessively prejudicial under Evid.R. 403. The Defense filed a pre-trial motion to suppress the fingerprint, but expressly declined to object at trial to the admission of the latent fingerprint exhibits. Tr. 1149. The Rules of Evidence provide that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless . . . . a timely objection or motion to strike appears on the record." Evid.R. 103 (A) (1). Haley and the State disagree as to whether a pre-trial motion in limine is sufficient to preserve an alleged error. However, we conclude that whether the alleged error was properly preserved is moot in light of our determination that this assignment of error cannot be sustained on the merits.
The trial court's ruling was in strict accord with the Ohio Rules of Evidence. Generally, all relevant evidence is admissible and all irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. Evid.R. 402. Relevant evidence is that evidence that tends "to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Evid.R. 401. Clearly, the presence of Haley's fingerprints at the scene of the crime, the Fashion Bug stockroom, on the date of the crime makes the presence of Haley at the scene of the crime on the date of the crime - - a fact of obvious consequence - - more probable than it would be...
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