State v. Holliday

Decision Date09 November 1998
Docket NumberNo. 2896.,2896.
PartiesThe STATE, Respondent, v. Aaron HOLLIDAY, Appellant.
CourtSouth Carolina Court of Appeals

Assistant Appellate Defender M. Anne Pearce, of Office of Appellate Defense, of Columbia, for appellant.

Attorney General Charles Molony Condon, Deputy Attorney General John W. McIntosh, Assistant Deputy Attorney General Salley W. Elliott, and Senior Assistant Attorney General Norman Mark Rapoport, of Office of the Attorney General, all of Columbia; and Solicitor Joseph J. Watson, of Greenville, for respondent.

CONNOR, Judge:

A jury convicted Aaron Holliday of assault with intent to kill, resisting arrest, illegally carrying a pistol, failure to stop when signaled by law enforcement, and carjacking. On appeal, Holliday argues the State improperly impeached him by commenting on his post-arrest silence. He also alleges the trial court erred in refusing his jury instruction of defense of others. We reverse and remand for a new trial.

FACTS

Aaron and his brother Jeremy were both convicted for their actions in the early morning hours of December 31, 1995. The two brothers and the victim, Jerome Vereen, gave conflicting accounts of the night in question. According to Vereen, he left work around midnight and then went home. Vereen tried to "settle down," but could not due to pain in his side. He then went to the Winn—Dixie for some pain medication. He parked his car in the fire lane, left the keys in the car, and went inside. Vereen said he was sure he did not leave his lights on. When Vereen exited the store, he saw Jeremy sitting on the driver's side of his car. Also, a truck had pulled up beside his car. He opened the driver's side door of his car, and the truck sped off. He asked Jeremy what he was doing in his car. Jeremy told Vereen he was merely trying to turn Vereen's lights off. Vereen, convinced Jeremy was actually attempting to steal the car, told Jeremy to slide over. He claimed he intended to take Jeremy to the police station.

Aaron drove up behind Vereen in the truck and began firing at Vereen's car. A bullet pierced the rear window of the car. Vereen stopped and ran and hid on the side of the road. He testified Aaron and Jeremy continued to drive up and down the road looking for him. Vereen then ran to a friend's house and called the police. Deputies John Broecker and John Boyd with the Greenville County Sheriffs Department responded to the call. After hearing Vereen's story, both deputies were initially skeptical.

Shortly thereafter, Deputy Broecker returned to his routine patrol. He saw Aaron and Jeremy in a car matching the description Vereen had given. At that point, Deputy Boyd responded to the radio dispatch and joined Deputy Broecker. The deputies arrested Aaron and Jeremy after a chase and a struggle.

According to the brothers, they rode to the Winn—Dixie in Aaron's truck to buy something to eat and drink. Aaron waited in the truck for Jeremy to go into the store. Jeremy testified he noticed the lights on in Vereen's car, which was parked in the store's fire lane. He reached into the window of the car to turn off the lights. At that point, Vereen came out of the store and demanded to know what Jeremy was doing. Jeremy stated he told Vereen he was only trying to turn the lights off. Vereen told Jeremy he did not believe him and pulled a gun on Jeremy. He then forced Jeremy into the car and drove away. During the drive, Vereen told Jeremy he was taking him to the police station, but he was going to take him somewhere else first. Jeremy also claimed Vereen used racial slurs such as "cracker" and "white trash."

Aaron testified he saw his brother talking to Vereen and then get into the car. He knew something was amiss because his brother would not leave the store without telling him. Aaron became worried about his brother's safety and began to follow the car, flashing his lights and honking the horn. At that point, Vereen began firing a gun at his truck. Aaron therefore reached for his gun and fired two shots, attempting to hit the tires. One bullet entered the rear window of Vereen's car. Vereen stopped the car and fled the scene on foot while continuing to fire his gun. Jeremy testified he crawled to the driver's side of the car and drove home. Aaron claimed he had been lying down on his seat to avoid getting shot. Once he sat up, his brother was gone. Aaron then met Jeremy at home.

At that point, Jeremy wanted to call the police. Aaron, concerned the police would not believe them, decided it would be best to abandon the car somewhere. Aaron and Jeremy were on their way to a parking lot to abandon the car when the police spotted them. The brothers led the police on a chase before wrecking the car. Jeremy attempted to escape, but was apprehended by Deputy Boyd. Aaron testified he tried to get out of the car and run when Deputy Broecker repeatedly hit him. After a struggle, the officers arrested the brothers and took them to the Greenville County Detention Center.

