State v. Hines
| Citation | 816 S.E.2d 182,259 N.C.App. 358 |
| Decision Date | 01 May 2018 |
| Docket Number | No. COA17-968,COA17-968 |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. David HINES, Jr. |
| Court | Court of Appeal of North Carolina (US) |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General William H. Harkins, Jr., for the State.
William D. Spence, Kinston, for defendant-appellant.
Where defendant's admitted that he was the driver of the vehicle, and the State presented sufficient independent corroborating evidence that defendant was the driver of the vehicle, the corpus delicti rule is satisfied and the State did not err in denying defendant's motion to dismiss the charges against him. We find no error in the judgments of the trial court.
Around 10:00 p.m. on 9 April 2016, volunteer firefighter Brent Driver ("Brent") was off duty when he saw an unknown female standing in the middle of the road waving her arms back and forth on Princeton Kenly Road in Johnston County. Brent stopped, and the woman told him that a wreck had occurred, and that she had already called 911. Brent's passenger, another firefighter, went and checked the car—a white Rodeo SUV which was nose-down in a ditch on the side of the road—"to see if there was [sic] any fluids leaking from the vehicle, gas or anything like that." Brent then observed defendant David Hines, Jr., leaning against the back of the white Rodeo. Brent testified that defendant "smelled [of a] real high odor of alcohol and couldn't maintain his balance or anything." Brent asked defendant to come and sit in the back of Brent's truck "so [defendant] didn't fall and hurt himself."
Brent noted that defendant was wearing only one white shoe. An identical white shoe was found in the driver's side floorboard of the white Rodeo. Brent also observed a cut on defendant's forehead.
Trooper Chris Bell with the North Carolina State Highway Patrol responded to the scene of the accident. He first spoke with Brent, who told him that the driver of the white Rodeo—defendant—was sitting in the tailgate of his truck. As Trooper Bell approached defendant, he noticed that defendant had "a distinct sway," "bloodshot" and "glassy eyes," and he also "[d]etected a very strong odor of alcohol."
Trooper Bell asked defendant for his driver's license, and defendant responded that he did not have one. Instead, he provided Trooper Bell with an ID card containing defendant's picture, name, and date of birth. When Trooper Bell asked about the accident, defendant told him he was not familiar with the area, he was the only person present in the vehicle at the time of the accident, and that he "hit the ditch" when he ran a stop sign driving approximately sixty miles per hour.
Trooper Bell then asked defendant to fill out a standard witness statement form, which he handed to defendant as he sat on the tailgate of Brent's truck. Trooper Bell stepped away to call a tow truck, and when he returned to retrieve the witness statement from defendant about ten to fifteen minutes later, he discovered defendant "laying in the bed of the truck, passed out."
Trooper Bell retrieved the witness statement form, noting that defendant had only signed and dated the form without providing a statement. Based on the information given him by defendant, Trooper Bell proceeded to fill out the witness statement in his own handwriting.
At some point, Trooper Bell asked defendant to submit to a portable breath test, and defendant refused. Defendant was then arrested for driving while impaired ("DWI"), handcuffed, placed in the front passenger seat of Trooper Bell's patrol car, and driven to the Johnston County courthouse's Intoximeter room. Once there, defendant was read his rights but refused to provide "any kind of sample" for analysis and also refused standardized field sobriety testing later at the jail. Trooper Bell obtained a warrant for defendant's blood sample, and defendant was transported to Johnston Medical Center in Smithfield. Defendant's blood was drawn, and the sample was submitted to the State crime lab for analysis.
On 9 April 2016, defendant was charged with DWI, driving while license revoked ("DWLR"), and careless and reckless driving. The case was called for trial before the Honorable W. Douglas Parsons, Judge presiding, during the 13 March 2017 Criminal Session of Johnston County Superior Court. The trial court denied defendant's pretrial motion to suppress, and defendant was tried before a jury.
Defendant stipulated that he had been previously convicted of DWI three separate times, with his counsel acknowledging that "[h]e's eligible for habitual DWI." Defendant also stipulated that his license was revoked at the time of the accident on 9 April 2016.
