State v. Holdcroft

• Decision Date: 20 November 2013
• Docket Number: 2012–1441.,Nos. 2012–1325,s. 2012–1325
• Parties: The STATE of Ohio, Appellee, v. HOLDCROFT, Appellant.
• Court: Ohio Supreme Court

137 Ohio St.3d 526

1 N.E.3d 382

The STATE of Ohio, Appellee,

v.HOLDCROFT, Appellant.

Nos. 2012–1325, 2012–1441.

Supreme Court of Ohio.

Submitted June 4, 2013.

Decided Nov. 20, 2013.

Syllabus of the Court

1. A sentence is a sanction or combination of sanctions imposed for an individual offense. ( State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, applied.)

2. When a judge fails to properly impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant's sentence, the postrelease-control sanction is void. ( State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, applied.)

3. A trial court does not have the authority to resentence a defendant for the purpose of adding a term of postrelease control as a sanction for a particular offense after the defendant has already served the prison term for that offense.

Jonathan K. Miller, Wyandot County Prosecuting Attorney, for appellee.

Kristopher A. Haines, Assistant Ohio Public Defender, for appellant.

O'NEILL, J.

{¶ 1} In this case, we must again consider when a trial court has the authority to correct a sentence when one of the sanctions originally imposed by the trial court is void. We hold that a trial court cannot add a term of postrelease control as a sanction for a particular offense after the defendant has already served the prison term for that offense, even if the defendant remains in prison for other offenses.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

{¶ 2} On July 29, 1999, the Wyandot County Court of Common Pleas entered a judgment finding appellant, Henry Allen Holdcroft, guilty of aggravated arson and arson, pursuant to a jury verdict. In September 1999, the trial court imposed a prison term of ten years for Holdcroft's aggravated-arson offense and a prison term of five years for Holdcroft's arson offense. The trial court ordered that the prison terms be served consecutively. The trial court notified Holdcroft that a postrelease-control sanction would be imposed, but it failed to state the duration of the sanction and did not state whether it was part of the sentence for aggravated arson, arson, or both offenses. The judgment entry of sentence reflected the same defects.

{¶ 3} Holdcroft completed his prison term for aggravated arson in 2009 and began serving the term of imprisonment for arson at that time. On January 26, 2010, the trial court held a new sentencing hearing to correct its errors related to postrelease control. Holdcroft argued in part that he had served 10 1/2 years in prison and that his aggravated-arson term of incarceration had expired. But the trial court reimposed a prison term of ten years for aggravated arson and a prison term of five years for arson, and it ordered the arson prison term to be served consecutively to the aggravated-arson prison term. The trial court also imposed a mandatory term of five years of postrelease control for the aggravated-arson offense and a discretionary postrelease-control term of up to three years for the arson offense.

{¶ 4} Holdcroft appealed the sentencing judgment, asserting that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to impose postrelease control related to his aggravated-arson offense because he had already served the prison sentence for that offense. In a divided decision, the Third District Court of Appeals disagreed. The appellate court held that a trial court may resentence a defendant for the purpose of correctly imposing postrelease control, so long as the defendant is still serving a prison term for any of the other offenses included in the same judgment entry of sentence. The court certified that its judgment conflicted with the judgment in State v. Dresser, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92105, 2009-Ohio-2888, 2009 WL 1710757,abrogated in part on other grounds by State ex rel. Carnail v. McCormick, 126 Ohio St.3d 124, 2010-Ohio-2671, 931 N.E.2d 110, on the following question:

Does a trial court have jurisdiction to resentence a defendant for the purpose of imposing mandatory post-release control regarding a particular conviction, when the defendant has served the stated prison term regarding that conviction, but has yet to serve the entirety of his aggregate prison sentence, when all of the convictions which led to the aggregate sentence resulted from a single indictment?

Holdcroft filed a notice of certified conflict and a discretionary appeal in this court. We determined that a conflict exists and accepted the discretionary appeal, and we consolidated the cases. 133 Ohio St.3d 1409, 2012-Ohio-4650, 975 N.E.2d 1028;133 Ohio St.3d 1410, 2012-Ohio-4650, 975 N.E.2d 1029. For the reasons that follow, we reverse the judgment of the Third District and hold that when Holdcroft completed his prison term for aggravated arson, the trial court lost the authority to impose a postrelease-control sanction for that offense.

