State v. Holifield, A15-0899
| Decision Date | 27 December 2016 |
| Docket Number | A15-0899 |
| Parties | State of Minnesota, Respondent, v. Ricky Donell Holifield, Appellant. |
| Court | Minnesota Court of Appeals |
This opinion will be unpublished and may not be cited except as provided by Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).
Affirmed
Hennepin County District Court
Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and
Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Elizabeth R. Johnston, Assistant County Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)
Mark D. Nyvold, Fridley, Minnesota (for appellant)
Considered and decided by Stauber, Presiding Judge; Worke, Judge; and Bratvold, Judge.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
On appeal from his conviction of second-degree sale of drugs, and from the order denying his postconviction petition, following a stay and remand, appellant argues that the district court abused its discretion by (1) denying him an evidentiary hearing to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel due to his trial attorney's conflict of interest and (2) denying his chain-of-custody objection to the state's drug evidence. We affirm.
In August 2012, Officer Jeffrey Werner conducted a narcotics investigation involving appellant Ricky Donell Holifield. As part of the investigation, Officer Werner obtained a warrant to search appellant. In an effort to execute the warrant, Officer Werner set up surveillance of an apartment located in Minneapolis. Officer Werner acted as the case agent during the surveillance, with officers from both the third and fourth precincts of Minneapolis reporting to him.
Throughout the surveillance, Officer Werner observed the location from an unmarked vehicle parked on the street in front of the apartment building. Sergeant Jeffrey Jindra also observed the location from an unmarked vehicle in the parking lot behind the building. Several other officers in both marked and unmarked vehicles were positioned nearby, and all of the officers were in radio communication with one another.
Shortly after midnight, Sergeant Jindra observed appellant drive into the parking lot and park two spaces away from him. An unknown male then exited the apartment building and approached the passenger side of appellant's vehicle. The unknown male handed money to appellant who exchanged the money for a small item. Although the parking lot was well illuminated and he had an unobstructed view of the exchange, Sergeant Jindra was unable to specifically identify the object exchanged. But based on his 30 years ofexperience as a police officer, Sergeant Jindra testified that the exchange "looked like a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction."
Sergeant Jindra notified Officer Werner of his observation, which prompted the other squads to be ordered "to come in and stop [appellant]." A "marked squad came up the alley from the south and pulled in . . . diagonally to [appellant's] car." The squad's emergency lights and spotlight were then turned on which "lit up the inside of [appellant's] car." When the squad illuminated appellant's vehicle, Sergeant Jindra observed appellant "throw something across his body towards the passenger seat floor." Sergeant Jindra broadcasted his observation and a subsequent search of appellant's vehicle revealed a bag containing "several smaller plastic baggies" of suspected cocaine located on the "front passenger floor." The substance was then weighed and tested, and was identified as 3.1 grams of cocaine. Appellant was subsequently charged with one count of second-degree sale of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. § 152.022 (2012), and one count of third-degree possession of a controlled substance under Minn. Stat. § 152.023 (2012).
At trial, Officer Werner testified that, after the cocaine was recovered from appellant's vehicle, he took possession of the cocaine from Officer Carl White and put it in an evidence bag and labeled it. The state then moved to admit Exhibit 2, the suspected cocaine. Appellant vigorously objected, claiming an insufficient chain of custody. The district court "conditionally" accepted the exhibit in contemplation of the state's promise to "link up the chain of custody."
The state presented additional testimony that the evidence bag containing the cocaine was transported to the Third Precinct headquarters and placed in an evidence locker byOfficer White. An evidence technician documented his receipt of the evidence bag from the locker. Several months later, Officer David Menter transported the sealed evidence bag to the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehension (BCA), where it was received by forensic scientist Rebecca Willis. According to Willis, the evidence bag was assigned a "unique identifier" and barcode so that it could be tracked throughout the agency. Willis testified that she weighed and tested the cocaine, and then repackaged it for return to the third precinct. Willis further testified that as is standard BCA procedure, her analysis was subjected to a "peer review process" and was confirmed. The district court then admitted Exhibit 2 into evidence.
