State v. Hodges

• Decision Date: 11 February 1985
• Citation: 695 S.W.2d 171
• Parties: STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Robert HODGES, Appellee. 695 S.W.2d 171
• Court: Tennessee Supreme Court

Page 171

695 S.W.2d 171

STATE of Tennessee, Appellant, v. Robert HODGES, Appellee.

695 S.W.2d 171

Supreme Court of Tennessee, at Jackson.

Feb. 11, 1985.

Ann Lacy Johns, Asst. Atty. Gen., Nashville, for appellant; William M. Leech, Jr., Atty. Gen. and Reporter, Nashville, of counsel.

Alan Bryant Chambers, Memphis, for appellee.

OPINION

FONES, Justice.

In January 1983, defendant was charged in a multiple count indictment with tampering with utility metering devices. His lawyer appeared before the trial judge on February 22, 1983, asking for a trial date for the misdemeanors with which defendant was charged. The trial judge informed defendant's counsel on that occasion that he would not "put up with his [defendant's] foolishness" and if "he comes in here dressed like a chicken, I am going to order him out of here under guard."

On June 28, 1983, defendant appeared for trial, with the same counsel, and to say that he was dressed "like a chicken" as the trial judge had anticipated, is a mild description of the outrageous attire in which defendant barely covered himself. ¹

The trial judge first addressed defendant's attorney and asked him to have his client appear in proper clothes. Defendant's attorney responded by informing the court that defendant wished to exercise his right of "freedom of expression." The trial judge then directed his remarks to defendant and ordered him to put on "regular clothes" for the trial scheduled that day. The trial judge sought a yes or no answer, but defendant responded with the following assertion:

"This is a spiritual attire and it is my religious belief and I have never worn anything else in court but this when I am on trial."

Whereupon, the trial judge found him to be in contempt of court, revoked his bond, and ordered him committed to jail for ten days or until he agreed to appear for trial in proper clothes.

Defendant's counsel asked the court to allow him to "build a record for appeal" which was denied. Motions were filed the following day, June 29, 1983, on behalf of defendant for a new trial, for reconsideration of the finding of contempt, and for bail pending appeal. At the hearing held on that same day, defense counsel again sought an evidentiary hearing on the issue of defendant's religious belief which was again denied. However, the trial judge fixed bail at one thousand dollars and continued the trial on the meter tampering charges to August 1983.

The Court of Criminal Appeals reversed the contempt adjudication, holding that the trial judge erred in failing to inquire into the

"nature and sincerity of appellant's beliefs, the denomination of his religion, its origin, organization, and the length of time which the appellant has espoused it."

We agree that the trial judge erred in failing to inquire into the religious belief of defendant and in failing to allow a full record to be developed for appeal. However, we think the intermediate court's instructions on remand, quoted above, may be misleading and not entirely in conformity with United States Supreme Court opinions.

A Rhode Island litigant appeared in court wearing a white, knitted skull cap and the trial judge ordered him to remove it or leave the courtroom and refused to consider the litigant's claim that he was a Sunni Muslim, that he was wearing a prayer cap that was a religious symbol of that sect, that indicated that the wearer was in constant prayer. In re Palmer, 120 R.I. 250, 386 A.2d 1112 (1978). On appeal, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island accurately summarized the first amendment principle ennunciated by the United States Supreme Court applicable where a religious belief or practice collides with a state law or regulation, as follows:

Despite the exalted status so rightly afforded to religious beliefs and activities that are motivated by and embody those beliefs, the freedom of an individual to practice his religion does not enjoy absolute immunity from infringement by the state. Individuals have been subject to mandatory innoculations despite religious objections to such medical care. Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 25 S.Ct. 358, 49 L.Ed. 643 (1905).... Thus while the freedom to hold religious beliefs and opinions is absolute, the freedom to act in harmony with these religious beliefs and opinions is not beyond state regulation where such restriction serves the public interest by promoting public health and safety or preserving order. We must then accommodate the right to exercise the religious freedoms safeguarded by the first amendment with the right of the state to regulate these individual freedoms for the sake of societal interests. The problem is one of balance and degree--the courts are called upon to determine when the societal interest becomes so important as to justify an incursion by the state into religious activity that is otherwise protected by the free exercise clause of the first amendment. Id. 386 A.2d at 1114-15.

After discussing the United States Supreme Court's application of the balancing test to the facts in Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 81 S.Ct. 1144, 6 L.Ed.2d 563 (1961), Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 83 S.Ct. 1790, 10 L.Ed.2d 965 (1963), and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972), the Supreme Court of Rhode Island continued as follows We believe that because petitioner claimed that his act was protected by the free exercise clause, in order to justifiably curtail the exercise of that alleged right the trial justice should have first allowed petitioner to display the sincerity of his religious belief, and then should have applied the second prong of the Sherbert test by balancing petitioner's first amendment right with the interest of the court in maintaining decorum in its proceedings by regulating dress in the courtroom. Id. 386 A.2d at 1115.

Thus, the threshold inquiry is whether or not the religious belief or practice asserted qualifies for the protection of the free exercise clause of the first amendment. The record in this case, though meager, clearly...