State v. Hewey

• Decision Date: 24 March 1993
• Citation: 622 A.2d 1151
• Parties: STATE of Maine v. Alden HEWEY.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 1151

622 A.2d 1151

STATE of Maine v. Alden HEWEY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Feb. 1, 1993.

Decided March 24, 1993.

David W. Crook, Dist. Atty., Alan P. Kelley (orally), Asst. Dist. Atty., Augusta, for the State.

Claudia C. Sharon (orally), Sharon & Oreskovich, Portland, for defendant.

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, COLLINS and RUDMAN, JJ.

GLASSMAN, Justice.

Alden Hewey appeals from the judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court (Kennebec County, Alexander, J.) on a jury verdict finding him guilty of robbery, 17-A M.R.S.A. § 651(1)(C) (1983) ¹ and from the sentence imposed by the court. He contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress from evidence his statement made to the police and in the imposition of a 30-year sentence. We affirm the judgment of conviction but find the sentence imposed by the court results from an error in principle. Accordingly, we vacate the imposed sentence and remand this case to the Superior Court for the resentencing of Hewey.

The record discloses that at approximately 1:15 a.m. on October 3, 1989, Christopher Cote while driving home from a social visit suddenly felt ill and pulled off the interstate into a rest area in Augusta. Returning from a restroom at the stop, Cote noticed a stranger, later identified as Hewey, walking toward his car. Feeling threatened, Cote reentered his car. Hewey entered Cote's vehicle on the passenger side, pinned Cote against the inside of the driver's side door with his forearm and demanded money, while searching Cote's pockets. Hewey took approximately $55 from Cote's front pant pocket and left the car, instructing Cote not to observe his movements. Cote telephoned the police and gave them the license plate number of a truck that he suspected was that of his assailant. Cote then visited the police station, identified Hewey in a photographic line-up and at approximately 3:00 a.m. accompanied the police to Hewey's home. Hewey's truck parked outside the residence matched the description given by Cote. The hood of the truck was still warm. Hewey complied with the initial requests of the police to come outside and identify himself and responded to their query of his whereabouts that evening by stating he had been at home. The police then arrested Hewey for the robbery of Cote. Before leaving the premises, Hewey was allowed to speak with his girlfriend. The police overheard him tell her that he had been at the Bob Inn in Waterville until 1:00 a.m. that morning and had witnesses "who would get him out of the charges." On the way to the police station, Hewey asked the arresting officer why the officer did not believe his story.

After a hearing, the court denied Hewey's pretrial motion to suppress these three statements from evidence at the trial of the present case. Following a jury trial finding Hewey guilty of robbery and receipt of a presentence investigation report, the trial court sentenced Hewey to the custody of the Department of Corrections for a period of 30 years with all but 25 years suspended and a period of probation for six years. The Sentence Review Panel of the Supreme Judicial Court granted Hewey leave to appeal his sentence, see 15 M.R.S.A. §§ 2151-2157 (Supp.1992), and this appeal followed.

On this appeal, Hewey confines his challenge to the trial court's denial of his motion to suppress Hewey's statement to the investigating officer that he had been home throughout the period preceding and following the robbery. He argues that because the statement was made without the benefit of warnings pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16 L.Ed.2d 694 (1966), the trial court erred in its ruling. We disagree.

Miranda warnings are mandated only when a suspect is both in custody and subjected to interrogation. See State v. Pinkham, 556 A.2d 658, 659 (Me.1989). "[T]he trial court's finding of no custodial interrogation will be upheld if the record provides rational support for that determination." Id. Here, the court rationally could have found that Hewey voluntarily went outside his home to meet with the police officer and knew he was free to leave at any time. The court appropriately determined "that a reasonable person in [Hewey's] position would not have believed that he was being restrained to the degree associated with a formal arrest." Id. Accordingly, the court properly denied Hewey's motion to suppress the statement at issue.

We agree with Hewey's second contention. In so doing, and prior to addressing the issue presented by the present case, we use this opportunity for clarification of our review of an appeal from a sentence imposed by the trial court. We are cognizant that in our previous opinions there has been some inconsistency in the terminology used to define each of the three steps we deem necessary to be followed by the trial court to achieve a greater uniformity in the sentencing process and to enable us to apply the correct standard of review to each of those steps. See 15 M.R.S.A. § 2155 (Supp.1992).

We do not here describe in detail the purposes of criminal sanctions or the multiple factors the trial court may consider. Rather, we describe a sentencing process by which the significant purposes and relevant factors may be articulated by the trial court in an individual case.

In the sentencing process, the trial court must first determine a basic period of incarceration. That determination is made solely by reference to the offender's criminal conduct in committing the crime, that is, "by considering the particular nature and seriousness of the offense without regard to the circumstances of the offender." State v. Weir, 600 A.2d 1105, 1106 (Me.1991).

"[I]n order that [the court] may appropriately individualize each sentence," id., the court must thereafter consider those factors peculiar to that offender. For example, mitigating factors, that may include the favorable prospect of rehabilitation of the offender, demonstrate the offender's low probability of re-offense and, thus, justify a diminution of the basic period of incarceration; aggravating factors demonstrate a high probability of re-offense and, in order to protect the public, justify enhancing the basic period of incarceration. In determining the appropriate degree of mitigation or aggravation...