The morning following their arrest, Aaron and Jeremy appeared before a magistrate for a bond hearing. The magistrate read them their Miranda1 rights. Then, the magistrate asked both Aaron and Jeremy whether they had anything to say. Jeremy stated he was sorry to Deputy Broecker. Deputy Broecker asked Jeremy if he wanted to tell him what happened. Jeremy said he was trying to steal the car, but things got out of hand. Aaron said nothing.

DISCUSSION

Aaron argues the trial court erred in allowing the solicitor to use his post-arrest silence to impeach his testimony at trial.

During an in camera Jackson v. Denno2 hearing, the trial court held Aaron's silence was not admissible at trial. Thereafter, Aaron's counsel asked the court to instruct Deputy Broecker not to refer to Aaron's decision to remain silent. The judge then asked the solicitor, "[t]he fact that the other defendant didn't give a statement you are not going to bring that out?" The solicitor responded, "No, sir."

At trial, the solicitor's cross-examination of Aaron included the following colloquy:

Q. Isn't it true you never told law enforcement this version of your story?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Your Honor, I am going to object to that.
THE COURT: Overruled. Proceed, ma'am.
Q. Thank you, Your Honor. Isn't it true you never told law enforcement this version of the story?
A. I never told them any version, they never gave me a chance.
Q. Isn't it true you never told anyone that has anything to do with your charges and the prosecutorial process until right now?
A. No, ma'am. I tried to talk to Mr. Broecker and I tried to and I have told Mr. Clay Allen, I have told my dad and I have told Ms. Cagle, the Magistrate.
Q. Did you tell my office, me, the person in charge of your case?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL:] Your Honor, if it please the Court, I renew my objection to this line of questioning.
THE COURT: I understand your objections, noted for the record....
Q. Did you ever tell anyone in the prosecution, that would be my side, this story? I understand you have to discuss with your attorney— A. No, I didn't.
Q. But today is the first time we are hearing this story?
A. Well, this story—I'm not sure, is it? ... As far as I know, yes, ma'am.
Q. You never told anyone?
A. No ma'am.

As a threshold matter, the State argues Aaron failed to preserve this issue for appeal because he failed to make a specific objection, and he failed to move for a mistrial or ask for additional relief.

In order to preserve an error for appellate review, a defendant must make a contemporaneous objection on a specific ground. State v. Hoffman, 312 S.C. 386, 440 S.E.2d 869 (1994); State v. Crowley, 226 S.C. 472, 85 S.E.2d 714 (1955). In terms of the specific objection, South Carolina Rule of Evidence 103 provides in pertinent part:

(a) Effect of Erroneous Ruling. Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected, and
(1) Objection. In case the ruling is one admitting evidence, a timely objection or motion to strike appears of record, stating the specific ground of objection, if the specific ground was not apparent from the context[.]

Rule 103(a)(1), SCRE. "The objection should be sufficiently specific to bring into focus the precise nature of the alleged error so that it can be reasonably understood by the trial judge." McKissick v. J.F. Cleckley & Co., 325 S.C. 327, 344, 479 S.E.2d 67, 75 (Ct.App.1996).

Here, the trial court and the attorneys had previously discussed the impropriety of Deputy Broecker commenting on Aaron's silence. Because of this discussion, the grounds for Aaron's attorney's objection would have been apparent to the trial court. The court even stated it understood Aaron's objections. Moreover, it is clear from earlier portions of the record that the trial court understood the objection. For example, during the solicitor's direct-examination of Deputy Broecker, Aaron's attorney renewed his objection when Deputy Broecker testified the magistrate had given the Holliday brothers their Miranda warnings. At that point, the trial court stated the objection was noted for the record. Because the trial court was aware of the grounds for the objection, Aaron's attorney was not required to reiterate his previous argument. See Dunn v. Charleston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 311 S.C. 43, 46, 426 S.E.2d 756, 758 (1993)

(It is not "incumbent upon defense counsel to harass the judge by parading the issue before him again, by asking for a mistrial.").

Additionally, Aaron was not required to move for a mistrial or a new trial in order to preserve this issue for our review. See State v. Blyther, 287 S.C. 31, 336 S.E.2d 151 (Ct.App.1985)

(A motion for a new trial is not needed for a defendant to preserve an error where the objection that prompted the error was ruled on by the trial court.); City of Columbia v. Myers, 278...

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