State v. Holley

• Decision Date: 18 May 2016
• Docket Number: MMXCR08185982
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: State of Connecticut v. Reginald Holley

State of Connecticut v. Reginald Holley

No. MMXCR08185982

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Middlesex, Middletown, Geographic Area 9

May 18, 2016

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S SECOND AMENDED MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL SENTENCE

ELPEDIO N. VITALE, JUDGE.

By amended motion dated February 9, 2016, the defendant Reginald Holley, moves this court to correct his sentence of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after twelve years (ten years of which is mandatory) followed by five years of probation. The sentence was imposed by the court (Handy, J.) on February 11, 2011. The defendant's motion is made pursuant to " P.B. § 43-22, the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, Article First, § § 8 and 9 of the Connecticut Constitution, Miller v. Alabama [132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012)], Graham v Florida, [560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010)], State v. Riley, [315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015)], and Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, [317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015)]." In the motion the defendant asserts that his sentence was imposed in an illegal manner " because it was imposed without a full consideration of the mitigating factors related to the defendant's youth. [His] sentence is illegal because it was imposed based upon inaccurate information and because it is not proportionate to the defendant's culpability." As a result, the defendant requests that " this court vacate [his] illegal sentence, grant him a new sentencing hearing, and re-sentence [him], as law and justice require."

The defendant filed a memorandum of law in support of the motion. The State objects to the motion, and filed its memorandum in opposition to the motion on April 25, 2016. The matter came before the court and was argued on April 26, 2016. This court was provided with a transcript of the defendant's guilty pleas under the Alford doctrine^[1] occurring on February 15, 2011, as well his sentencing on those pleas occurring on May 24, 2011. The Honorable Susan B. Handy presided over both proceedings.

II.

Nature of the Proceedings

The defendant pleaded guilty under the Alford doctrine on February 15, 2011 to offenses which occurred in 2008. In docket number CR-10-190087, the defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree, in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-59(a)(1). The state alleged that on October 1, 2008, the defendant shot a man near a barbershop in Middletown. The gunshot severed the victim's femoral artery requiring several surgeries. In docket number CR09-186723, the defendant pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit assault in the second degree, in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-49 and 53a-60(a)(1). The state alleged that on October 28, 2008, the defendant and a co-conspirator together shot at two intended victims. Finally, in docket number CR08-185892, the defendant pleaded guilty to home invasion, in violation of C.G.S § 53a-100aa, and assault in the first degree, in violation of C.G.S. § 53a-59(a)(5). The state alleged that on December 6, 2008, the defendant unlawfully entered a residence with two occupants inside. While inside the residence, the defendant was armed with a firearm which he pointed at a former girlfriend. He later discharged the firearm at a second person, causing that person to sustain multiple gunshot wounds. It is undisputed that the defendant's date of birth is April 29, 1991. Thus, at the time of the commission of the aforementioned crimes, the defendant was seventeen years old.

It is also undisputed that the total effective sentence imposed was the result of a plea agreement negotiated by Judge Handy and the defendant. The State sought a lengthier period of incarceration.^[2]

At the time of his pleas of guilty, the defendant was almost twenty years old. Sentencing occurred on May 24, 2011, approximately one month after his twentieth birthday. The sentencing transcript reveals that at the time of sentencing, Judge Handy had available to her a presentence investigation.^[3] Judge Handy commented during her sentencing remarks that " I thought the state's offer was too high. I came off it by eight years. That's significant. I want you to understand why I did that. I did that because you are twenty years old. You're not a throw away. I don't want us to abandon you." ^[4] The transcript of the sentencing proceeding and the presentence investigation report together make it clear that the sentencing court was fully aware of the defendant's relative youth and the circumstances of his life. Implicit in a careful reading of the sentencing transcript is the fact that Judge Handy presided over plea negotiations regarding the defendant over a period of time, during which mitigating factors, including youth, were discussed.^[5]

