State v. Holder

• Decision Date: 30 May 1898
• Citation: 76 Miss. 158,23 So. 643
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, EX REL., v. W. D. HOLDER, AUDITOR OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS

23 So. 643

76 Miss. 158

STATE OF MISSISSIPPI, EX REL., v. W. D. HOLDER, AUDITOR OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTS

Supreme Court of Mississippi

May 30, 1898

March 1898

FROM the circuit court, first district, of Hinds county HON ROBERT POWELL, Judge.

The appellant, the state, ex rel., was the plaintiff in the court below; appellee, Holder, auditor, was defendant there. Mandamus on the relation of the teachers and officers of the Industrial Institute and College to compel the auditor of public accounts to issue warrants for their salaries. The mandamus was denied and the relators appealed. The opinion states the case.

Affirmed.

Williamson & Potter, for appellant.

The auditor takes the position (1) that this law is null and void, not having been constitutionally passed by the legislature and approved by the governor, and that he is without legal authority to issue a warrant on the treasury for the money appropriated for the support and maintenance of the college; (2) that if it became a law at all, the whole act became a law, and the trustees have not complied with the conditions imposed and required before the warrant can be issued by him.

The petitioner insists (1) that the part of the bill approved by the governor became a law, and, all the conditions required having been complied with by the trustees, the auditor must issue the warrant; (2) that if the governor was not authorized by the constitution to veto that part of the bill disapproved, then his signature to it approved the whole bill, as passed by the senate and house, regardless of his futile effort to disapprove a part; but that the portion of the bill which the governor attempted, and for lack of authority failed, to veto, is unconstitutional and void, yet the valid and constitutional part of the act will remain being complete in itself, and capable of execution in accordance with the main purpose and intent of the legislature, and the auditor must issue the warrant, as all the valid conditions of the law have been complied with by the trustees; (3) that if the governor was without constitutional authority to veto a part of the bill, and no part of it is unconstitutional and void, then the whole bill is a law, having been passed by both houses and signed by the governor. If this view be taken by the court, the writ will of course, be denied, and the judgment of the lower court be affirmed, since the conditions imposed by the law have not all been complied with by the trustees.

The conditions can easily be complied with by the trustees should this court be of opinion that the whole bill became a law. Section 73 of the constitution provides that "the governor may veto parts of any appropriation bill, and approve parts of the same, and the portions approved shall be law." The language is not the governor may veto items and approve items, but that he may veto parts and approve parts of an appropriation bill. Nor is the language that the items approved shall become law, but it is that "the portions approved shall be law."

The appropriation to the Industrial Institute and College is not in the list of the subjects directed by section 69 to be placed in the general appropriation bill, hence it had to be by a separate bill, which can embrace but one subject. It must contain no legislation except to prescribe for what purpose the money is to be paid and the conditions on which it may be drawn.

Now, a separate bill, like the one under review, may contain several items, provided all are embraced in the one subject and directed to a common purpose. But such a bill may contain only one item. The amount of money appropriated, and the purpose for which it is appropriated, are the only essential and inseparable parts of each and every item of an appropriation. It is difficult to conceive how an appropriation could be made without stating the purpose. Now, if there be but one item in an appropriation bill, it would contain only the amount fixed and the purpose, and there could be but one part to such a bill unless the legislature put to it a condition on which the money could be drawn. This would make two parts to the bill. Now, if the governor may veto part of any appropriation bill, he could, certainly, under the power granted by the broad language of section 73 of the constitution, veto the condition, and it would leave a law, complete in itself, capable of execution. So, if a bill contains sundry items, in which the purpose of each item is prescribed therein, all being directed to the accomplishment of the general purpose of the bill and within the scope of the subject embraced in the act, with sundry conditions on which the money may be drawn, the governor, under section 73 of the constitution, may veto any separate item or condition as part of such a bill, and approve the other parts, which will become law.

If the governor should veto such parts of a bill that the main purpose, intent, and object of the legislature in passing it were destroyed, this would be tantamount to a veto of the whole bill; but where the approved parts would leave it a law, complete in itself, capable of being executed, and its execution would not subvert the main object, purpose and intent of the legislation, the portion approved by the governor would become law under our constitution, and the parts disapproved would be dead, unless revived and vitalized again by a passage in both houses with a two-thirds majority.

The object and purpose of the law is stated in the title, which is "An act appropriating money for the support and maintenance of the Industrial Institute and College." From the title it would never be suspected that legislation on the subject of the government and control of the school, the regulation of its curriculum, and other cognate subjects, would be found in the body of the bill. This is purely legislation independent of the part of the bill making the appropriation, and the one cannot be said to be so intimately associated that the two cannot be separated. The main purpose of the bill and the intent of the legislature are not destroyed by striking out part of the bill which, in the form of a condition, undertook to compel the trustees of the college to transfer, through by-laws, to the president, powers which the law of the state vested in them solely, and to impose upon him duties which the law imperatively required of them. In view of the purpose and object of the legislation, who can say that it is most probable that the legislature would not have passed the appropriation without the conditions which were vetoed by the governor? But if it be held that the governor had no authority, under section 73, to veto such a part of the bill, then, as to this bill, it was the governor's duty to have approved or disapproved in toto. He approves by signing it; if he disapprove, he should not sign it, but send it back with his objections. See sec. 72, constitution.

Now, when the governor signed his name to the bill, it became a law, regardless of his effort to explain that he disapproved a part of it. He had no authority to disapprove a part. All that the constitution requires to make a law was done when both houses passed the bill, and, on presentation to the governor, he affixed his name to it. His effort to veto a part is null and void, if section 73 did not give the authority. "A bill is approved as a whole or disapproved as a whole. The signature of the governor affixed to a bill is the evidence of his approval. . . . It becomes immaterial what the governor may have done in the way of adding his objections to any part of the bill. He exercised the full measure of his power, in respect to the bill, when he affixed his signature." See Porter v. Hughes, Auditor, 32 P. (Ariz.), 165.

This bill, therefore, became a law as a whole, and is now the law unless a part of it is unconstitutional. We insist that that portion of the bill which the governor vetoed, or undertook to veto, is legislation, and is unconstitutional and void for two reasons, to wit: (1) Because section 69 of the constitution forbids the legislature to engraft such legislation upon an appropriation bill; (2) because the legislature had no authority to pass such legislation at a special session, the same not having been submitted to them by the governor for consideration while they were in session. At a special session none but appropriation and revenue bills shall be considered, except such other matters as may be acted upon at an extraordinary session called by the governor. Sec. 36, const. Miss. At an extraordinary session, only such subjects can be considered and acted on as may be embraced in the proclamation of the governor, or that the governor may submit, in writing, to them, while in session. Sec. 121, const. Miss. So that the jurisdiction of the legislature, at its special session, did not extend to any subject-matter of legislation except appropriation and revenue bills, unless the governor submitted it to them in writing while in session. It is admitted that none of the subject-matters embraced in the act of February 11, 1898, were submitted to the legislature, in writing, by the governor, at the special session. Over the subject-matter of appropriation of money for the support and maintenance of the college, the legislature, therefore, had jurisdiction at the special session, independent of any action or recommendation by the governor, but they had no constitutional authority to consider or act upon any other legislation with reference to the college. The appropriation to the industrial institute and college was not in the list of subjects directed, by section 69, constitution, to be placed in the general appropriation bill, and, therefore, had to be made by a separate bill. Legislation could not be engrafted upon...