ANALYSIS

{¶ 5} This court has consistently and repeatedly held that a trial court loses jurisdiction to resentence a defendant for the purpose of imposing postrelease control once the defendant has served his entire sentence of incarceration. Hernandez v. Kelly, 108 Ohio St.3d 395, 2006-Ohio-126, 844 N.E.2d 301, ¶ 32;State v. Bloomer, 122 Ohio St.3d 200, 2009-Ohio-2462, 909 N.E.2d 1254, ¶ 70;State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 884 N.E.2d 568, syllabus, superseded on other grounds by statute as stated in State v. Singleton, 124 Ohio St.3d 173, 2009-Ohio-6434, 920 N.E.2d 958;State v. Bezak, 114 Ohio St.3d 94, 2007-Ohio-3250, 868 N.E.2d 961, ¶ 18,overruled on other grounds by State v. Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332. Thus far, we have had the opportunity to examine the imposition of postrelease control in three situations: (1) cases in which the defendant or the state filed a timely direct appeal, (2) cases in which the defendant remained in prison with no completed sentences, and (3) cases in which the defendant had already been released from prison. But we have not yet addressed the situation presented here, in which the trial court has resentenced the defendant to impose postrelease control for an offense, but the defendant had already served the entire prison term for that offense and remained in prison for other offenses.

{¶ 6} Resolution of this issue is helped significantly by examining the definitions of the words “sentence,” “sanction,” and “conviction” and by reviewing State v. Saxon, 109 Ohio St.3d 176, 2006-Ohio-1245, 846 N.E.2d 824, which offers insight into Ohio's felony-sentencing structure. In Saxon, this court addressed and rejected the use of the “sentencing package” doctrine by Ohio's appellate courts. Under that doctrine, a defendant's sentences in a multiple-conviction judgment entry are viewed in the aggregate, and if one of the sentences is vacated on appeal, the trial court has the authority to review the entire “sentencing package” on remand. Id. at ¶ 5. In Saxon, we concluded that the doctrine did not apply in Ohio, because “Ohio's felony-sentencing scheme is clearly designed to focus the judge's attention on one offense at a time.” Id. at ¶ 8. In so holding, we observed that R.C. 2929.01(EE) (formerly numbered R.C. 2929.01(FF)) defines “sentence” as “ ‘the sanction or combination of sanctions imposed by the sentencing court on an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Id. at ¶ 12. Further support for the Saxon rule can be found in R.C. 2929.01(DD), which states that “ ‘[s]anction’ means any penalty imposed upon an offender who is convicted of or pleads guilty to an offense, as punishment for the offense ” (emphasis added) and in State v. Gapen, 104 Ohio St.3d 358, 2004-Ohio-6548, 819 N.E.2d 1047, ¶ 135, which recognizes that a criminal “conviction” consists of both a finding of guilt and the imposition of a sentence. See also State v. Whitfield, 124 Ohio St.3d 319, 2010-Ohio-2, 922 N.E.2d 182, ¶ 12, and State v. Poindexter, 36 Ohio St.3d 1, 5, 520 N.E.2d 568 (1988). In sum, under both the Revised Code and this court's decisions, a conviction is composed of a finding of guilt and a sentence, a sentence is a sanction or combination of sanctions imposed for an individual offense, and incarceration and postrelease control are types of sanctions that may be imposed and combined to form a sentence.

{¶ 7} Although we have not previously so stated, generally speaking, our recent cases in this area have dealt with void sanctions, rather than sentences that were void ab initio. For example, in Fischer, 128 Ohio St.3d 92, 2010-Ohio-6238, 942 N.E.2d 332, we held that “when a judge fails to impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant's sentence, that part of the sentence is void and must be set aside.” (Emphasis added in part.) Id. at ¶ 26. We further recognized that in most cases, the prison sanction is not void and therefore “only the offending portion of the sentence is subject to review and correction.” Id. at ¶ 27. Accordingly, when a judge fails to properly impose statutorily mandated postrelease control as part of a defendant's sentence, the postrelease-control sanction is void. In such situations, the void sanction “may be reviewed at any time, on direct appeal or by collateral attack,” id., but “res judicata still applies to other aspects of the merits of a conviction, including the determination of guilt and the lawful elements of the ensuing sentence,” id. at ¶ 40.

{¶ 8} The Fischer rule does not apply to most sentencing challenges. For example, challenges to a trial court's compliance with R.C. 2929.11 and 2929.12, which may be brought by either the defendant or the state, must still be presented in a timely direct appeal under R.C. 2953.08. R.C. 2953.08(E); see generally State v. Kalish, 120 Ohio St.3d 23, 2008-Ohio-4912, 896 N.E.2d 124. This is also true with regard to challenges to a sentencing court's determination whether offenses are allied and its judgment as to whether sentences must be served concurrently...