State v. Holloway

• Decision Date: 07 March 2012
• Docket Number: No. PD–0324–11.,PD–0324–11.
• Parties: The STATE of Texas v. Danny Lee HOLLOWAY, II, Appellee.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

360 S.W.3d 480

The STATE of Texas

v.Danny Lee HOLLOWAY, II, Appellee.

No. PD–0324–11.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

March 7, 2012.

John W. Stickels, Arlington, for Appellant.

Gary D. Young, County & District Attorney, Paris; Jeffrey W. Shell, Attorney Pro Tem, Rockwall; Lisa C. McMinn, State's Attorney, Austin, for State.

PRICE, J., delivered the opinion of the Court in which KELLER, P.J., and WOMACK, JOHNSON, KEASLER, HERVEY, COCHRAN, and ALCALA, JJ., joined.

A jury found the appellee guilty of manslaughter,¹ made an affirmative finding that he used a deadly weapon,² and assessed his punishment at twenty years in prison. The Texarkana Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction, and we refused the appellee's petition for discretionary review. Four years later, the appellee filed a motion for DNA testing of presumptive blood on the knife that was admitted at trial as the murder weapon. The convicting court granted his motion. When the subsequent DNA testing revealed that the biological material on the knife did not belong to the victim, the convicting court purported to grant the appellee a new trial. The State appealed, and the Sixth Court of Appeals reversed, holding that (1) the convicting court did not have jurisdiction under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure to grant the appellee a new trial, and (2) the absence of the victim's DNA on the knife, by itself, could not support the convicting court's finding, under Article 64.04,³ that the jury would not have convicted the appellee had the DNA evidence been available at trial.⁴ We will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL POSTURE

The appellee was convicted of manslaughter after multiple witnesses identified him as “wildly” wielding and “swinging” a knife during a fight that erupted outside a bar in Paris.⁵ The victim, Ashley Lee, died of a stab wound inflicted by a single-edged implement such as the knife that police found afterwards in the appellee's truck. The witness testimony at trial conflicted regarding whether the appellee possessed such a knife during the melee. ⁶ In a video-taped interview with a homicide detective following his arrest, the appellee denied that the knife found in his truck belonged to him and speculated that it had been planted in his car. The jury apparently chose to disbelieve him, however, and convicted him of manslaughter. His conviction was upheld on direct appeal.⁷

Four years after the court of appeals's decision, the appellee filed a motion for DNA testing of the knife found in his truck. At the time of trial, a presumptive test for blood had been conducted on the knife that yielded positive results, but no DNA testing was done. The convicting court granted the appellee's motion for testing and, following the receipt of the DNA results, held a hearing on February 25, 2010, pursuant to Article 64.04 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.⁸ The convicting court found that “there [was] a reasonable probability that [the appellee] would not have been convicted if the exculpatory DNA results had been available for trial” and granted him a new trial.⁹ The State appealed, challenging both the order granting DNA testing in the first place and the order granting a new trial.¹⁰

The Sixth Court of Appeals did not reach the merits of the State's challenge to the order granting DNA testing, holding that the State did not timely file a notice of appeal to challenge that order.¹¹ The court of appeals went on to hold, however, that the convicting court erred in granting the appellee a new trial.¹² The court of appeals reasoned that, according to Rule 21.8(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure, ¹³ the convicting court's jurisdiction to grant a new trial ended seventy-five days after it pronounced the appellee's sentence, and Chapter 64 does not independently provide any basis for granting a new trial.¹⁴ Lastly, applying a de novo standard of appellate review, the court of appeals held that the DNA test results were insufficient, when considered in the context of the other evidence presented at trial, to support the convicting court's finding of a reasonable probability that the appellee “would not have been convicted if the DNA evidence had been available during trial.” ¹⁵

We granted the appellee's petition for discretionary review to examine his contentions that the court of appeals erred to hold (1) that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction under Chapter 64 to grant the appellee a new trial, and (2) that the record did not support the convicting court's Article 64.04 favorable finding. We will affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Chapter 64: A Brief Overview

Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure outlines the procedure for a “convicted person” to make a motion in the original convicting court for DNA testing of biological evidence that was not previously tested or, due to new testing techniques, warrants re-testing by a state or other accredited laboratory.¹⁶ The evidence must have been in the State's possession at the time of trial and must relate to the conviction the movant seeks to challenge.¹⁷ To obtain testing, the movant has the burden of establishing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he “would not have been convicted if exculpatory results had been obtained through DNA testing,” and that he is not requesting the testing in order “to unreasonably delay the execution of sentence or administration of justice.” ¹⁸ If the movant satisfies this burden of proof, the convicting court must additionally find that the evidence “still exists and is in a condition making DNA testing possible; [that it] has been subjected to a chain of custody sufficient to establish that it has not been substituted, tampered with, replaced, or altered in any material respect; and [that] identity was or is an issue in the case [,]” in order to grant the motion and order testing.¹⁹ That the movant pled guilty or admitted guilt in any other manner leading up to his conviction does not preclude him from obtaining testing under Chapter 64.²⁰

If the convicting court grants a motion for DNA testing, it is required to hold a hearing following the receipt of the test results.²¹ At this hearing, the convicting court must make a finding as to “whether, had the results been available during the trial of the offense, it is reasonably probable that the person would not have been convicted[,]” assuming that the jury (or the judge in a plea or trial to the court) had known of the exculpatory evidence at the time of its verdict.²² Chapter 64 is notably silent, however, with respect to what remedial action, if any, the convicting court may take on the basis of its finding under Article 64.04. Either party may appeal an order entered pursuant to Chapter 64.²³

B. Jurisdiction

1. Jurisdiction/Power/Authority

In his first ground for review, the appellee contends that the court of appeals erred in holding that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction to grant him a new trial under Chapter 64 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. The convicting court, the appellee argues, has both jurisdiction, as the convicting court under Chapter 64, and the “inherent power,” by virtue of that jurisdiction, to correct its own rulings.²⁴ The State replies that the court of appeals correctly concluded that the convicting court lacked jurisdiction (whether “general,” “special,” or “limited”) to grant the appellee a new trial under Chapter 64,²⁵ and that further, the convicting court did not have any “authority,” implicit, inherent, or otherwise, to grant that specific relief.²⁶

The court of appeals disposed of appellee's ground for review as a question of jurisdiction, but along the way it referred to a court's “power to act” under that grant of jurisdiction, and a court's “authority” arising from statutory law.²⁷ We have recognized that these various terms are not co-extensive or interchangeable.²⁸ “Jurisdiction” is typically used to refer to “the power of a court to hear a controversy and make decisions that are legally binding on the parties involved,” also commonly referred to as “subject-matter jurisdiction.” ²⁹ Jurisdiction, then, is vested in the actual judicial body, the court.³⁰ “Authority,” on the other hand, may be used to refer to the power of an individual—the judge who presides over the court—to act under that grant of jurisdiction. ³¹ A lack of authority, therefore, is not always co-extensive with a lack of jurisdiction; a judge's lack of authority to act in a particular manner will not necessarily call into doubt the court's jurisdiction over the particular case. A trial court must derive its jurisdiction from either the Texas Constitution or our state legislative enactments.³² After a trial court has lost plenary jurisdiction, it may nonetheless re-acquire “limited” jurisdiction to perform specific functions as authorized by statute or as instructed on remand by a higher court.³³

For reasons expressed below, we conclude, as did the court of appeals, that the convicting court in the instant case lacked jurisdiction to grant a new trial either under: (1) the regulatory scheme that governs motions for new trial generally; (2) independently, under the provisions of Chapter 64 itself; or (3) somehow “implicitly,” as a necessary corollary to the renewed, but limited, jurisdiction that Chapter 64 does confer.

2. Motion for New Trial

Rule 21 of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure provides the guidelines for filing a motion for new trial in a criminal case. Under Rule 21.4(a), a defendant may file a motion for new trial within thirty days from the day the judge pronounces the sentence in open court.³⁴ Rule 21.8(a) allocates seventy-five days following the imposition of the sentence in open court for the trial court to rule on the motion; if the motion is not timely ruled on within that period, the authority to grant the motion expires, and the motion is deemed...