State v. Hodges
| Decision Date | 03 March 2020 |
| Docket Number | No. COA19-266,COA19-266 |
| Citation | 838 S.E.2d 206 (Table) |
| Parties | STATE of North Carolina v. Darius William HODGES, Jr., Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Sarah G. Zambon, for the State.
Michael E. Casterline, P.A., by Michael E. Casterline, for defendant-appellant.
Substantial evidence must exist for a trial court to deny a motion to dismiss. The trial court here properly denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss because the State presented substantial relevant evidence to persuade a rational juror to accept that Defendant acted in concert with his armed brother and others to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault.
In addition, a trial court needs to instruct a jury on a lesser-included offense only if the evidence would permit the jury to rationally find defendant guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit him of the greater. No evidence exists that Defendant committed common law robbery rather than robbery with a dangerous weapon. Thus, the trial court properly denied the motion to include an instruction for the lesser-included offense of common law robbery.
Victim1 was walking home when a car pulled up beside him. The car was driven by Xavier Hodges ("Xavier"). Xavier rolled down his window, pointed a handgun at Victim, and told Victim, "Run yo shit."2 At the same time, two men emerged from behind trashcans and approached Victim from behind. One man was Lonnie Degraffenreidt ("Degraffenreidt"), and the other was Defendant, Darius William Hodges, Jr.—Xavier’s brother.
Degraffenreidt said to Victim, "You were going for my homie’s head," and punched Victim twice on the side of his face while grabbing Victim’s phone. Defendant "was just standing right behind [Degraffenreidt] trying to make sure [Victim] didn’t do nothing or try to hit him back or anything." After Victim handed over his wallet to one of the men, both Degraffenreidt and Defendant got into the car, and Xavier drove them away. As the car pulled away, Victim noticed a fourth man sitting in the car’s backseat. Victim ran home and called 911.
After an investigation, a warrant was issued for Defendant’s arrest on charges of felony robbery with a deadly weapon and misdemeanor assault. He was later indicted for the same offenses. At trial, defense counsel moved "to dismiss the robbery with a dangerous weapon, as well as the assault[.]" Counsel also moved to include a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of common law robbery. Both motions were denied. The jury found Defendant guilty of robbery with a dangerous weapon and misdemeanor assault.
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying the motion to dismiss the charges of robbery with a dangerous weapon and assault. In particular, he contends there was insufficient evidence to support a conviction based on the State’s theory of acting in concert because he was "merely present at the scene." The State argues it presented "overwhelming evidence" that Defendant was acting in concert with the other perpetrators.
We "review[ ] the trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss de novo ." State v. Smith , 186 N.C. App. 57, 62, 650 S.E.2d 29, 33 (2007). "In ruling on a motion to dismiss, the trial court need determine only whether there is substantial evidence of each essential element of the crime and that the defendant is the perpetrator." State v. Mann , 355 N.C. 294, 301, 560 S.E.2d 776, 781 (2002). "Substantial evidence is that amount of relevant evidence necessary to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion." Id. (citation omitted).
"In making its determination, the trial court must consider all evidence admitted, whether competent or incompetent, in the light most favorable to the State, giving the State the benefit of every reasonable inference and resolving any contradictions in its favor." State v. Rose , 339 N.C. 172, 192, 451 S.E.2d 211, 223 (1994). "The trial court is concerned only with the sufficiency of the evidence to take the case to the jury and not with its weight, and the test of the sufficiency of the evidence to withstand the motion is the same whether the evidence is direct, circumstantial or both." State v. Chekanow , 370 N.C. 488, 492, 809 S.E.2d 546, 550 (2018) (quoting State v. Malloy , 309 N.C. 176, 178-79, 305 S.E.2d 718, 720 (1983) ) (internal marks omitted). "Once the court decides that a reasonable inference of defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances, then it is for the jury to decide whether the facts satisfy the jury beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is actually guilty." Chekanow , 370 N.C. at 492, 809 S.E.2d at 550 (internal marks omitted) (quoting State v. Fritsch , 351 N.C. 373, 379, 526 S.E.2d 451, 455 (2000) ). "But if the evidence is sufficient only to raise a suspicion or conjecture as to either the commission of the offense or the identity of the defendant as the perpetrator, the motion to dismiss must be allowed." Id. (alterations omitted) (quoting Malloy , 309 N.C. at 179, 305 S.E.2d at 720 ).
State v. Giles , 83 N.C. App. 487, 350 S.E.2d 868 (1986). "A defendant may be found guilty of committing a crime under the theory of acting in concert if he is present at the scene of the crime acting together with another person with whom he shares a common plan although the other person does all the acts necessary to carry out the crime." State v. Gaines , 345 N.C. 647, 675, 483 S.E.2d 396, 413 (1997). "A defendant’s presence at the scene may be either actual or constructive." Id. "Constructive presence is not determined by the defendant’s actual distance from the crime[.]" State v. Combs , 182 N.C. App. 365, 370, 642 S.E. 2d 491, 496 (2007). Instead, "[a] person is constructively present during the commission of a crime if he is close enough to provide assistance if needed and to encourage the actual execution of the crime." Gaines , 345 N.C. at 675-76, 483 S.E.2d at 413.
Id. at 284-85, 321 S.E.2d at 536 (). This "establishe[d] that [the robbery with a dangerous weapon] occurred after the crime [defendant] committed in removing the radio from [the victim’s] vehicle." Id. at 285, 321 S.E.2d 536 (emphasis added). There, no evidence tended to show (1) "defendant knew that his companions were going to rob [the victim]"; (2) defendant "knew one of the men was armed"; (3) "defendant encouraged the other men in the commission of the crime"; or (4) defendant "by word or deed indicated to them that he stood prepared to render assistance." Id. at 285-86, 321 S.E.2d at 537. "The most that [could] be said [about the] evidence [was] that [the] defendant was present when the [robbery with a dangerous weapon] was committed, and [that was] insufficient to take the case to the jury." Id. at 286, 321 S.E.2d at 537. That is not the case here.
Unlike Ikard , Defendant was not merely present at the scene of the robbery with a dangerous weapon or the assault. When considered in the light most favorable to the State, there is sufficient testimony to persuade a rational juror to accept a conclusion of Defendant’s guilt. Defendant and Degraffenreidt were already at the scene, behind trashcans, when Xavier, Defendant’s brother, drove up in a car and pointed a gun at Victim. Then, at the same time, Defendant and Degraffenreidt moved toward Victim from behind. Degraffenreidt started punching and taking Victim’s property while Defendant "was just standing right behind [Degraffenreidt.]" Finally, even though Defendant did not arrive in the car with his brother, the Defendant and Degraffenreidt "hopped in the car and they left" together after the robbery was completed.
Under its theory of acting in concert, the State presented substantial evidence of each essential element of the crimes and that Defendant was the perpetrator. A reasonable inference of Defendant’s guilt may be drawn from the circumstances, and the evidence raises more than suspicion or conjecture as to Defendant acting in concert to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon and...
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