State v. Hicks
| Decision Date | 24 November 2010 |
| Docket Number | No. 09-1246.,09-1246. |
| Citation | 791 N.W.2d 89 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Scott Allen HICKS, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
David A. Lemanski, Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Jean Pettinger, Assistant Attorney General, and Christopher M. Raker, County Attorney, for appellee.
Appellant seeks further review of court of appeals' decision to affirm the district court's denial of appellant's motion to suppress. The appellant sought to suppress evidence allegedly derived from an unconstitutional stop and evidence purportedly obtained after law enforcement denied appellant his right to call a family member as guaranteed by Iowa Code section 804.20 (2007). We find the district court correctly determined the detaining officer's stop of the petitioner to have been permissible, but the district court erred in holding that the appellant was afforded his section 804.20 rights. The decision of the court of appeals is vacated, the district court's judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded with instructions.
Sergeant Kennie Sparks of the Maquoketa Police Department was on patrol in an unmarked police car during the early morning hours of August 23, 2008. Sparks observed a car weaving in his rearview mirror. The car was quickly approaching the rear of the officer's car. Sparks pulled over to allow the car to pass and then began to follow the car. While following the car, Sparks attempted to drive at the same speed as the vehicle in front of him, a police tactic known as pacing. The onboard camera displays the squad car's speed pursuant to GPS. While pacing thecar, the camera showed the squad car was traveling thirty-four to thirty-six miles per hour. The speed limit was twenty-five miles per hour. In addition, the on-board camera also showed the car weaving and crossing the center of the road. Sparks then pulled the car over.
Appellant, Scott Hicks, was operating the vehicle and was the sole occupant. When making initial contact with Hicks, Sparks detected the odor of beer coming from Hicks's car. Sparks observed Hicks had bloodshot, watery eyes and slurred speech. Inside the car were two open, half-full beer cans. Sparks asked Hicks to take several tests. Hicks failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test. Hicks agreed to take the walk-and-turn test; however, after struggling with his initial steps, Hicks refused to complete the test and admitted to Sparks that he had too much to drink. Hicks refused to take the remaining field sobriety tests and subsequently was arrested and transported to the Maquoketa Police Department.
At the processing center, Sparks and Hicks engaged in numerous conversations, many relevant to Hicks's right to communicate with a family member:
Officer Sparks then informed Hicks that pursuant to police department policy Hicks would not be released until he passed a breath test. If Hicks refused to submit to a breath test or failed to pass the test, he was informed he would be held until morning and then see the judge.
Hicks ultimately announced he would no longer like to continue the implied consent process. Sparks insisted on completing the implied consent form. After the implied consent process was completed, Hicks again refused chemical testing and engaged in non-relevant conversation.
Hicks was charged with operating while intoxicated, second offense, in violation of Iowa Code section 321J.2(1)( a ) and ( b ). Hicks filed a motion to suppress. First, Hicks alleged Sparks lacked probable cause to pull him over and all evidence subsequent to the improper stop should be suppressed. Second, Hicks alleged he was denied his statutory right to contact a family member afforded by Iowa Code section 804.20 and all evidence subsequent to his invocation of this statutory right should be suppressed. The district court denied Hicks's motion to suppress on each issue. The jury found Hicks guilty of operating while intoxicated, and Hicks stipulated to an earlier operating-while-intoxicated conviction.Hicks was sentenced to twenty days of incarceration and fined $2500.
Hicks filed a timely notice of appeal. This appeal was routed to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed the district court's denial of Hicks's motion to suppress, finding the arresting officer had reasonable suspicion to stop Hicks, and the officer did not violate Iowa Code section 804.20. We granted Hicks's application for further review.
A. Reasonable Grounds for Stop. Hicks argues Sparks did not have probable cause to stop his car, and therefore the district court should have granted his motion to suppress evidence resulting from this improper stop. Because Hicks's argument as to the validity of his stop raises a constitutional issue, our review is de novo. State v. Kinkead, 570 N.W.2d 97, 99 (Iowa 1997).
To conduct an investigatory stop an officer must have a reasonable suspicion that criminal activity has occurred or is occurring. Id. at 100 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). "[T]he State must show by a preponderance of the evidence that the stopping officer had specific and articulable facts, which taken together with rational inferences from those facts, to reasonably believe criminal activity may have occurred." State v. Tague, 676 N.W.2d 197, 204 (Iowa 2004). Reasonable suspicion is evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances facing the officer at the time of the stop. Id.
