State v. Hill

• Decision Date: 12 August 1941
• Docket Number: 6254
• Citation: 116 P.2d 392,100 Utah 456
• Court: Utah Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE v. HILL

116 P.2d 392

100 Utah 456

STATE v. HILL

No. 6254

Supreme Court of Utah

August 12, 1941

Appeal from District Court, Fifth District, Millard County; Will L Hoyt, Judge.

Frank R. Hill was convicted of obtaining property by false pretense, and he appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with instructions to dismiss the complaint.

Willard Hanson, of Salt Lake City, for appellant.

Joseph Chez, Atty. Gen., and Zelph S. Calder, Zar E. Hayes, and Calvin I. Rampton, Deputy Attys. Gen., for respondent.

McDONOUGH Justice. WOLFE and PRATT, JJ., concur. MOFFAT, C. J., and LARSON, J., concur in the result.

OPINION

McDONOUGH, Justice.

Frank R. Hill was convicted in the district court of the crime of obtaining property by false pretense, from which judgment of conviction he has appealed. The alleged errors relied on for reversal are directed, first, to the complaint and information charging the offense, second to the bill of particulars and amendments thereto which the court directed the state to file in connection with the information, third, to certain evidence which was introduced, and fourth to the verdict of guilt returned.

As to the complaint and information, it is contended that the same are insufficient; that, in so far as the pleading here is authorized by the provision of our Reformed Code of Criminal Procedure (and more particularly Sec. 105-21-8 and 105-21-47 thereof) adopted by the legislature in 1935, said reformed procedure contravenes Article 1, Sec. 12 of the Constitution of the State and also the 6th Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

The particular sections of the statute above referred to are, so far as material, as follows:

105-21-8. Charging the Offense. (1). The information or indictment may charge, and is valid and sufficient if it charges the offense for which the defendant is being prosecuted in one or more of the following ways:

"(a) By using the name given to the offense by the common law or by a statute.

"(b) By stating so much of the definition of the offense, either in terms of the common law or of the statute defining the offense or in terms of substantially the same meaning, as is sufficient to give the court and the defendant notice of what offense is intended to be charged.

"(2) The information or indictment may refer to a section or subsection of any statute creating the offense charged therein, and in determining the validity or sufficiency of such information or indictment regard shall be had to such reference." (L. 1935, Ch. 118, Sec. 1.)

"105-21-47. Forms for certain offenses. The following forms may be used in the cases in which they are applicable:

"False pretenses--A. B. obtained an automobile from C. D. by means of false pretenses."

The information, following closely the language of the complaint, charges the defendant with "obtaining property by false pretenses in an amount over $ 50 in value, committed as follows: "That the said Frank R. Hill on or about the 31st day of July, 1939, at Delta, County of Millard, State of Utah, did obtain 112,905 pounds of alfalfa hay of the value of $ 536.30 from Dudley and Reed Crafts by means of false pretenses."

It is clear that the information adequately complies both with the requirements of subdivision (a) of Section 105-21-8 and the requirements of Sec. 105-21-47. The contention is, however, that these sections violate the provisions of Article 1, Section 12, of our Constitution, which provides that:

"In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right * * * to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, * * *."

In considering this attack on the statute, we have examined the available similar statutes of the various states having like constitutional provisions and the adjudications thereunder. We have found no state where a so-called short form has been adopted where it has been held unconstitutional. There are three states which have provisions almost identical to ours with respect to indictments and informations. They are Iowa (see Code of Iowa 1939, Chapter 638, Sec. 13732.01 et seq.), New Mexico (see Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure in Judicial Proceedings in Courts other than the Supreme Court, adopted by the Supreme Court of New Mexico by authority of Chapter 84, Laws of 1933, 38 N. M., p. VII, Article 44, Sec. 35-4402 et seq.), and Rhode Island (see Public Laws of Rhode Island 1932, Chapter 1954, Section 1). See also the Code of Criminal Procedure of Louisiana (Act No. 2 of 1928, Code of Criminal Procedure) Art. 227 et seq. In each of these states the constitutionality of sections similar to those in our state quoted above has been upheld in cases involving a variety of criminal charges. Iowa: State V. Henderson, 215 Iowa 276, 243 N.W. 289 (larceny from a building in the nighttime); State V. Engler, 217 Iowa 138, 251 N.W. 88 (possession of burglary tools with intent to commit the crime of burglary); State V. Keturokis, 224 Iowa 491, 276 N.W. 600 (crime of rape); State V. Evans, 229 Iowa 932, 295 N.W. 433 (obtaining property by false pretenses). New Mexico: State V. Roy, 40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 646, 110 A. L. R. 1 (crime of murder). Rhode Island: State V. Smith, 56 R.I. 168, 184 A. 494 (conspiracy to steal); State V. Domanski, 57 R.I. 500, 190 A. 854 (crime of robbery); Louisiana: State V. Capaci, 179 La. 462, 154 So. 419 (crime of murder); State V. Simpson, 184 La. 190, 165 So. 708 (obtaining money by use of confidence game).