To succinctly address the defendant's arguments, the court is cognizant of the fact that the defendant essentially relies on three United State Supreme Court decisions and two Connecticut Supreme Court decisions in support of his claim that his sentencing was illegally imposed. The defendant relies, first, on the United States Supreme Court decisions in Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 125 S.Ct. 1183, 161 L.Ed.2d 1 (2005) (death penalty cannot be imposed on those who committed their crimes as juveniles), Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 130 S.Ct. 2011, 176 L.Ed.2d 825 (2010) (juveniles cannot be sentenced to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for non-homicide offenses under a nondiscretionary sentencing scheme), and Miller v. Alabama, 132 S.Ct. 2455, 183 L.Ed.2d 407 (2012) (juveniles convicted of homicide offenses cannot be sentenced to mandatory sentences of life without the possibility of parole). The defendant combines the principles of the latter cases with the Connecticut Supreme Court decisions of State v. Riley, 315 Conn. 637, 110 A.3d 1205 (2015) (one-hundred-year sentence without the possibility of parole for sixty years requires an individualized sentencing proceeding), petition for cert. filed, Docket No. 14-1472, (U.S. June 8, 2015) and Casiano v. Commissioner of Correction, 317 Conn. 52, 115 A.3d 1031 (2015) (fifty-year sentence constitutes an " effective" life sentence), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Semple v. Casiano, Docket No. 15-238 (U.S. August 20, 2015) to conclude that the sentence in the present case was imposed illegally.

The defendant argues, in particular, that the combination of Roper, Graham, Miller, and Riley render his sentence illegal because, inter alia, the court was obligated to conduct an individualized sentencing hearing as " demanded by the eighth amendment . . . and required by the Connecticut constitution" because the defendant was a juvenile at the time of his commission of the crimes at issue. The defendant asserts that the sentencing court had " discretion to depart further downward from the court indicated sentence, " or could have withdrawn the recommendation completely, " exposing the defendant to the possibility of life imprisonment" if he went to trial. Finally, the defendant argues that the sentencing court " was unaware that the defendant was actually a juvenile" and thus " never had the opportunity to weigh the appropriate factors" to determine if the sentence was appropriate.

Consequently, the defendant contends that Miller, Graham, and Riley control in this case because the court could have rejected the agreement, and if the defendant thereafter went to trial he would have been exposed to the possibility of a life sentence if were to have been convicted on all original charges.

The defendant also appears to argue that " cruel and unusual punishment" under the eighth amendment is defined as the lack of an individualized sentencing hearing at which the court specifically and demonstrably considers " how children are constitutionally different from adults, " including the Roper court's observation that [t]he susceptibility of juveniles to immature and irresponsible behavior means 'their irresponsible conduct is not as morally reprehensible as that of an adult.' . . . The reality that juveniles still struggle to define their identity means it is less supportable to conclude that even a heinous crime committed by a juvenile is evidence of irretrievably depraved character. From a moral standpoint it would be misguided to equate the failings of a minor with those of an adult, for a greater possibility exists that a minor's character deficiencies will be reformed. Indeed, '[t]he relevance of youth as a mitigating factor derives from the fact that the signature qualities of youth are transient; as individuals mature, the impetuousness and recklessness that may dominate in younger years can subside.' Roper, supra at 570.

The state opposes the motion on multiple grounds. The state argues that the defendant's sentence was not illegal, nor was it imposed illegally, and therefore this court is without jurisdiction to consider the motion. The sentence was not illegal, the state contends, because the defendant's sentence of twenty years of incarceration, execution suspended after twelve years of incarceration is not the functional equivalent of a life sentence. The state notes that the sentence imposed was the product of an agreed-upon recommendation that did not include a right to argue for a lesser sentence; there is no claim that the sentence exceeded the applicable statutory limits; nor was the sentence ambiguous, inherently contradictory, or in violation of the defendant's right against double jeopardy. The defendant was addressed personally at sentencing, he had an opportunity to speak in mitigation of punishment, and there is no claim that the state breached the plea agreement. In short, the requirements of a legal sentence were met in ...