State v. Moorehead
| Decision Date | 01 April 2005 |
| Docket Number | No. 03-1904.,03-1904. |
| Citation | 699 N.W.2d 667 |
| Parties | STATE of Iowa, Appellee, v. Joshua Paul MOOREHEAD, Appellant. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
John P. Lander of Brown, Kinsey, Funkhouser & Lander, P.L.C., Mason City, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Richard J. Bennett, Assistant Attorney General, Paul L. Martin, County Attorney, and William Hoekstra, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Mother knows best. While detained in the back of a patrol car on suspicion of drunk driving, a young man asked the police if he could talk to his mother about his predicament. He now asks us to overturn his conviction because the police did not comply with his request. We reverse and remand for further proceedings.
In the wee hours of April 20, 2003, a Cerro Gordo County deputy sheriff clocked a car speeding on a highway in Mason City. The deputy gave chase but the car did not immediately stop. The car swerved over the center line twice before eventually coming to a halt on the wrong side of an adjacent residential street.
The deputy spoke to the driver, Joshua Paul Moorehead. Moorehead was eighteen years old, living at home with his parents, and driving his mother's car. The deputy smelled alcohol and noticed Moorehead's speech was slurred. Moorehead's eyes were glazed but not bloodshot. Moorehead initially denied having anything to drink, but later admitted he had drunk one beer.
The deputy administered three field sobriety tests for drunkenness. Moorehead failed them all. While taking one of these tests, Moorehead said he did not know if he could pass the test "if I was sober." The deputy also asked Moorehead to take a preliminary breath test, and Moorehead complied. Based upon his observations, the deputy placed Moorehead in the deputy's vehicle.
While Moorehead was sitting in the back of the police car, the deputy and Moorehead had the following videotaped conversation:
The deputy contacted his dispatcher. The dispatcher called Moorehead's parents. Moorehead's parents arrived at the scene of their son's detention. Moorehead's mother asked the deputy if she could speak with her son. The deputy told her he had to take Moorehead to the police station first and the dispatcher would call her when she could pick him up.
By all accounts, however, Moorehead's mother did have a brief encounter with her son at the scene through the window of the patrol car. (It is unclear from the record whether the window was up or down.) For approximately thirty seconds to one minute, Moorehead's mother yelled at her son. She told Moorehead he was grounded, and would remain grounded for a long period of time. Moorehead's father said his wife "wasn't very happy" and "kind of chewed on him a little bit." Moorehead testified his exchange with his mother was not a "conversation," just his mom yelling at him through a closed window. Moorehead did not get in a word. Moorehead's parents took the car home and waited for a call from the police.
The deputy took Moorehead to the police station. The deputy read Moorehead the Miranda warnings and the implied consent advisory. Moorehead asked the deputy whether he should take the breath test. The deputy replied it was entirely Moorehead's decision to make. Moorehead never asked to call his mother again, or, for that matter, anyone else. Moorehead testified he still wanted to speak to his mother but did not ask to do so again because he had already asked and therefore assumed the deputy would tell him when he could do so. Moorehead took the breath test and blew a .182.
After the test, the deputy gave Moorehead a list of written questions. On the questionnaire Moorehead admitted he had drunk not one, but three cans of Busch Light — "the only kind of beer I touch." Bizarrely, he also indicated he wished he had a glass eye and diabetes.
While filling out the questionnaire Moorehead stood up. The deputy asked Moorehead if he was okay. Moorehead replied "I'm drunk as hell."
The county attorney charged Moorehead with first-offense OWI. See Iowa Code § 321J.2 (2001). Before trial Moorehead moved to suppress "any and all evidence obtained from this matter including results of breath testing and ... answers to any interrogation which occurred without counsel." Moorehead argued the deputy had denied him his statutory right to contact a family member. See id. § 804.20. The district court denied Moorehead's motion. The court concluded Moorehead made his request at the scene of the stop (as opposed to the police station) and therefore the statute did not apply.
Moorehead waived his right to a jury and stipulated to a bench trial on the minutes of testimony, as well as other agreed-upon evidence. Moorehead renewed his suppression argument; the trial court again denied the motion. The court found Moorehead guilty. The trial court noted Moorehead had a breath alcohol level of .182 and "exhibited observable physical symptomatology of [impairment]." The court did not expressly rely upon any of Moorehead's incriminating statements in reaching its verdict.
Moorehead appealed. Although the court of appeals found the police had violated Iowa Code section 804.20, it affirmed on harmless error grounds. The court cited "overwhelming evidence" of Moorehead's guilt, including Moorehead's admission that he was "drunk as hell."
Moorehead sought further review, which we granted. The primary issues before us are the same as those in the court of appeals, namely: (1) Did the district court err when it held Moorehead did not sufficiently invoke his statutory right to contact a family member when he asked to talk to his mother at the stop scene? and (2) If the district court did err, was admission of the breath test result harmless?
We review the district court's interpretation of Iowa Code section 804.20 for errors at law. State v. Krebs, 562 N.W.2d 423, 425 (Iowa 1997) (citing State v. Frake, 450 N.W.2d 817, 818 (Iowa 1990)). If the district court properly applied the law and there is substantial evidence to support its findings of fact, we will uphold its ruling on a motion to suppress. See Krebs, 562 N.W.2d at 425
. "Evidence is substantial when a reasonable mind would accept it as adequate to reach the same findings." Id.
Iowa Code section 804.20 is Iowa's statutory right to call an attorney or a family member. It provides:
Any peace officer ... having custody of any person arrested or restrained of the person's liberty for any reason whatever, shall permit that person, without unnecessary delay after arrival at the place of detention, to call, consult, and see a member of the person's family or an attorney of the person's choice, or both.... If such person is intoxicated, or a person under eighteen years of age, the call may be made by the person having custody.... A violation of this section shall constitute a simple misdemeanor.
Iowa Code § 804.20. In previous cases we have held section 804.20 does not require a police officer to inform a defendant of his right to contact counsel or a family member. See, e.g., State v. Tubbs, 690 N.W.2d 911, 914 (Iowa 2005)
; State v. Stroud, 314 N.W.2d 437, 439 (Iowa 1982). An officer may not, however, tell a defendant he does not have such a right, and once the right is invoked the officer must give the defendant the opportunity to call or consult with a family member or attorney. See State v. Vietor, 261 N.W.2d 828, 831 (Iowa 1978).
The first issue in this case is primarily a matter of statutory interpretation. We must decide whether Moorehead's Iowa Code section 804.20 rights attached when he made his request at the scene of the stop. In resolving this issue, we consider two matters: whether Moorehead's request was (1) properly timed and (2) sufficiently voiced.
We conclude Moorehead's request was properly timed. Moorehead was "restrained of [his] liberty" as he sat in the back of the patrol car. See Krebs, 562 N.W.2d at 426
(). Moorehead had already failed three field sobriety tests, a preliminary breath test, arguably made an incriminating statement, and displayed many symptoms of drunkenness. The deputy told Moorehead he was taking him in for one more test. The investigatory stage of the stop had ended. Cf. id. (). The deputy himself testified that he considered Moorehead "technically" under arrest after he failed the field sobriety tests. Moorehead was not going anywhere. Cf. State v. Countryman, 572 N.W.2d 553, 557-58 (Iowa 1997). He was restrained of his liberty, and therefore his request fell within the time-frame of the statute. Like the court of appeals, we can find nothing in the plain language of Iowa Code section 804.20 that requires the defendant make his request for counsel or a family member at the ultimate place...
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