After the state rested, appellant waived his right to testify and called no witnesses. A jury found appellant guilty of the charged offenses, and the district court imposed a 108-month sentence.
In December 2015, this court granted appellant's motion to stay his direct appeal to allow appellant to pursue postconviction relief. Appellant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief claiming that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel due to a conflict of interest. Specifically, he claimed that his trial counsel failed to investigate his story that police planted the cocaine in his car in retaliation for his refusal to act as a confidential informant. Appellant argued that his trial counsel's desire to conceal his inadequate investigation created a conflict of interest that induced trial counsel to advise him not to testify. The district court summarily denied appellant's postconviction petition, and in June 2016, this court granted appellant's motion to reinstate his appeal.
Appellant challenges the district court's summary denial of his petition for postconviction relief. This court reviews the "denial of a petition for postconviction relief, as well as a request for an evidentiary hearing, for an abuse of discretion." Riley v. State, 819 N.W.2d 162, 167 (Minn. 2012). In doing so, we review the postconviction court's underlying factual findings for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo. Williams v. State, 869 N.W.2d 316, 318 (Minn. 2015). A postconviction court may deny a petition for postconviction relief without holding an evidentiary hearing if the petition, files, and records in the proceeding conclusively establish that the petitioner is not entitled to relief. Minn. Stat. § 590.04, subd. 1 (2014).
A criminal defendant has the right to effective assistance of counsel; counsel is ineffective if (1) his or her performance is deficient and (2) the defendant was prejudiced by the deficient performance. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). In addition to assistance of counsel, a criminal defendant has a Sixth-Amendment "right to representation that is free from conflicts of interest." Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271, 101 S. Ct. 1097, 1103 (1981); State v. Patterson, 812 N.W.2d 106, 112 (Minn. 2012). "The burden of a defendant claiming ineffective assistance due to a conflict of interest depends on whether and to what extent the alleged conflict was brought to the [district] court's attention." Cooper v. State, 565 N.W.2d 27, 32 (Minn. App. 1997), review denied (Minn. Aug. 5, 1997). A defendant who did not object to the alleged conflict at trial "must demonstrate that defense counsel 'activelyrepresented conflicting interests' and this conflict 'adversely affected [the] lawyer's performance.'" Id. (quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348, 350, 100 S. Ct. 1708, 1718-19 (1980)). If a defendant establishes a conflict of interest, prejudice is "generally presumed." State v. Paige, 765 N.W.2d 134, 140 (Minn. App. 2009).
Appellant argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to investigate his version of the events. According to appellant, several unnamed officers from the fourth precinct initially searched his car and found nothing. Appellant also claimed that the named officers from the third precinct who testified at trial planted the cocaine in his car in retaliation for appellant's refusal to work as a confidential informant for the third precinct. Appellant contends that his trial counsel's failure to investigate appellant's claim created a conflict of interest because it prompted trial counsel to advise appellant not to testify at trial in order to protect himself from either an ineffectiveness claim, a professional-responsibility complaint, or both.
Because he did not object at trial, appellant must show an actual conflict of interest and an adverse effect on his trial counsel's performance. See Cooper, 565 N.W.2d at 32. A conflict of interest arises if "there is a significant risk that the representation of [a client] will be materially limited . . . by a personal interest of the lawyer." Minn. R. Prof. Conduct 1.7(a)(2). A theoretical or potential conflict is not sufficient to mandate reversal; instead, there must be "an actual conflict of interest . . . that affected counsel's performance - as opposed to a mere theoretical division of loyalties." Mickens v. Taylor, 535 U.S. 162, 171, 122 S. Ct. 1237, 1243 (2002) (emphasis omitted) (quotation omitted). "[U]ntil a defendant shows that hiscounsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." Cuyler, 446 U.S. at 350, 100 S. Ct. at 1719.
The alleged conflict in this case was appellant's trial counsel's inability to adequately represent appellant due...
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