See, also, cases from the following states having statutes of a modified nature all of which have been held constitutional: California: Penal Code, Pt. 2, Title V, Chap. II § 948 et seq. People V. Wiezel, 39 Cal.App.2d 657, 104 P.2d 70; People V. Torp, 40 Cal.App.2d 187, 104 P.2d 542; People V. Dunn, 40 Cal.App.2d 6, 104 P.2d 119, certiorari denied 311 U.S. 701, 61 S.Ct. 139, 85 L.Ed. 454 Illinois: (Smith-Hurd St. c. 38, Sec. 716) People V. Green, 362 Ill. 171, 199 N.E. 278; People V. Gruber, 362 Ill. 278, 200 N.E. 483; People V. Flynn, 305 Ill.App. 619, 27 N.E.2d 669; People V. White, 307 Ill.App. 528, 30 N.E.2d 782. Wisconsin: Statutes 1933, Secs. 348.402, 348.403; Spoo V. State, 219 Wis. 285, 262 N.W. 696. See also New York cases of People V. Farson, 244 N.Y. 413, 155 N.E. 724; and People V. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A. L. R. 1378.

Without going into a detailed analysis of the constitutional question involved, we quote the language used in the Iowa case of State V. Engler, supra, and the New Mexico case of State V. Roy, supra. Both of these cases relied on the analysis and reasoning of the New York Court of Appeals in the case of People V. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 69 A. L. R. 1378, holding that the legislature might simplify the form of the indictment without violating the constitutional rights of the accused.

The question is discussed in State V. Roy, supra [40 N.M. 397, 60 P.2d 653, 110 A. L. R. 1 ], in the following language:

"The defendant claims that the information in the instant case is violative of article 2, § 14, of the N. M. Const. * * *

"This constitutional provision establishes the principle that trial for a felony must be preceded by a sworn accusation. This is one of the ancient immunities and privileges of English liberty. Under such constitutional provisions, as under the common law, a person accused of crime is entitled to be advised of the crime he is charged with by an indictment or presentment by a grand jury, or an information by a judicial officer representing the state.

"In New Mexico we have provided a simple means of indictment or information by which, and within the Constitution, an accusation can be presented against one accused of a crime which sufficiently identifies the charge against the accused so that his conviction or acquittal may prevent a subsequent charge for the same offense; notify the accused of the nature and character of the crime charged against him to the end that he may prepare his defense; and enable the court upon conviction to pronounce judgment according to the right of the case.

"The form we have prescribed does not require the technical craftsmanship of an artist in rhematics for the drawing of an indictment. Validity is not sacrificed to perfection of form, nor is justice delayed or defeated by legalistic insistence upon statement of details which serve no useful purpose. People v. Bogdanoff, 254 N.Y. 16, 171 N.E. 890, 891, 69 A. L. R. 1378. We have provided that every accused shall be informed against as the defendant here insists he shall be informed against, in simple, understandable language of the crime he is charged with. This was done in the instant case.

"An information or indictment is sufficient if from its language and form those elements which the Constitution guarantees to an accused are therein found.

"We quote with approval from the able majority opinion in the case of People v. Bogdanoff, supra 'For generations attempts have been made, with varying degree of success, to simplify forms of indictment. Such attempts may not be thwarted by insistence upon the preservation of outworn legalistic formulas. "An indictment, then, within the meaning of the constitution, is nothing more than what it is defined to be by Blackstone" (4 Com. 302), "a written accusation, of one or more persons, of a crime or misdemeanor, preferred to, and presented by, a grand jury, upon oath." Wolf v. State, 19 Ohio St. 248. We may not hold that the framers of the Constitution intended that all the formalities of the old common-law indictments must remain forever inviolate. They intended, undoubtedly, that a written accusation of a crime must be presented by the grand jury before an accused may be held for trial upon a charge of...