Erin Cosme, a forensic toxicologist with the North Carolina State Crime Laboratory, was qualified as an expert witness without objection. Cosme testified about the chain of custody regarding defendant's blood sample taken the day of the accident and testified that defendant's sample revealed a blood ethanol concentration of 0.33 grams of alcohol per 100 milliliters.
At the close of the State's evidence, defendant moved to dismiss all charges for insufficiency of the evidence pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-1227 and the corpus delicti rule. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss, noting that in addition to defendant's own admission to Trooper Bell that he was driving the white Rodeo on the day of the accident, there was also corroboration of the corpus delicti , the crime. Defendant did not present any evidence.
The jury found defendant guilty of DWI, DWLR, and careless and reckless driving. Defendant admitted to aggravating factors, and he was sentenced to twenty-four months minimum, thirty-eight months maximum on the felony DWI. Defendant was also sentenced to 120 days for the misdemeanors of DWLR and careless and reckless driving. Defendant appeals.
On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the charges of (I) habitual impaired driving; (II) driving while license revoked; and (III) reckless driving to endanger.
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss the charges of (I) habitual impaired driving and (II) driving while license revoked. Specifically, defendant contends that the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss under the corpus delicti rule, where a trooper testified that defendant admitted at the scene that he was the driver of the wrecked car but where there was otherwise no corroborative evidence, independent of defendant's extra-judicial confession. We disagree.
"This Court reviews the trial court's denial of a motion to dismiss de novo ." State v. Smith , 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007) (citing State v. McKinnon , 306 N.C. 288, 298, 293 S.E.2d 118, 125 (1982) ). State v. Fritsch , 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) (quoting State v. Barnes , 334 N.C. 67, 75, 430 S.E.2d 914, 918 (1993) ).
"When the State relies upon a defendant's extrajudicial confession, we apply the corpus delicti rule ‘to guard against the possibility that a defendant will be convicted of a crime that has not been committed.’ " State v. Cox , 367 N.C. 147, 151, 749 S.E.2d 271, 275 (2013) (quoting State v. Parker , 315 N.C. 222, 235, 337 S.E.2d 487, 494 (1985) ). "This inquiry is preliminary to consideration of whether the State presented sufficient evidence to survive the motion to dismiss." Id.
The corpus delicti rule is historically grounded on three policy justifications: (1) to "protect[ ] against those shocking situations in which alleged murder victims turn up alive after their accused killer has been convicted and perhaps executed"; (2) to "ensure[ ] that confessions that are erroneously reported or construed, involuntarily made, mistaken as to law or fact, or falsely volunteered by an insane or mentally disturbed individual cannot be used to falsely convict a defendant"; and (3) "to promote good law enforcement practices [by] requir[ing] thorough investigations of alleged crimes to ensure that justice is achieved and the innocent are vindicated."
Id. (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Smith , 362 N.C. 583, 591–92, 669 S.E.2d 299, 305 (2008) ). "Traditionally, our corpus delicti rule has required the State to present corroborative evidence, independent of the defendant's confession, tending to show that ‘(a) the injury or harm constituting the crime occurred [and] (b) this injury was done in a criminal manner.’ " Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Smith , 362 N.C. at 589, 669 S.E.2d at 304 ).
[T]he [corpus delicti ] rule requires the State to present evidence tending to show that the crime in question occurred. The rule does not require the State to logically exclude every possibility that the defendant did not commit the crime. Thus, if the State presents evidence tending to establish that the injury or harm constituting the crime occurred and was caused by criminal activity, then the corpus delicti rule is satisfied and the State may use the defend-ant's [sic] confession to prove his identity as the perpetrator.
Id. at 152, 749 S.E.2d at 275 (citing State v. Trexler , 316 N.C. 528, 533, 342 S.E.2d 878, 881 (1986) ). "Significantly, however, ‘a confession identifying who committed the crime is not subject to the corpus delicti rule.’ " State v. Sawyers , ––– N.C. App. ––––, ––––, 808 S.E.2d 148, 152 (2017) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Ballard , 244 N.C. App. 476, 480, 781 S.E.2d 75, 78 (2015) ).
In Trexler , a DWI case, the defendant admitted that he wrecked his car after drinking, left the scene, and returned a short time later. 316 N.C. at 533, 342 S.E.2d at 881. The trial court concluded that the following independent...
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