The record contains evidence that creates a rational inference to believe Hicks may have been engaging in criminal activity. First, Sparks observed Hicks's car swerving in Sparks's rearview mirror. Then, after allowing Hicks to pass, Sparks observed Hicks's car cross over the center of the roadway into an unmarked lane for oncoming traffic. The on-board camera corroborates Sparks's observation. Second, the on-board camera shows that Sparks's squad car was traveling between thirty-four to thirty-six miles per hour in a twenty-five miles-per-hour speed zone while Sparks was pacing Hicks's car. The defendant challenges the validity of the pacing technique and the calibration of the GPS system; however, Sparks's pacing and the GPS speed allows for a rational inference that Hicks was traveling in excess of the twenty-five miles-per-hour speed limit. See State v. Bedwell, 417 N.W.2d 66, 70 (Iowa 1987) (). We find the record shows that Sparks had a reasonable suspicion to stop Hicks; therefore, the district court properly denied Hicks's motion to suppress on this issue.
B. Statutory Right to Call a Family Member. We review the district court's interpretation of section 804.20 for errors at law. State v. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d 667, 671 (Iowa 2005). If the district court correctly applied the law, we then determine whether there is substantial evidence to support the court's findings of fact. Id.
Hicks argues he was denied his statutory right guaranteed by Iowa Code section 804.20 to call a family member once detained by a police officer. Iowa Code section 804.20 states:
Any peace officer or other person having custody of any person arrested or restrained of the person's liberty for any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of the person's family or an attorney of the person'schoice, or both. Such person shall be permitted to make a reasonable number of telephone calls as may be required to secure an attorney.
The right to call a family member is equally important as the right to call counsel. State v. McAteer, 290 N.W.2d 924, 925 (Iowa 1980). The statute does not require a police officer to affirmatively inform the detainee of his statutory right; however, the peace officer cannot deny the right exists. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d at 671. The guaranteed right is a limited one and only requires a peace officer to provide the suspect with a reasonable opportunity to contact an attorney or family member. Bromeland v. Iowa Dep't of Transp., 562 N.W.2d 624, 626 (Iowa 1997).
To determine whether Hicks was denied his right to contact a family member under section 804.20, two distinct inquiries are required. First, we must determine whether Hicks invoked his rights under section 804.20. Second, we examine whether Hicks was afforded the rights section 804.20 guarantees. We examine these inquiries in turn.
1. Invocation of statutory right. We have evaluated the sufficiency of a suspect's invocation within two frameworks. First, we have examined the clarity of the suspect's request to determine if the suspect invoked his statutory right. Moorehead, 699 N.W.2d at 672. In Moorehead we held that a suspect invoked his section 804.20 right when the suspect asked a police officer, while detained in the back of a squad car, "[W]ould it be possible for me to talk to my Mom when you call her to come pick [the car] up?" Id. at 669. We concluded the suspect's request invoked section 804.20 because "Moorehead specifically, separately,...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
State v. Gaskins
...might have made and then search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments.”); see also State v. Hicks, 791 N.W.2d 89, 97–98 (Iowa 2010) (same); In re S.P., 719 N.W.2d 535, 539–40 (Iowa 2006) (stating “the court is prohibited from assuming the role of an adv......
-
State v. Coleman
...have made and then search for legal authority and comb the record for facts to support such arguments."); see also State v. Hicks , 791 N.W.2d 89, 97–98 (Iowa 2010) (declining to speculate as to argument not made at district court); Feld , 790 N.W.2d at 83 (Appel, J., concurring in part and......
-
Westra v. Iowa Dep't of Transp.
..., 456 N.W.2d 367, 369 (Iowa 1990) ; Ferguson v. Iowa Dep't of Transp. , 424 N.W.2d 464, 466 (Iowa 1988), abrogated by State v. Hicks , 791 N.W.2d 89, 94 (Iowa 2010). But this rule of exclusion is longstanding and predates Westendorf and Manders . See Fuller v. Iowa Dep't of Transp. , 275 N.......
- Simmons v. State Pub. Defender